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This thesis exploits a unique micro dataset that uses a natural field experiment to 
identify indirect effects of formal savings access on de facto ineligibles residing in the 
same community. Despite widespread interest in microfinance as a poverty-reduction 
tool, the indirect effects on the very poor of expanding formal financial services 
remain largely unexplored. This study examines evidence from a large field 
experiment which helps fill this gap. It also contributes to an important emerging 
literature on the indirect impacts of policy interventions in developing countries, often 
(incompletely) evaluated solely on the basis of how they impact participants and 
beneficiaries. In developing regions, households vulnerable to extreme poverty often 
benefit from long-standing local safety nets based on cash gifts and other transfers 
from relatives and friends, which help them smooth consumption across food-deficits 
and household shocks. To date, little is known about how these pre-existing practices 
  
are affected as community members begin adopting newly available formal financial 
services, and there remains much unexplored in the interaction of formal financial 
markets with informal safety nets. This paper addresses that gap by examining how 
formal savings expansion affects inter-household wealth transfers, with a particular 
emphasis on receipts by the most vulnerable. Using a rich panel dataset from Central 
Malawi that includes over 2,000 households, I find that experimentally boosting local 
savings uptake in rural areas leads to a strong positive effect on assistance receipts by 
non service-users during peak periods of hunger. The difference is strongest among 
the most vulnerable households. That is, the entrance of formal savings appears to 
complement local informal support systems for the highly vulnerable through an 
indirect mechanism, channeling greater wealth to such households during periods of 
food-deficits. The positive impacts of formal savings expansion on non service-users 
suggests that formal savings may have substantially greater benefits than would be 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Interest in non-credit microfinance services has grown sharply in recent years 
among development policy-makers and practitioners, as well as among researchers. There 
is great enthusiasm, for example, over financial instruments such as crop-insurance for 
poor farmers. Several large aid organizations have also made it their mission to expand 
access to formal savings across the developing world.
1
 In the earlier excitement over 
micro-credit, the potential benefits of savings and insurance services for the poor were 
given comparatively little attention. In recent years, however, poverty and development 
policy has increasingly broadened its focus to include these additional financial 
technologies in efforts to expand access to capital markets. Yet, even as projects of 
financial deepening are pushed forward, there remain crucial gaps in our understanding 
of the full effects. In particular, there is scant reliable evidence on what the encounter of 
formal finance with pre-existing informal institutions will yield.  
Households across the developing world face frequent, often severe, adverse 
income and consumption shocks, particularly in rural settings. Given that average 
consumption levels are already low, this can place individuals at risk of dangerously low 
welfare outcomes. Savings and insurance vehicles can help households smooth 
consumption across periods of high volatility and better avoid sharp drops in welfare. 
Over the last two decades it has become abundantly clear such vehicles need not derive 
from modern economic institutions. On the contrary, communities excluded from formal 
                                               
1 The Gates Foundation, for example, has explicitly stated it is one of their primary objectives for its 





financial markets typically have vibrant local safety-net systems and informal financial 
tools to help smooth consumption and prevent severely low outcomes during hard times.  
It is unclear a priori how these pre-existing systems will be affected by the 
introduction of market-based instruments, and whether certain populations will be 
affected differently than others by the changes that ensue. Local practices key to the 
welfare of some households may change. This amplifies the uncertainty over the impacts 
that financial deepening is likely to have. Even if service-users themselves are positively 
impacted by the new formal financial technologies they adopt (a hypothesis which itself 
has been challenged), introducing new financial service options could still lead to mixed 
results overall. For example, use of new financial services may benefit the comparatively 
wealthy in a village, while very poor non-users may lose access to cash-resources for 
consumption-support, causing those hit with a shock to pull children from school, forego 
medical treatment, or reduce food-intake. On the other hand, use of formal services may 
enhance a household‟s management and accumulation of wealth, which might be shared 
with any dependent households.  
It is in this context that the expansion of formal savings services, promoted by 
many in recent years as a major piece of development agendas, must be considered. 
Large-scale introduction of formal savings in rural areas of developing countries is likely 
to interact with indigenous institutions which have already evolved to fulfill important 
economic roles. The interaction could result in unintended consequences for non-users, 
which may be either negative or positive, and there remains scant evidence to serve as a 
guide. To date, what little work has been done on micro-savings quite naturally tends to 




household. This handful of studies concentrate on understanding the direct outcomes on 
users of things like commitment devices and new wealth management tools, and the 
mechanisms driving these outcomes.
2
 Few studies have considered the broader economic 
and institutional contexts in which these new product take-up decisions are being made, 
and none seem to have explicitly considered spillover effects on the non-using 
population. 
 
1.1. Financial Deepening & Informal Risk-Coping Institutions 
Townsend (1995) makes an intriguing observation about risk-bearing capacities 
among the villages he studies in northern Thailand. The village most integrated into 
markets outside the village had a marked paucity of internal informal credit and insurance 
mechanisms, and more pronounced negative shocks to consumption for households 
suffering a severe illness. This suggests that deeper penetration of formal financial 
markets into villages could in fact weaken local risk-bearing systems and social safety 
nets, a hypothesis echoed by Besley (1995) and Morduch (1999).  
Despite interest in both existing informal insurance arrangements for the poor in 
villages, as well as the ameliorative potential of financial markets in consumption-
smoothing, there are few serious studies on the interaction of the two. Perhaps this is due 
to a lack of datasets suitable for examining the relationship of formal and informal 
institutions. Two exceptions are Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2000), and Foster and 
Rosenzweig (2000). The former, a purely theoretical contribution, models the 
introduction of an enhanced savings technology in the presence of informal mutual 
                                               




insurance contracts. The latter paper models the simultaneous introduction of formal 
savings and formal credit in a similar setting, and includes a short empirical analysis, but 
where identification of effects relies on distance from banks as an instrument. Both 
studies conclude that the introduction of formal services tend to weaken informal 
insurance based on inter-household wealth flows. Importantly, both follow the dominant 
perspective in the literature on informal insurance, assuming transfers are bidirectional, 
based on the promise of future reciprocation and the notion of mutual insurance – an 
assumption which may not always be valid. 
The present study advances this nascent line of research by closely examining 
impacts of formal services on local safety nets through a cleaner and more direct 
empirical strategy – the importance of which is underscored by the fact that the results 
run counter to effects suggested by less well-identified observations. Precision in 
identifying impacts is improved by this study in at least two major ways. First, the 
analysis here empirically disentangles the effects of formal savings from that of credit. 
This is not only important for a more complete and accurate academic understanding of 
the interaction of formal and informal systems. The reality that expanded formal savings 
access may precede access to formal credit by extended periods highlights the policy 
relevance of distinguishing the effects of formal savings from formal credit, as the effects 
of the former may materialize well before access to the latter is introduced.  
Second, identification of causal effects in the present study rests on a more solid 
foundation than the handful of empirical observations collected thus far. An information 
intervention, randomized at the community level, raised local formal savings rates in the 




allows analysis of impacts to avoid many of the endogeneity concerns that hinder the 
sparse collection of current evidence on the effects of formal capital markets on informal 
insurance.  
The present study advances this literature along a few other dimensions which are 
at least as important, and which have not yet been addressed in the research on this area. 
This is the only empirical analysis I am aware of which considers heterogeneous impacts 
of financial deepening on household transfers. By examining effects across households of 
varying levels of vulnerability to low welfare states, the analyses here shed important 
light on the different impacts of financial deepening across subpopulations of key policy 
relevance. In particular, by focusing on how formal savings expansion affects safety nets 
and outcomes of the poorest of the poor – those typically least in a position to start using 
formal services – the dissertation centers analysis of the effects of formal capital markets 
on one of the most crucial populations for anti-poverty policy. 
In addition, this is the only study I know of that explicitly examines the effects of 
financial deepening on non-eligibles. By identifying those unable to take advantage of 
new financial products, the empirical strategy pursued here enables analysis of indirect 
effects. While identifying an indirect channel of impacts is important from a theoretical 
perspective, its policy relevance derives from the practical reality of wealth-constrained 
access to formal services. As the geographical reach of formal capital markets expands, 
access is likely to grow unevenly at first, with only the wealthier able to take advantage 
during the early phases of transition towards modern financial markets. As these early 




better understand what is likely to happen to those excluded from financial access during 
these initial stages.  
 
1.2. The Importance of Indirect Effects in Development Projects 
This study also contributes to an important emerging literature on the local 
indirect effects of policy interventions in developing countries. A seminal study in this 
new thread of the project evaluation literature is that by Angelucci and DeGiorgi (2009), 
who find strong impacts from the Mexican welfare program, Progresa, on households that 
are not eligible to participate in the program. They show that the presence of informal 
insurance networks and inter-household transfers lead to positive spillover effects onto 
households that are not direct beneficiaries of the program.  
This underscores the importance of accounting for the fact that many village 
settings are characterized by a greater degree of inter-household interactions than in other 
scenarios, making it easier for program effects to extend beyond participating 
households. However, the program evaluation literature is generally focused only on how 
participants and beneficiaries are themselves affected by a particular program. Depending 
on whether indirect effects are present, and how they impact the non-treated, this can lead 
to important over-assessment or under-assessment of program effects, and incomplete or 
inaccurate impact estimates. The results of the present study demonstrate the clear 
importance of broader local effects of an additional type of intervention which has 




1.3. Overview of Findings  
Contrary to suggestions which might be inferred from the limited existing 
evidence, introduction of formal savings technologies in rural Malawi has a significant 
positive effect on inter-household wealth flows. In particular, in communities where 
formal savings rates were experimentally boosted by the information intervention, the 
proportion of households receiving cash-gifts during the high-stress hungry season is 
nearly 50% higher (a difference of about 10 percentage points, from 21% to 31%). When 
restricting to the most vulnerable households, for whom the impact is clearly identifiable 
as indirect, the difference in proportion of those receiving cash gifts grows to 180% (a 
difference of about 18 percentage points, from 10% to 28%). Instrumental variables 
estimates indicate that, for every one percentage-point increase in the proportion of 
households in a community using formal savings, the worst-off households experience a 
three percentage-point increase in the probability of receiving a cash gift. 
This substantial cross-sectional difference in cash-gift receipts by the most 
vulnerable is accompanied by a commensurate two-year increase in informal loan 
receipts. Villages assigned to the formal savings encouragement exhibit increases in the 
proportion of highly vulnerable households receiving loans from friends and relatives 
ranging from 14.4 to 22.4 percentage points, relative to changes in the non-encouraged 
areas. This is similar in scale to the 18 percentage-point difference observed for cash gift 
receipts. 
Moreover, increased assistance-receipts by the worst-off are associated with 
significant welfare impacts. Living in communities that received the savings 




among the highly vulnerable. The worst-off households in treated villages are more likely 
to exit the worst food-security category and enter one of the three less severe categories, 
the increase in probability ranging from 11.8 to 16.3 percentage points. They also 
experience a 1.3 to 1.4 reduction in a continuous food-insecurity score, representing a 10-
12% improvement over baseline values for this food-security indicator. In addition, the 
worst-off households living in savings-encouraged communities experienced a relative 
drop in the likelihood of  reporting that any members of the household were recently 
unwell, the effect ranging from 12 to 17.4 percentage points. 
These results on the experience of rural households in Central Malawi have 
important policy implications. First, as they derive from a well-identified study of 
the impacts of formal savings on intra-village transfer practices, they provide 
compelling evidence not only that formal savings affects inter-household transfers, 
but that the effects can be quite large. Second, they demonstrate the clear presence of 
an indirect effect from the entrance of formal savings on inter-household transfer 
receipts and welfare outcomes, among households that are not formal-savers. Third, 
they show that the worst-off households in a community can be particularly sensitive 
to changes stemming from the expansion of formal savings. Finally, in contrast to the 
handful of observed associations between more developed financial markets and 
weakened informal safety nets which have peppered the literature thus far, these 
results show formal savings can in fact have a positive impact on inter-household 
transfers. It would be premature to infer a universal positive indirect effect on 
transfer receipts among the worst-off, since long-term effects may differ from those 




norms across different settings may affect outcomes.  Nevertheless, the substantial 
positive impacts documented through this dissertation demonstrate a clear and 
significant potential for an ameliorative role to be played by formal savings, even on 
the non-users of such services.  
These results also highlight the failure to account for key factors in how 
institutional change from the introduction of financial markets is often conceptually 
framed. In conjunction with a simple framework which allows for unidirectional 
transfers, the results presented here suggest the commonly accepted theoretical 
underpinnings of transfer-based insurance practices are too narrow. That higher local 
savings rates causes an influx of assistance-receipts by non-saving households is not easy 
to reconcile with the view that transfers are predicated simply on self-insurance motives. 
Indeed, the observed increase in transfers runs counter to key implications from the 
sparse existing theoretical work on this question.  
In addition, contrary to how they are often treated in the literature, the findings 
suggest that inter-household transfers are not all equal. The high sensitivity of transfer 
receipts by the worst-off to local savings adoption indicates an important heterogeneity. 
That the experience of rural households in Central Malawi is at odds with the little 
existing research on the interaction of formal and informal institutions demonstrates just 
how little we still know about the transition process. There is still much to be learned 
about informal insurance and consumption support practices and market-based 
mechanisms, and how these very different types of institutions are likely to interact. The 
present study helps address this gap, at a time when institutions of modern finance are 




1.4. Outline of the Dissertation  
The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 explores in greater depth the 
literatures to which this dissertation contributes, and the ways in which this study helps 
push these literatures forward. Chapter 3 describes the empirical setting, the data-
collection process, and important characteristics of the dataset and its households. It also 
defines key variables used in the following analyses.  
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 comprise the key analytical chapters. Chapter 4 describes the 
identification strategy on which this study turns, an information intervention designed to 
encourage formal services use, randomly assigned at the community-level. Analyses then 
show that the intervention increased formal savings use, while leaving formal credit use 
unchanged.  
Chapter 5 explores the central finding of the study, that increases in local formal 
savings rates raises inter-household cash gifts, particularly assistance receipts by the most 
vulnerable. It begins by developing a simple theoretical framework for analyzing the 
effects of formal savings services penetration in different contexts. In an attempt to 
broaden the theoretical approach that has dominated the literature on informal insurance 
institutions, a simple innovation allows for transfers which are unidirectional (“charitable 
gifts”) rather than bidirectional (“mutual insurance”), as is commonly assumed. The 
model illustrates how the entrance of superior savings technologies can lead to different 
effects when transfers are of one type or the other. Empirical analyses then explore the 
reduced form effects of the information intervention, before proceeding to an 




effects are clearly identified – the highly vulnerable.
3
 The analyses of this chapter are 
limited to cross-sectional data, as the information on cash-gifts was only gathered in the 
second and final wave of the survey. 
Chapter 6 moves on to a panel analysis of related types of transfers for which 
there is data in both years of the survey. These analyses show impacts on transfer receipts 
by the highly vulnerable on a scale similar to the response of cash gifts. The chapter then 
examines welfare impacts associated with these changes. Chapter 7 concludes and 





                                               
3 Note that the clear presence of an indirect effect means that the instrument cannot identify effects among 
formal savings-eligible households as coming from a direct or indirect effect. Any effects among savings-





Chapter 2. Development Projects, Risk, & Consumption in Villages: 
The Expanding Frontier Between Capital Markets and Pre-Modern 
Institutions 
 
This chapter explores the current status of scholarship in the main areas to which 
my research contributes, as well as explains how my research relates to recent 
developments and advances our understanding in these areas of enquiry. One literature 
this study helps advance is the scholarship on local informal methods used to protect 
against low consumption and its negative welfare consequences. Households across the 
developing world face frequent, and often severe, adverse income and consumption 
shocks, particularly in rural settings. The central focus of the dissertation – assistance 
receipts by the very poor from other households – constitutes one of the most crucial 
safety nets available in many village-settings, especially for those living on the margins 
and producing close to subsistence. In particular, I contribute to a thin strand within this 
literature which attempts to understand a relationship of ever-growing relevance as 
financial deepening proceeds apace across the developing world: the interaction of 
market-based institutions for wealth management and risk-coping with indigenous non-
market methods which fulfill similar functions. I focus on an issue that has received 
surprisingly little attention: the impact of formal capital markets on informal insurance 
institutions – and the empirical effects of formal savings in particular, which, to the best 
of my knowledge, is a unique contribution to this strand.  
My research also contributes to a growing number of studies highlighting indirect 
effects of policy interventions, and in particular the possibility of spillovers of 




serve as an important warning to researchers that accurately assessing the full impacts of 
interventions requires accounting for the possibility of local spillovers, which may be 
positive or negative. They also stand as an important reminder to policy-makers and 
practitioners to remain aware of second-order consequences of development programs. In 
the case of negative local externalities, true total benefits from a program might diminish 
substantially, possibly to the extent that net effects are in fact counter to policy 
objectives. In the case of positive spillovers, the full benefits of the intervention may be 
much larger than what would be measured by focusing solely on direct participants or 
beneficiaries.  
This has already been shown in the context of indirect treatment impacts on 
fellow pupils and neighboring schools in the case of deworming in Kenya (Michael and 
Kremer, 2004) and in the context of indirect benefits of welfare payments to rural 
households in Mexico on non-beneficiaries (Angelucci and DeGiorgi, 2009). The present 
study in Central Malawi demonstrates the importance of these considerations in the 
context of a different type of intervention – microfinance programs, and projects to 
expand access to formal financial services.  
A rich literature documents the central problem of risk in rural settings of 
developing countries. From Zimbabwe to India to China, several studies detail the 
exposure of village communities to substantial fluctuations in consumption levels due to 
periodic swings in income and the inherent uncertainty surrounding agricultural 
livelihoods. Especially among the poorest, who are already consuming at low-levels, 




with long-lasting or permanent effects – such as serious illness, lower education levels, 
physical stunting, and death.  
 There is also a broad literature on the various responses that, in the absence of 
formal markets, have indigenously arisen to meet the threats posed by uncertainty. Pre-
modern societies not fully integrated into modern market economies exhibit a variety of 
methods to protect individuals from falling into dangerously low consumption. Variously 
referred to as “hunger insurance”, local “social security”, “non-market institutions”, and 
“informal insurance arrangements”, these strategies for managing risk and tactics for 
coping with adverse outcomes generally fall into one of two categories: individual-based 
approaches that one may pursue in isolation, or interdependent approaches which rely on 
help from others.  
Despite the presence of indigenous non-market practices, however, many 
households remain exposed to sharp downward swings in consumption, often with very 
harmful consequences. A growing body of literature explores the ameliorative role that 
formal financial markets can offer in this context. Highlighting the many problems and 
limitations of informal safety nets, and the empirical evidence that risk is generally far 
from efficiently allocated in village settings despite the variety of informal coping 
methods, many researchers advocate the expansion of formal financial services to help 
the poor better address their acute vulnerability. 
However, despite widespread academic and policy interest in both informal 
insurance practices on the one hand, and the promise that formal services might offer the 
poor on the other, there appears to be surprisingly little research on how the two systems 




influence the overall risk-bearing capacity of rural communities is a question raised at 
least as early as Townsend (1995a, 1995b). It is thus perhaps surprising that there remains 
relatively little research on the interaction between formal financial institutions and 
informal indigenous institutions for inter-temporal wealth exchanges and risk-
management. In particular, little attention seems to have been given to the impact of 
financial deepening on informal safety nets.  
Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2000), and Foster and Rosenzweig (2000) represent 
two exceptions. The models, simulations, and theoretical implications of both provide 
important insights and lay a solid foundation for rigorous analysis of how formal 
financial services and informal insurance practices are likely to interact. In addition, the 
empirical observations of the Foster and Rosenzweig are provocative. Their identification 
strategy, however, similar to the more casual observations of Townsend (1995a, 1995b), 
is complicated by the fact that it fails to resolve important endogeneity concerns. In 
addition, both papers share the fundamental assumption that inter-household transfers are 
sustained by the promise of future reciprocation, an assumption, as I argue below, which 
may not be valid in important cases.  
My principal focus is a slightly different set of questions than that pursued in 
these two studies. I examine primarily the effects on safety nets of those who are 
excluded from market access in an asymmetric setting. The introduction of an 
asymmetric situation in the context of formal services expansion is, I believe, a novel 
contribution to this thin literature, and one which takes account of an important practical 
reality likely to obtain throughout most of the protracted process of financial deepening. 




represents a significant improvement over the only other empirical study I was able to 
find on the effects of formal services expansion on informal practices – that of FR. The 
present study also represents the only analysis I am aware of which clearly separates the 
effects of formal savings expansion from that of formal credit services.  
Finally, despite the central focus on a slightly different question, the present 
study‟s evidence on assistance-receipts both by those excluded from financial access, as 
well as by the broader community, does in fact address the work of LTW and FR in a 
more direct fashion. The experience of rural households in Central Malawi appears to be 
at odds with some of the key conclusions shared by LTW and FR. This suggests the need 
for theoretical innovation and models which better accommodate the expanded set of 
empirical data I bring to the literature. 
 
2.1. The Centrality of Risk in Developing Economies, and Common Responses 
This study helps advance a rich and important literature on methods in non-
modern economies for protecting individuals against poor outcomes in the face of 
frequent negative shocks. The ubiquitous presence of risk and uncertainty in production 
and consumption throughout the developing world, particularly in rural areas, is well-
known. Incomes of households in villages are not only typically low, but also subject to 
substantial variation. As agriculture plays such a central role in the incomes of village 
households, much of this risk stems from uncertainties in agro-climatic conditions such 
as storms, drought, or floods, as well as threats such as crop disease or pests, which can 
seriously harm each season‟s output. In addition, fluctuations of input and output prices, 




affect total output and net revenues, while volatility in the prices of any purchased 
consumption goods represent additional sources of upward and downward swings in 
annual or seasonal real incomes. Negative shocks may also derive from violence, political 
instability, or theft, all of which are more common in settings with low security 
infrastructure and weak state institutions, which characterize many developing 
economies. Consumption shocks may also occur, for example funeral expenses arising 
from unexpected deaths, or medical expenses from severe illness, drawing household 
resources away from typical goods and services such as food and schooling. 
Absent smoothing devices, significant fluctuations of income will translate to 
large variations in consumption by household members from one period to the next. In 
good years, this of course means higher than average consumption levels. However, in 
bad years, this may result in very low consumption and dire welfare outcomes, often with 
permanent effects – such as physical and mental stunting, chronic illness, or death. Rose 
(1999), for example, finds in rural India that lack of coping mechanisms to address 
negative income shocks from poor rainfall leads to choices that harm children, and higher 
infant mortality rates, particularly among the worst-off households. Foster (1995) shows 
that vulnerability to income swings can lead to physical stunting; Jacoby and Skoufias 
(1997) demonstrate the link between fluctuating incomes and reductions in school 
attendance; and Alderman et. al. (2006) show that vulnerability to low consumption from 
income shocks can lead to both reduced stature among children and lower human capital 
accumulation. These types of permanent impacts can also extend beyond those directly 
affected. Dercon and Hoddinott (2005), for example, find evidence in Zimbabwe and 




decreased stature and schooling which have employment and productivity effects which 
may persist for several generations.
4
 
 These and related studies generally show that the most severe negative 
consequences of shocks fall disproportionately on those households with the fewest 
assets, and often on children. This signals a clear positive role for insurance, which would 
help farm-households cover downward swings in income and protect them from 




 Nevertheless, in the face of such pervasive and acute exposure to uncertainties in 
periodic income, a broad variety of non-market methods for minimizing downward 
swings in consumption have been documented in the literature. When formal market 
options are lacking, how well households are able to mitigate the negative consequences 
of risk depends largely on the strength and quality of informal strategies for minimizing 
uncertainty ex-ante, as well as informal tactics for coping with negative ex-post 
realizations. Changes which might improve or worsen the set of tools households have at 
their disposal are likely to have strong welfare consequences – particularly for those 
households most exposed to risk of severe negative outcomes. 
                                               
4For more on long-term effects of negative shocks, permanent impacts of low-consumption, and links 
between health outcomes and risk, see also Dercon 2005, Hoddinott and Kinsey 2001, Jalan and Ravallion 
2004, Beegle at. al. 2006,  Karlan and Morduch (2009) p.57. 
5For a discussion of the obstacles to formal insurance and their general absence from poor communities and 





Addressing Uncertainty in Isolation 
Many of the methods a household might use to either reduce uncertainty, or 
mitigate negative consequences from the realization of poor outcomes, involve choices a 
household can make as an isolated unit. Several studies have shown that one strategy 
households pursue is to adjust production decisions and diversify income-generating 
activities so as to dampen income volatility. While reducing the scope for variation in 
realized income (and, more to the point, raising lower bounds for expected income 
ranges), this often unfortunately lowers efficiency, reduces profits, and diminishes total 
household incomes over the long-run. Morduch (1995) reviews several ways this practice 
of “income-smoothing” has been documented in other studies as a method to reduce the 
risk of low income. He cites, for example, results from Antle (1987) showing that rice 
farmers in southern India use labor well beyond profit-maximizing levels as evidence that 
rural households use techniques and inputs that reduce variability of profits but lower net 
expected returns. Bliss and Stern (1982) find evidence in northern India of fertilizer usage 
far below profit-maximizing levels, suggesting production choices aimed to minimize 
potential investment losses (and thus income reductions) in case the crop fails. Morduch 
(1995) also cites Walker and Ryan (1990) and Bliss and Stern (1982) as providing 
evidence that households sometimes delay the onset of production to await more accurate 
weather predictions. While this allows them to limit production and cut potential losses 




reduces total expected yields.
6
 Morduch (1990) also finds that vulnerability of 
consumption to income shocks is linked to use of lower-risk, but lower-yielding, crop-
varieties. Anecdotal evidence in Central Malawi also suggests that, while farmers know 
that genetically modified maize may result in significantly higher yields, their concern 
that it has a higher risk of spoilage prevents them from using it. 
Just as wealth level affects the extent of negative impacts on long-term welfare 
from downward income shocks, wealth level and degree of risk exposure also have an 
important impact on the negative effects to profits that can result from income-smoothing 
as response to production uncertainty. Binswanger and Rosenzweig (1993), by 
considering the impact of risk-aversion on a broad set of agricultural inputs, show that 
increasing the variation in rainfall timing has a differential impact on households by 
vulnerability level. Those households in the lowest wealth strata are most likely to shift 
production toward safer, but less profitable, modes of production. They estimate that 
raising the coefficient of rainfall timing variation by one standard deviation would have a 
negligible impact on production decisions and profitability of the richest farmers, as they 
have adequate auxiliary methods to cope with risk, but would lower incomes among the 
bottom quartile by 35%. Morduch (1999a) also notes that shocks may send more 
vulnerable households into a downward spiral into deeper poverty if assets previously 
used in production are sold off (threatening future income) to protect current-period 
consumption levels. 
 While it may help prevent dangerously low consumption swings, this method for 
handling adverse shocks can thus nevertheless have substantial negative long-run impacts 
                                               
6 Bliss and Stern (1982) estimate that delaying production by two weeks can reduce yields by 20% , in the 




on the poor. Formal financial services deepening may have an important impact in the 
context of this approach to dealing with risk. Any indirect effects that might worsen a 
household‟s choice-set of ex-post risk-coping mechanisms may exacerbate total income 
losses from any ex-ante income-smoothing of this sort. On the other hand, if indirect 
effects lead to an improvement in a household‟s ex-post options for dealing with negative 
shocks, it may induce movements towards greater efficiencies in production, and higher 
net incomes among such households. While the present study does not address this 
possibility explicitly, the data may enable an analysis of this sort, and this represents an 
opportunity for future research. 
 Some households also make use of strategies in diversifying their income sources 
along a spatial dimension. This can range from fairly local approaches, such as 
intentional plot-fragmentation, to sending household members out to more distant locales 
in order to generate income from environments subject to less covariate risk. The former 
(discussed, for example, in Townsend 1995b) may help diversify against variations in 
crop yields caused by localized events such as pests or crop disease, and even help hedge 
against weather variations in topographically diverse places.
7
 Sending household 
members further away could also achieve the same goal, by generating crop-incomes 
from locations distant enough to avoid experiencing covariate weather-based shocks, 
such as drought or floods. In addition, however, it may provide access to income sources 
subject to entirely different types of risk, much less correlated with fluctuations in farm-
income. Giles (2006) shows that households in rural China, for example, use local off-
                                               
7 See, for example, Townsend (1995b) for an explanation of how high levels of rainfall can be 
simultaneously good for certain plots farmed by a village and bad for other plots farmed by the same 




farm labor markets as well as remittances from migrants working in more distant cities to 
reduce exposure of consumption to the uncertainties inherent in agricultural production.  
 In addition to spatial diversification of income sources, individuals also often 
have at least limited access to trade-offs along a temporal dimension. By sacrificing 
consumption now, it may be possible to transfer some wealth forward to future periods to 
help cover any negative income realizations. Paxson‟s (1992) well-known study of 
Thailand shows that households save out of windfall seasons, helping them upwardly 
smooth consumption during hard times.  A wide variety of savings instruments have been 
documented in the literature, ranging from cash at home to livestock and grain storage to 
durable goods and jewelry (see, for example, Deaton 1992; Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 
1993; Fafchamps et. al. 1998).  
However, most savings options in village settings typically have important 
limitations. As Besley (1995) notes, it is often difficult to find assets that yield positive 
returns for postponing consumption. Illiquidity can be an important problem. For wealth 
stored in livestock, land, or durable assets, for example, the transaction costs (the 
opportunity cost of time and other resources, and potentially explicit expenses) associated 
with finding buyers and selling assets may be significant. Furthermore, covariate shocks 
can mean that when one household is trying to sell off assets in order to purchase 
consumables, many neighbors may be doing the same. When markets are fragmented, 
this can drive local prices for the asset down. It can also exacerbate transaction costs by 
making it harder to find local buyers for assets in order to convert the wealth to 
consumption (i.e. the liquidity of the asset may worsen in times of crisis). Thus the 




most. Fafchamps et. al. (1998) find, for example, that livestock sales in Burkina Faso are 
able to make up for only 15-30% of income shortfalls – due in part to these types of 
difficulties.  
Storing wealth in cash, on the other hand, is subject to potentially high risks from 
inflation (frequent and often acute in many developing-country settings). Both types of 
risk can cause the value of any savings to depreciate substantially. Saving in livestock, 
durables, or cash is also subject to risk of theft. Even storing food can carry substantial 
risk of loss, from spoilage, theft, and being eaten by rodents or other animals. 
Indeed, most studies have concluded that wealth-storage mechanisms in rural 
areas of the developing world, while they do smooth consumption, are rarely ever replete 
enough to support the constant stream of income that would be predicted by the 
permanent income hypothesis.
8
 In fact, this is one of the major motivations behind 
current intensified efforts to expand formal savings options across the developing world. 
Zeller (1999), for example, presents compelling evidence in favor of high-liquidity 
precautionary savings options. 
 The use of precautionary savings to insure against future adverse outcomes can 
also have important drawbacks. As Giles and Yoo (2007) point out, holding savings as a 
hedge against potential income shortfalls may prevent it from being productively invested 
elsewhere, for example in human capital. They estimate that in rural China 10% of 
household savings is attributable to a precautionary motive, and find this climbs to 15% 
for households below the poverty line. 
                                               
8 Deaton (1997), for example, notes that while many empirical studies indicate positive levels of 





Responses to Risk Involving Multiple Households 
 Addressing short-falls in income through assistance from other households is also 
common across rural communities in developing countries. A rich literature documents 
an array of methods through which members of rural communities help each other in 
times of need, and participate in informal systems of social security and hunger 
insurance.
9
 These practices have typically been viewed through the lens of contract-
theory and mechanism design, interpreted as informal contractual arrangements between 
multiple parties for dealing with risk in village-settings. Coate & Ravallion (1993) and 
Kletzer and Wright (1992) were among the first to formalize inter-household wealth 
flows as insurance contracts with incentives which make them self-enforcing in the 
absence of external enforcement mechanisms. When viewed from this perspective, the 
motivation for one household assisting another is the promise of future reciprocation 
should rough times strike the giving household; the arrangement therefore constitutes a 
form of “mutual insurance”. 
In this context, the main difference between these non-market institutions for 
coping with risk and formal market arrangements is that the former are non-anonymous 
agreements (generally between two parties that know each other very well), and they are 
not supported by codified legal institutions. They also often exploit informational 
advantages and local enforcement mechanisms which make them more sustainable when 
                                               
9Rather than an exhaustive survey of this literature, I limit the review here to several of the most salient 
studies, as well as those to which my research is most related. See Besley (1995a, 1995b); Morduch 
(1999b); Karlan and Morduch (2009) for some surveys of the literature on informal arrangements for risk-




the information flow and external enforcement capacity required to support formal 
institutions are lacking. In this light, the various forms of inter-household assistance 
behavior are interpreted as mechanisms that attempt to deal with information and 
enforcement constraints, such that more efficient outcomes can be achieved. 
It is also possible, however, that “behavioral” factors, such as altruism or 
inequality-aversion play a role in inter-household assistance, and that expected future 
reciprocation may not always be a prerequisite for offering assistance. In such a context, 
it may be more appropriate to consider certain types of assistance as contributions to an 
informal social security system to provide a safety net for the worst-off, rather than as 
participation in insurance that is mutual, per se. Lucas and Stark (1987) made some 
important early movements in a direction which would accommodate motivations other 
than expected reciprocation, formalizing a concept of “tempered altruism”, or enlightened 
self-interest, and demonstrating the explanatory power of their model in the context of 
remittances. However, Cox (1987) finds evidence in survey data from the US which 
appears to reject altruistic motivations in favor of exchange-based motivations, and 
argues that the latter is what truly drives private transfer decisions. Since then, the notion 
that transfers-out are based on expected future reciprocation of transfers has become the 
dominant paradigm in the literature on inter-household transfers in village settings. 
Regardless of the underlying motivations of inter-household transfers, in the absence of 
formal insurance, these arrangements offer individuals additional methods to cope with 





 One of the most commonly cited methods through which households help each 
other make it through periods of low income is by offering each other loans. Fafchamps 
(1999) examines the theoretical basis for how low or zero-interest informal credit 
between friends and relatives can be used to share risk, but also highlights some of the 
limitations of informal loans as an insurance arrangement. Several empirical studies 
confirm the importance in practice of informal credit for smoothing consumption across 
shocks. Platteau and Abraham (1987) were among the first, showing how reciprocal 
credit arrangements constitute a hunger insurance mechanism in fishing villages in 
Kerala, India. Townsend (1995a, 1995b) documents reported use of loans from friends 
and relatives in response to negative fluctuations in income among households in 
northern Thai villages. Fafchamps and Lund (2003) demonstrate the key role played by 
zero-interest loans between households in risk-sharing and consumption-smoothing in 
rural communities in the Philippines. 
 Informal lending can also provide an underlying framework on top of which 
mutual insurance can operate. Udry (1994) shows how villagers in northern Nigeria use 
deviations in loan repayments (in terms of timing and amounts repaid) are used as a 
means to transfer wealth between households experiencing shocks. For example, a 
household that borrowed in a previous period but which experiences a negative shock this 
period might repay its loan later and at a negative interest rate. While a household which 
loaned money out the previous period and experiences a negative shock this period might 
receive a loan repayment with extra positive interest. Such state-contingent loan 





 Often discussed in conjunction with informal loans, and perhaps just as important 
as a mechanism for insuring against low consumption levels, is the practice of reciprocal 
gift-giving. Fafchamps (1992) formalizes the notion of mutual insurance through 
reciprocal gift-exchange across time, interpreting them as a sustainable equilibrium in a 
repeated game, with information considerations. He argues that such relationships 
function on a principle of delayed reciprocity, contingent on one household‟s need and 
another‟s ability to help. Several empirical studies show that households experiencing 
rough times are in fact able to help smooth consumption through receipt of pure gifts, 
rather than loans, from other households facing better situations. Dercon et. al. (2008), for 
example, identify a particular type of informal network in some Ethiopian villages (the 
“Iddir”) which provides health-insurance   help with medical expenses through a 
combination of loans and pure transfers. Fafchamps and Lund (2003) find that rural 
Filipino households are able to mitigate a substantial portion of the consumption effects 
of negative income shocks through a mixture of informal loans and pure gifts from 
individuals outside the household. Cox and Jimenez (1998) show that private transfers 
can also serve an important insurance function in urban settings of developing countries. 
 Insurance through gifts may not be confined to relationships between individuals 
residing in the same village. Indeed, gift-assistance relationships that extend outside the 
village should perform better at insuring against locally covariate shocks, such as drought 
or flooding. A variety of studies explore the importance of intentional spatial 
diversification of kinship networks, and remittances received from migrant relatives, in 
insuring households against low levels of consumption. Paulson (2000) finds evidence 




insure the households to which they send remittances, choosing areas for which shocks 
tend to not covary with the province to which they remit. Paulson finds this is particularly 
true for remitters that support poorer rural households which have less access to formal 
institutions that could be used to mitigate risk. Lucas and Stark (1987) discuss the 
importance of risk-sharing as a motivation of remittances in Botswana, while Rosenzweig 
and Stark (1989) find evidence that some village households in India intentionally marry 
their daughters out to distant locales to create a spatially dispersed kinship network in 
order to mitigate income shocks in environments characterized by covariant risk. They 
find that this practice leads to a significant reduction in food-consumption variability. 
Giles and Yoo also find that, in rural China, expansion of migration networks lead to 
reductions in unproductive (e.g. non-invested) precautionary savings used as a hedge 
against consumption risk.  
 Given the array of non-market mechanisms to handle risk and engage in mutually 
beneficial trades to mitigate the effects of negative shocks, it is natural to question 
whether they are perhaps sufficient to achieve Pareto efficient allocations in the absence 
of markets. Townsend (1994) shows how the dynamic programming problem for optimal 
within-village allocations implies that individual household consumption should move 
monotonically with aggregate village-level consumption, and be unrelated to household 
income. Testing for efficiency among three villages in southern India, he rejects the 
hypothesis of perfect risk pooling, but finds it is surprisingly close: while efficient risk 
allocation predicts zero marginal propensity to consume out of own income, he estimates 
it is no higher than 0.14. Udry (1994) also finds that the mutual insurance households 




studies, however, find informal insurance is highly imperfect (e.g. Townsend 1995a, 
1995b; Deaton 1997; Jalan and Ravallion 1999). The conclusion is that  non-market 
institutions result in allocations that are generally far from efficient, leaving the poor 
substantially exposed to risk.
10
  
One of the major criticisms of informal insurance is that they are typically based 
on local arrangements, and thus likely to fail in the face of covariate shocks such as 
droughts, flooding, or other crises experienced by the broader community as well. Other 
households are unlikely to be able to help if they are simultaneously hit by negative 
income shocks as well. These and other considerations often lead to the policy 
implication that formal institutions such as market-based financial services and public 
insurance provided by the state would increase efficiency in risk-sharing, and should 
therefore be encouraged. 
 In addition, there is evidence that the size and quality of informal safety nets that 
households can rely on is correlated with wealth. Morduch (1999a) notes that theory 
suggests that a system of reciprocal transfers  will be more effective for wealthier 
households, and that this is consistent with empirical evidence from China, the 
Philippines, and southern India. Dercon et. al. (2008), find that in rural Ethiopia, better-
off households, as well as those related to people of high-status, have larger networks of 
individuals that might help them in the event assistance is needed. Jalan and Ravallion 
(1999) find that among rural households in China the poorest decile of households are the 
least well-insured, with 40% of an income shock being passed on to consumption, while 
                                               
10 There is some divergence in the literature on this. Banerjee (2005), for example suggests informal 
insurance mechanisms may in fact leave the poor fairly well-insured. In a more recent survey, however, 
Karlan and Morduch (2009) conclude from the literature on informal village insurance that poor 




among the richest decile, only 10% of the income shock is passed on to current 
consumption. If the worst-off households in villages tend to be those with the weakest 
safety nets to begin with, this may make them especially sensitive to any negative effects 
on informal insurance practices from policy interventions or the introduction of new 
services. Furthermore, if it is the case that a higher proportion of the informal insurance-
providers for the worst-off households are likely to adopt formal services, the worst-off 
are additionally likely to be more sensitive to any changes caused by formal financial 
markets – negative or positive. 
 
2.2. Impact of Financial Markets on Informal Insurance & Social Safety Nets 
The presence and strength of non-market institutions in areas where market-based 
practices have yet to take hold is often attributed in part to the many advantages they 
have over market mechanisms in village-settings. Stiglitz, (1990),  and Arnott & Stiglitz, 
(1991), for example, discuss the role of “peer monitoring” in these types of settings, 
referring to the observability of (otherwise private) information that derives from close 
geographical and social proximity between parties to the informal contract. This is what 
often allows informal institutions to function where market-based ones fail. In addition to 
solving informational problems, agents being part of the same community may add moral 
constraints to behavior, pressuring individuals to comply with social norms, or risk social 
censure for violating communal expectations (see for example Wade 1988; Fafchamps 
1992). 
As the transition towards more modern economies proceeds, however, it is likely 




become less of an issue, making it easier for formal financial mechanisms to operate 
smoothly. At the same time, development policy and programs are pushing the expansion 
of formal financial services into these areas. The natural question then becomes: What 
will happen to non-market based methods for insuring households against low 
consumption outcomes as this occurs? 
Townsend (1995a, 1995b) poses this question after some provocative 
observations on the experience of villages in northern Thailand. He notes that the village 
in his sample most integrated into the external regional economy exhibited a striking 
absence of local internal credit and insurance mechanisms, and little evidence of inter-
household assistance. In addition, households appeared to experience more pronounced 
negative swings in consumption for certain types of negative shocks, such as illness. This 
not only raises the possibility that market integration may be linked to a weakening of 
indigenous non market-based methods to insure households against dire consumption 
outcomes. It also suggests that it may leave some households in a worse position to 
address the effects of risk and uncertainty.  
Besley (1995a) echoes the suggestion that indigenous institutions will disappear 
as part of the development process, emphasizing more specifically the link between 
financial markets and informal arrangements, noting that the decline in non-market 
institutions generally goes hand-in-hand with the development of capital markets. He 
acknowledges it is unclear whether the expansion of financial markets causes the decline 
of informal arrangements, or vice versa. However, he cites improvements in monitoring 
and information technologies, as well as economies of scale offered by formal financial 




the informational structures (e.g. high degree of knowledge about neighbors) and 
enforcement mechanisms (e.g. community sanctions for violating norms) upon which 
non-market institutions rely tend to erode as part of the broader transformation to a 
modern economy. Even more pointedly, Morduch (1999a) notes that improvements in 
methods to accumulate savings, since it offers a greater degree of self-insurance and thus 
less reliance on other households, may cause transfer-based social safety nets to break 
down. In addition, savings as a form of insurance against low future consumption levels 
is less susceptible to failure in the face of locally covariate risks than reliance on inter-
household transfers. 
 If informal systems insuring households against low consumption were in fact to 
disappear as formal capital markets develop, it would seem to beg the question: What 
will happen to those who rely on informal arrangements but may be excluded from 
formal markets, either during the transition period, or after formal markets are fully 
present? Yet the first-order question also remains: Do informal institutions in fact break 
down with financial deepening? Curiously, there has been little serious analysis of what 
really happens to non-market institutions villagers use to cope with risk, and to those 
households relying on them, as financial services expand. 
It would be premature to use the present setting in Central Malawi to draw 
definitive conclusions regarding long-term shifts which may result from financial 
deepening. However, to the extent that this study provides insight into the early stages of 
such a process, it offers significant clues about potential long-term effects. Equally 




developed capital markets in rural locales, a process which may be protracted, and during 
which welfare and poverty outcomes of the poorest may be strongly affected. 
 There are at least two studies which make serious attempts to examine the 
consequences of financial service expansion in the presence of informal insurance 
institutions. Both lay important theoretical groundwork for a more focused analysis of the 
interaction of formal capital markets with informal wealth exchange arrangements. 
However, both also lead to theoretical predictions which are at odds with the experience 
of villages in Central Malawi. 
 Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2000) (henceforth LTW) develop a model which 
shows the effects of introducing an enhanced storage technology in an environment 
characterized by mutual insurance transfers with limited commitment, when there is no 
enforcement mechanism. Importantly, the sole incentive to provide a transfer to another 
household in their framework is the promise of a future insurance benefit should the need 
arise. They conclude that introducing improved intertemporal wealth storage technologies 
is in fact not unequivocally good, but rather that the impact on total welfare is ambiguous 
due to countervailing effects. In particular, one of their key predictions is that the 
introduction of storage technologies will tend to reduce inter-household wealth flows. 
They provide a formal foundation for the notion that improved storage options limits the 
scope of mutual-insurance, by tending to make autarky more attractive to purely self-
interested households, thereby encouraging more households towards self-insurance and 
isolation. As they note, “a household which could transfer income to another facing a bad 
shock may prefer instead to remain in autarky, and this reduction in mutual insurance due 




The only other study I have seen that approaches a serious explicit analysis of the 
effects of formal financial services on local informal insurance practices is a little-cited 
study by Foster and Rosenzweig (2000) (henceforth FR).
11
 Rather than restrict the focus 
to savings in particular, they model what happens when formal savings and credit 
technologies simultaneously become available in a village environment with limited 
enforcement and commitment. Just like LTW, however, they follow Coate & Ravallion‟s 
(1993) approach to interpreting inter-household wealth flows as bidirectional over time, 
that is, as contractual arrangements of mutual insurance sustained by a credible future 
promise of reciprocity. The implications of their model, similar to LTW, indicates the 
incidence and size of transfers should decrease as a result of the presence of formal 
financial intermediaries, but with the added qualification that the insurance-capability of 
the “surviving” transfers improves. 
 Unlike LTW, FR take a stab at empirically testing the implications of the model, 
using panel data on villages from India and Pakistan. They appear to find empirical 
support for their model‟s predictions. It is unclear to me that they actually find a 
reduction of informal insurance transfers, despite identifying this as one of the study‟s 
conclusions. Importantly, the instrument they use for local rates of financial service is not 
random. Instead, they use distance from financial services provider (within 5 km or more 
than 5km away) as an instrument – one for which identification could easily fail for a 
variety of reasons. For example, households in less remote locales may be more 
integrated into the formal market economy and more subject to the broad array of 
transformations that accompany the process of modernization. On the other hand, as often 
                                               
11 This study appears practically unknown to the broader literature on informal insurance. It has been cited 




noted elsewhere, the endogeneity of institution location choice allows for financial 
institutions intentionally selecting their locations based on local factors easily correlated 
with other aspects of household behavior. As another example, if markets are fragmented, 
changes over time can be experienced quite differently in remote areas and areas more 
closely linked to urban centers. Ultimately, their identification of effects turns on the 
assumption that the influence of unosbervables correlated with distance from financial 






2.3. Indirect Effects of Development Projects & Policy Interventions 
The focus of the present study on indirect impacts on households from expanded 
local access to financial services also contributes to an important growing number of 
studies on local externalities and indirect effects of policy interventions in developing 
economies. Miguel and Kremer (2004), for example, use evidence from Kenya to show 
that de-worming projects can have substantial positive spillover effects on health 
outcomes and school attendance of untreated children, and even children in nearby non-
treated schools. They find that failing to account for this seriously underbiases estimates 
of program impacts. Whereas previous studies based on simple individual-level 
randomization suggested little educational benefits from deworming, Miguel and Kremer 
conclude that positive externalities are large enough that the total benefits merit full 
program subsidization. 
Angelucci and DeGiorgi (2009) find positive spillovers in an entirely different 
type of intervention. Using data from the flagship Mexican welfare program, Progresa, 
they show that state transfers to rural households improves the consumption levels of 
non-eligible households in the same villages. They identify the channel as operating 
through informal insurance, as ineligible households receive more gifts and loans from 
public welfare recipients, thus providing the perspective from the flip-side compared to 
earlier studies on the effects of publicly provided insurance. Despite significant indirect 
impacts, they note that program evaluations generally focus on estimating effects only on 
the treated, missing these broader and often important local externalities. The very fact 




estimate for program impacts is a testament to the tendency for impact assessments to 
ignore these important second-order effects. 
The present study explores how a third type of intervention, microfinance, can 
also have substantial indirect consequences which bear heavily on policy objectives. The 
experience of villages in Central Malawi indicates a sharp impact on transfers received 
by non-using households. Just as in the studies by Miguel and Kremer (2004) and 
Angelucci and DeGiorgi (2009), positive local spillovers indicate strong secondary 
benefits accruing even to households which do not take up services. 
The findings on spillovers presented in this study thus also form an important 
methodological contribution to impact assessments in microfinance, an active field in 
development economics. The existence of local indirect effects warns against evaluations 
based on comparisons of financial service-users with geographically proximate non-
users, even when suitable instruments for uptake are available or randomization of 
services-use is feasible. As the present study demonstrates, such approaches are likely to 
yield a biased estimate of true impacts. Just as in Miguel and Kremer (2004), measured 
total benefits – to the extent that impacts have both positive direct and indirect effects – 
would suffer from being doubly underestimated. This identification problem has been 
discussed in other contexts, for example Heckman, Lalonde, and Smith (1999), who 
discuss the potential biases in job-program evaluations due to negative externality effects 
on non-participants. In the context of microfinance evaluations, spillovers complicate 
financial service impact assessments based on local average treatment effects. Due to the 




treatment spillovers, the Wald estimator must be interpreted with caution, and may in fact 
not be a good estimator for true program effects. 
 
2.4. Conclusion  
FR represents a rare example of an attempt to empirically assess the effects of 
formal financial services on informal insurance practices. In a similar vein, a few other 
empirical studies have examined the effects not of financial services expansion, but of 
publicly provided insurance and transfers from the government. These studies investigate 
the extent to which such payments crowd-out private inter-household insurance.
12
 Jensen 
(2004), for example, estimates that the introduction of state pension benefits in South 
Africa after the fall of Apartheid led to a reduction in private transfers to the elderly on 
the order of 0.25-0.30 rand for every rand received from the government. Cox and 
Jimenez (1995 and 1998) estimate that, for each unit of retirement benefits received, 
private transfers shrink by 17% in Peru and 37% in the Philippines. Cox and Jimenez 
(1995) present an even more striking example in their estimates of the likely impact of 
state unemployment insurance, estimating that private transfers to the unemployed would 
fall by 92 pesos for every 100 pesos offered by the government 
 These studies strongly suggest that indigenous insurance based on private wealth 
flows are susceptible to substantial impacts from the introduction of new external 
insurance options. However, they do not directly address the question of how expanded 
access to financial services (i.e. market-based savings, credit, and insurance services) will 
affect informal practices. The empirical literature on this question remains thin. FR 
                                               




presents a noteworthy exception to the general absence of empirical studies which 
seriously examine this question, but it does not disentangle the effects of savings and 
credit, and its identification of effects relies on an assumption which may not hold.  
This is one of the most important contributions the present study on the 
experience of households in Central Malawi provides. It adds to the sparse empirical 
research on the impact of formal financial service expansion on inter-household wealth 
transfers, in an empirical framework with a solid identification strategy. Contrary to FR, 
it isolates the effect of formal savings expansion. Using a randomized experiment, it 
presents evidence which questions previous theoretical predictions and empirical 
evidence based on more stringent (and perhaps less realistic) identification assumptions. 
In addition, the central focus of the present study on private assistance-receipts by 
households which are effectively excluded from expanded financial access represents a 
novel contribution that broadens the scope and practical relevance of this thin literature. 
This asymmetry between agents represents a fundamentally different type of setting, and 
a new approach. So far as I can tell, both FR and LTW assume uniform access to newly 
introduced financial services. However, practical considerations suggest the existence of 
transaction costs means access will in fact be heterogeneous, with wealthier households 
able to participate in new wealth management technologies while poorer households will 
be left out. Townsend and Ueda (2006) acknowledge this likelihood in practice in their 
concept of “wealth-constrained financial access” in a macroeconomic model which 
endogenizes economic growth, financial deepening, and inequality. The effects of 




poverty policy, especially if variation occurs within transfer-networks, and if lack of 
access is correlated with vulnerability to low consumption levels. 
Besley (1995a) highlights that the key component missing from analyses of non-
market institutions for risk-sharing, and from our understanding of such institutions, is a 
theory of institutional formation and adaptation – i.e. a theory for “how institutions are 
born, grow, change, and develop.” While the theoretical work of LTW and FR have 
helped advance such a theory, there remains much to be done. This study contributes in 
novel and important ways to the project of developing an integrated theory on 
institutional change, at the very least from an empirical angle, furnishing evidence on 




Chapter 3. Empirical Setting: Central Malawi 
 
This chapter introduces the empirical setting used to examine the questions this 
study endeavors to answer. The data come from a two-year household survey in Malawi 
that I helped oversee during field work in 2008 and 2010. The dataset is large, containing 
over 2,000 households that were present in both years, and covering the three largest 
districts in the central part of the country. 
As Malawi is one of the poorest countries in the world, with the majority of its 
population in rural areas with little or no access to formal financial markets, it provides 
an ideal setting to test the effects of formal financial services expansion on the poor. 
Moreover, since the survey was conducted during the pre-harvest “hungry” season, it 
captures the impacts on households during what is generally the most sensitive time of 
the year. As the climate generally affords just a single crop-cycle per year, most incomes 
are received during the harvest period, and household resources are highly restricted in 
the last few months leading up to the next crop‟s harvest. Collecting data on household 
transfers and welfare outcomes such as food-security and health-indicators during this 
highly sensitive period is likely to provide some of the most insight into how welfare 
outcomes are affected.  
The purpose of the survey was to gather data for an impact assessment of a local 
microfinance organization rapidly expanding access to its services into the thin formal 
financial environment of rural parts of the country. The vehicle through which service 
access was expanded is a mobile van-bank, which literally brought the bank closer to 




impacts on clients from adoption of the organization‟s products offered through the 
mobile bank, I use the data to examine indirect effects and impacts on informal insurance 
practices. To that end, I was allowed to add a module to the endline survey which 
gathered detailed information on inter-household wealth flows. 
The chapter is organized as follows. The first section describes key features of 
rural Malawi relevant to the research questions explored in this dissertation. The second 
section describes the major features of the data. It details how the data were collected 
(sampling methodology, geographical distribution, the survey instrument used), a few 
issues that arose during collection. This section also defines the key variables used in the 
analyses of chapters 4, 5, and 6. Finally, it provides information on a variety of key 
household characteristics, and tests for any important selection due to attrition. 
 
3.1.  Rural Central Malawi 
Rural Malawi provides an ideal setting to assess the importance of formal services 
expansion on inter-household wealth transfers, and its consequences in the lives of the 
rural poor. Located in south-central Africa, this landlocked agrarian country of 14 million 
is among the poorest in the world. In 2005, Malawi was ranked 165 out of 177 countries 
on the Human Development Index by the UNDP. The same year, about 52% of the 
population was ranked below the national poverty line, with 22% of the population 
considered as “ultra-poor” (defined as households whose total consumption falls below 
minimum thresholds for adequate food consumption), while 28% of the population fell 
below the international poverty line of $1/day.
13
   Malawi has been a major recipient of 
                                               




international aid to help address past food shortages, it is among the top countries in 
terms of HIV/AIDS prevalence, and also has one of the highest rates of malaria-related 
and AIDS-related deaths.   
With 85% of the population in rural areas, and more than three-quarters of the 
country‟s exports from agriculture, the rural sector dominates the economy and society, 
(Diagne and Zeller 2001). Most of the labor force is engaged in small-scale farming 
(typically on less than 1 ha per household), and crop production provides 73% of rural 
incomes. A single unpredictable rainy season, and just one yearly harvest, leaves the 
country‟s inhabitants heavily exposed to annual risk of crop failure and leaves households 
vulnerable to low consumption swings and food-insecurity.  
The research area for this study encompasses three of the largest districts in the 
central region of the country, close to the capital of Lilongwe. Dedza district has the 
greatest representation, with 46% of the households, while Mchinji district accounts for 
30%, and Lilongwe district accounts for 24%.
14
  According to the 2005 Integrated 
Household Survey published by the National Statistics Office of Malawi, average 
household incomes across the three districts in 2005 were about $400  in Lilongwe Rural  




Poverty rates in the study districts of Mchinji, Dedza, and rural Lilongwe in 
Central Malawi show that the Lilongwe (Rural) District has lower than national-level 
                                               
14 The capital city is also named Lilongwe, and is located in Lilongwe district. The portion of the sample 
for this dataset that is located in Lilongwe district is not from Lilongwe city, but rather “Lilongwe rural”. 
15 Malawi Integrated Household Survey (IHS2) 2004-2005 Volume 1: Household Socio-Economic 
Characteristics Zomba , National Statistical Office of Malawi; 2005, p75. 
Conversion to US dollars for these figures is based on an exchange rate of 120 Malawian Kwacha (MK) 





poverty rates, while Mchinji and Dedza Districts have higher than the national rates. 
Mchinji also appears to have a much higher proportion of ultra-poor than the other two 
districts.  
 
Table 1. Population & Poverty Rates in Study Area in 2005 (By Nat’l Poverty Line) 
District Number of  
Households  
Poverty Rate  Ultra-Poverty 
Rate  
Malawi TOTAL  2,731,346  52%  22%  
Mchinji  86,092  60%  30%  
Dedza  135,849  55%  21%  
Malawi TOTAL  2,731,346  52%  22%  
Source: Integrated Household Survey, 2005 
 
The sample includes seventeen different Traditional Authorities (TAs) – the clan-
based administrative unit of the traditional government. TAs are also used by the modern 
government as the administrative unit just below the district level. Eight of the TAs are in 
Dedza district, five of the TAs are located in Lilongwe district, and four are in Mchinji 
district.  
Participation in formal financial markets among the rural populace in this area is 
very low. Information from the baseline survey indicates, for example, that in 2008 only 
6.0% of the sampled households had at least one current formal loan, while 11.6% of the 
households had one or more formal savings accounts. Only 2.8% of the sampled 
households reported both formal savings and formal credit, so about 14.7% of the sample 
reported using formal savings accounts, formal credit, or both.  
On the other hand, there is evidence of widespread informal financial services use 
(especially informal loans), and significant incidence of inter-household assistance and 




at least one current informal loan from a friend or relative. In 2010, over a quarter of the 
sample reports receiving at least one cash gift from a friend or a relative in the last three 
months, and about 46% report either receiving a cash gift or a current loan from a friend 
or relative. 
To address the low rates of formal financial service penetration a local 
microfinance organization, Opportunity International Bank of Malawi (OIBM), began a 
project in late 2007 to expand access to formal savings and credit services to rural areas. 
The expansion occurred through a mobile van-bank innovation, rolled out in Lilongwe, 
Mchinji, and Dedza districts. The mobile bank traveled along paved roads, and had six 
different stops – three stops along the main highway running 110 km west from the 
capital city of Lilongwe, and three stops along the main highway running 90 km south. 
The stops were located in trading centers, and the bank stopped at each one on the same 
day every week – usually a market day, in order to take advantage of the fact that many 
villagers from surrounding areas are already in the trading center for other reasons. This 
not only reduces the transportation component of transaction costs, but also catches 
people after making sales, when they are more likely to have cash on hand to deposit into 
savings accounts. 
This expansion of formal services into the thin formal financial environment of 
rural Malawi provides the basis for this research project on the interaction between 





3.2.  The Data Sample  
The data come from two years of a household survey I oversaw as part of an 
independent impact assessment of the microfinance organization‟s services on client-
household welfares.
16
 The impact assessment‟s intent was to determine whether, and by 
how much, the average user of financial services  benefits by becoming a client of the 
microfinance institution. However, I use the data we collected to examine a very different 
set of research questions and hypotheses. Specifically, I examine how the expansion 
particularly of formal savings impacts non-service users, with specific emphasis on the 
community‟s highly vulnerable households.  
The baseline data (i.e. the first wave of the panel) was collected over February-
April of 2008, during the pre-harvest “hungry” season when food-stocks are low for the 
most vulnerable households. This was before any significant take-up of the microfinance 
organization‟s services. While the mobile van-bank first began operations in August of 
2007, there was little to no marketing, awareness of the existence of the mobile bank was 
low, and it was already well after the high-income harvest period when people are 




 The second round of data was collected during the 
same period of 2010, following two years of intensive marketing of the bank‟s services.  
                                               
16 The IRIS Center of the University of Maryland was hired by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation to 
perform an impact assessment evaluating the effect of the bank‟s services on client-household 
vulnerability, food security, and other welfare outcomes. I was hired to oversee the data-collection process 
and analyze the data. 
17 Malawi has a single growing season. Most farming households receive the majority of their annual 
income during one single period of the year – the harvest period, which in Central Malawi usually lasts 
from late April into June. 
18 The low awareness about the existence of the microfinance organization‟s mobile van-bank is supported 
by information I collected in focus-group discussions in 2008, and is also confirmed by the very low 





Sampling Methodology and the Survey Instrument 
Community sampling was performed following a matched-pair design, wherein 
one member of each pair was randomly assigned to a community-level information-
treatment, the other member to a control group. Each pair consists of two village-clusters, 
a cluster being defined by enumeration areas (EAs) – sampling units defined by Malawi‟s 
National Statistics Office (NSO) that typically include 2-4 villages
19
. Lists of EAs taken 
from the NSO were first categorized based on radial distance from the mobile van-bank 
stop: (i) within 5km; (ii) 5-10 km; and (iii) 10-12 km. Distance was measured from a 
central point in the EA, so some villages actually lie as far as 14 or 15 km from the bank 
stop. The EAs were then further split into two population categories based on NSO data: 
high versus low.  
At least two enumeration areas were then randomly sampled from each 
population-distance group around each of the six bank stops to form a pair for that 
stratum. The sampling frame included a rule stipulating a minimum distance of at least 3 
km between the two EAs in any pair, to help minimize spillovers from information-
treated communities to non-treated communities. A total of 60 pairs were sampled from 
the NSO lists (120 clusters total). Within each cluster (EA), typically 2 to 4 villages were 
randomly selected for sampling. Finally, within each pair, one of the EAs was randomly 
selected to receive the intensive marketing treatment to encourage adoption of the bank‟s 
                                               
19 For very large villages, the EA may consist of only one village; in a few cases, the EA might include as 




financial services. Figure 1 shows the sample size in each district, broken down by the 
distance of the EA from the trading center where the mobile bank stops.
 20
   
 
 
Figure 1. Number of sampled households in each distance category from the bank stop. The first 




Table 2. Number of sampled households by District and Distance Category 
 
< 5km 5-7 km 7-12 km > 12km Total 
Lilongwe 92 180 133 94 499 
Dedza 171 94 501 133 899 
Mchinji 135 116 324 36 611 
Total 398 390 958 263 2009 
 
 
                                               
20 Due to variations in population density, a larger percentage of our sample comes from Dedza district 
(1043) than either Lilongwe (688) or Mchinji (728).  Additionally, since two of the mobile bank stops in 
Mchinji District are relatively  close to the Zambian border (west) and a mountain (north), the population 









< 5km 5-7 km 7-12 km > 12km
Number of Sampled Households by 








Within each cluster, 20-23 households were sampled. As typically 2-4 villages 
were sampled from each EA, about 6-10 households were selected from each village. The 
first method for sampling households entailed making a census listing of all households 
in the village, and then randomly selecting households from this list. The randomization 
mechanism consisted of writing each household‟s number on a piece of paper, balling it 
up and dropping it into a bag, then having a member of the community draw blindly from 
the bag.  
In cases where the village was very large, rather than make a full census, a 
“random walk” sampling procedure was implemented using the following protocol.
21
 The 
total number of households in the village was divided by the number of households to be 
sampled from the village (usually 6-10) to obtain a sampling interval equal to X. (For 
example, if the village had 100 households, and the required sample was 10, the sampling 
interval was 10). With the assistance of a local key informant (such as an assistant to the 
village chief), the field supervisor of the interviewing team would identify the center of 
the village as a sampling starting point (SSP). The team (composed of 4-6 interviewers) 
would then start at the SSP, each facing a different direction. For each interviewer, a 
number n was randomly selected from 1 to X. The interviewer would then walk in that 
direction an interview the n
th
 household he or she encountered. When the interview with 
that household was completed (or if no one was home), the interviewer then continued in 
the same direction until he or she reached the X
th
 next household, and sampled that one. 
                                               
21 Note that this may help minimize the risk of omitting more marginal households in large villages, as 
village informants (e.g. chiefs and assistants) may have a higher probability of failing to include such 
households among the roster of those to be potentially visited – especially when the village is large. For 
smaller villages, the risk of such types of omission is plausibly lower. Also note that there is no known 
pattern to the layout of households in the village along socioeconomic status with respect to its 
geographical center. Distributions of household characteristics in the data confirm that sampling was 




For example, if the sampling interval was 10, and an interviewer drew the number 7, the 
first household he would sample would be 7 households away from the SSP in the 
direction assigned to him, and the next household he would sample would be 17 
households away from the SSP in that same direction.  
Insofar as generating a truly representative sample of the local community, the 
random walk sampling procedure is potentially inferior to randomly selecting from a 
village census-listing.
22
 It is conceivable, for example, that a certain sub-population of the 
community might be over- or under-represented in the sample, compared to their actual 
proportion in the local population. This sampling method, and any representational biases 
it might create, nevertheless remains fully orthogonal to the instrument for formal savings 
adoption. As the survey teams were unaware that a treatment would even occur 
anywhere, sampling is completely independent from treatment assignment, and any 
biases that might result are purely at the level of how accurately the sample represents the 
full population of each sampled community. 
Interviews typically lasted between 1.5 and 2.5 hours.
23
 Refusal rates were quite 
low, with over 97% of sampled households agreeing to participate in the interview. No 
monetary incentive was offered for the interview, nor any gifts given at the end in 
exchange for the time spent with the interviewer. Yet the survey took place during a time 
of the year when labor demands are relatively low, and people typically seem happy to 
discuss with outsiders not from the village. Households were sampled only in 2008; there 
                                               
22 As noted in the previous footnote, however, a village-census approach has its own risks in this regard, if 
certain households are ever accidentally or intentionally omitted. 
23 Variation in interview time-length depended mostly on factors affecting the amount of information to be 
collected from the household, and to a lesser extent by things such as old age or poor health of respondents. 
Information increases with the size of the household (since there are several individual-level variables), 
extent of financial services used (since there are many variables for each instance of financial-service 
usage), quantity of shocks experienced (as there are several variables at the shock-level), and the variety of 




were no new households sampled for the second wave of the survey in 2010. (Attrition is 
discussed further below.) 
The survey instrument used to gather data for the baseline (2008) was a 30-page 
structured questionnaire with eleven sections including household demographics, 
economic activities, poverty status, food security, physical assets, income, use of 
financial services, shocks experienced and mechanisms used to cope with shocks, and 
social capital.
 24
  The questionnaire design was based on several different sources, 
including World Bank Living Standard Measurement Surveys and USAID food-security 
questionnaires. It was translated into the local language, Chichewa, and back-translated 
for verification. Adjustments were made after several days of pre-testing in the field. 
With the exception of the new module that I added on inter-household transfers, 
the content of the endline (2010) questionnaire was essentially identical.
25
 The format of 
the survey instrument, however, changed from a paper-based survey to a computer-based 
survey using small (approximately 12-inch) ultra-mobile personal computers (UMPCs). 
This was one of the first known household surveys of this scale in a developing country 
to use computer-based data-collection.
26
 The major differences from paper-based survey 
were that greater up-front preparation was needed on our end (to ensure the software 
functioned properly during the interviews), training of interviewers required several extra 
                                               
24 The survey instrument for both years (2008 and 2010) is attached as an appendix. It is also available 
upon request in the local language, Chichewa. 
25 A few minor adjustments were made to shocks and financial services section in order to capture greater 
detail, and minor portions of other sections were cut in order to shorten the interview. See the appendices 
with the survey instruments for greater detail. 
26 Interviewers were all university-educated, with at least basic exposure to computers, skills ranging from 
basic computer literacy to competence of the sort required to run complicated statistical analysis packages. 
In addition, the computers were equipped with a stylus and included touch-based questionnaire screens 
with advanced hand-writing recognition technology, so that typing was not required if the interviewer 
preferred writing. The software guided the interviewer from one question to the next after each question 





days of training in the computer software, data-management and quality-control checks 
were considerably enhanced, and that question non-response is minimized (since the 
software leads the interviewer through the interview-process). We were careful to design 
the software so that implementation of the computer-based survey mirrored the data-
collection process for paper-based surveys as closely as possible. For example, options 
for “Not Applicable”, “Don‟t Know” and “Refused to Answer” were included where 
appropriate; interviewers were able to review the information they entered before moving 
to the next screen; and interviewers reviewed the completed questionnaire each evening 






Data Problems, Data Loss at Unit of Observation Level  
Due to unforeseen sampling issues, data management problems, and 
complications with the information intervention in one location, four pairs had to be 
dropped. The final remaining panel contains 112 clusters (about 325 villages), with a 
total of 2,006 households. Villages are located at radial distances from the mobile bank 
call-point ranging between 0 and 14 kilometers. 
 Fortunately, there was strong continuity among the interviewers across the two 
waves of the survey, and much of the institutional knowledge was preserved. The same 
survey firm used, under close supervision in both years by its director (economist Dr. 
                                               
27 In fact, a pop-up window appeared after completing each screen of survey questions, which encouraged 
the interviewer to verify that he or she had entered the information as they had intended, before proceeding 
to the next screen in the survey. The questionnaire-review process required some tricky trouble-shooting 
due to complications in the software and risk of data-loss, but we were able to create solutions by the end of 




Ephraim Chirwa), with the same overarching field supervisor (Dr. Peter Mvula). Also, 
30% of the interviewers in round 2 also participated in round 1, such that each survey 
team had at least 2 members present from the first year of the survey. In addition, the top 
team supervisor and several of the top interviewers who had leadership roles in the 
baseline, also participated in the endline data-collection. 
 
 
Missing Values for Certain Variables 
 There were several hiccups during the first 1-2 weeks of the survey due to issues 
related to collection of data through computers. The application sometimes shut down 
mid-interview or post-interview during quality-control checks by interviewer team 
supervisors, causing certain sections of data to be erased. We resolved the problem 
during the 2
nd
 week, on different dates for each survey team (depending on when and 
where we could meet them), by updating the software and re-training them on techniques 
for computer use during the interview and post-interview for quality control checks. This 
resulted in higher incidence of randomly missing data for some variables during the first 
1-2 weeks. 
 Due to a problem in the computer software which were unable to fix immediately, 
the data for the first 10 days of the survey is missing the date of the interview. However, 
information on which week of the survey is included. For these households, I therefore 
create a proxy date-variable, using the middle date for the week of the survey that the 
interview occurred in. 
 There are a few missing values for the inter-household transfers questions that are 




things such as cash gifts and in-kind gifts. It is not clear why this occurred, as the 
computer program was supposed to disallow progression in the interview if any of these 
fields were blank. It is not likely this was due to refusal to answer or lack of knowledge 
about household transfers, since there is an option for the interviewer to indicate “refuse” 
or “don‟t know”. It is most likely this was caused by computer errors or data-
transmission problems orthogonal to household and location characteristics. In any case, 
the proportion of missing values is quite low. In the final panel dataset of 2,006 
households, 17 households (0.9%) are lacking a response both for all three of the transfer-
receipt variables – (i) whether anyone received a cash gift; (ii) whether anyone in the 
household received help paying fees or expenses to a third party; (iii) whether anyone in 
the household received an in-kind gift. Half of these occurred during the first week, the 
rest were spread out fairly evenly over the remaining 9 weeks of the survey. 
It is important these missing values are not unevenly distributed across 
households of differing vulnerability category (explained in greater detail below). 
Fortunately, they are fairly evenly spread across wealth levels (one household is in 
vulnA, only one household in vulnG, the rest are evenly split between vulnC and vulnD, 
the two largest categories in the sample). There are an additional 10 households missing a 
response for just the in-kind gift question, all of which were interviewed during the first 
week, spread across different wealth-levels (2 from vulnA, 3 from vulnC, 5 from vulnD, 
none from vulnG). That is, 27 households (1.3% of the sample) are missing a response 
for whether anyone in the households received an in-kind gift in the last 90 days, two-
thirds of which were interviewed during the first week, but with fairly even 




 The 27 households missing a response for the in-kind gift receipt question are also 
missing a response for the four transfers-out questions, and they are the only households 
missing a response for the transfers out question. That is, for the questions of whether 
anyone in the household (i) gave a cash-gift to someone outside the household, (ii) helped 
pay fees/expenses to a third party on behalf of anyone outside the household, (iii) gave an 
in-kind gift to some outside the households, or (iv) gave a cash loan to anyone outside the 
household, there are 27 households missing a response (1.3% of the sample). Two-thirds 
of these are in the first week of the survey, the remaining 9 evenly spread across the 
remaining weeks of the survey. They are fairly evenly spread across wealth levels (3 in 
vulnA, 10 in vulnC, 13 in vulnD – of which 11 are in vulnF, and only 1 in vulnG). 
Information on number of times someone in the household was ever refused a gift 
is missing for the first 10 days of the interview, due to a computer software error. Again, 
since this was due to a computer error, and uniform across households interviewed the 
first 10 days of the survey, it should be orthogonal to household and location 
characteristics.  
 The financial services variables are missing for a few households due to failure to 
categorize the service as formal or informal. For example, certain savings accounts are 
neither defined as formal or informal. In such cases, there is a missing value for whether 
the household has formal savings. This occurs for 4 different households, which 
represents 0.2% of the entire sample, or which would represent 2% of the sample of 






Definitions of Key Variables 
 
Savings & Loans Variables 
 A “savings account” is defined as any monetary savings device external to the 
household. There is a wide variety of possible external agents in the research area with 
whom households might store their cash. Locations reported by households in the 
baseline (2008) survey, for example, include five commercial banks (OIBM,  National 
Bank, Standard Bank, NBS Bank, First Merchant Bank), two para-statal banks (Malawi 
Rural Finance Company and Malawi Savings Bank), savings and credit cooperatives 
(sometimes known as SACCOs), as well as several NGOs present throughout Africa 
(including, for example, Care, Pride, Foundation for International Community Assistance 
or FINCA, Concern Universal Microfinance Organization). Several households also 
report keeping cash at the home of a friend or relative, storing it in a friend‟s or relative‟s 
bank account, or participating in a rotating credit and savings association (rosca).
 28
  It is 
worth noting, however, that the incidence of roscas in this area is surprisingly low 
compared to many other developing country settings (reported by only about 0.5% of 
households in the baseline).
29
  
In general, keeping cash at organizations was initially quite sparse in the research 
area, and anecdotal evidence as well as qualitative data I drew from focus group 
discussions in several villages indicate low levels of knowledge about financial 
institutions. In this context, it is unclear to what extent most village residents would 
differentiate between cash deposits at an NGO, a cooperative, or a commercial bank, and 
                                               
28 For further details on formal and informal financial institutions of central Malawi, see Adelman and 
Nagarajan (2009), Meagher (2010), and McGuinness (2008).   





whether the differences matter to them. Existence as an organization external to 
indigenous village institutions is therefore used as the central criterion for differentiating 
between a “formal” savings account and an “informal” account. By this definition, all of 
the cash-storage methods mentioned above are defined as a formal account, with the 
exception of: (i) cash kept at a friend‟s or relative‟s home, (ii) cash contributed to a rosca, 
or (iii) cash kept in a friend‟s or relative‟s formal savings account. Instead, these are 
defined as “informal savings accounts”. 
A formal loan is similarly defined as any loan from an organization external to the 
village community – i.e. an organization that did not evolve from within the community 
as part of the village‟s indigenous institutions. The full list of potential lenders includes 
the organizations already mentioned above, plus local money-lenders, local grocery 
stores, MARDEF, Green Wing Capital, Blue Bank, and some church organizations. With 
the exception of loans from friends, relatives, informal money-lenders, grocery stores, 
and roscas, all the other loans are defined as “formal”. 
 
Variables on Inter-Household Transfer-Assistance Received or Given 
The main source of data on household transfers consists of a module that I added 
to the endline (2010) survey, which asks detailed questions about inter-household 
transfers. The variables derived from this module thus only exits in the endline cross-
section. 
The cash-gifts variable comes from a question which asks about gifts of 50 
Malawi Kwacha (about $US0.30) or more, received over a 90-day recall period preceding 




and a loan, the latter carrying with it an expectation of repayment of some type of wealth 
in the future. In addition, the module with questions on gifts came after a module in 
which detailed information was already gathered on loans. Interviewers were trained to 
distinguish between the two and collect information on each only in their respective parts 
of the questionnaire. Due to concerns about the length of the interview, details were not 
gathered on all gifts received. Instead, each household was asked whether any household 
member received a cash gift (exceeding 50 MK) from someone outside the household 
(over the last 90 days), as well as how many times such gifts were ever received during 
this period. Additional details were then gathered only for the most recent gift, as well as 
the largest gift (if the most recent was not the largest). These details included the value of 
the gift, the month of receipt, round-trip travel-time to request and receive the gift, and 
the perceived wealth-level of the giving household compared to that of the receiving 
household. 
The data also include information on any instances in which an individual 
external to the household helped a household member pay fees or expenses to a third 
party. This enabled us to capture wealth transfers which are in principle equivalent to a 
cash donation, yet which occur through a different path. Just as for the cash gifts, this 
variable is limited to assistance exceeding 50 MK, over the last 90 days. The same details 
are gathered for these types of assistance as for cash gifts (value, month received, travel 
time, and relative wealth status of giver), also just for the most recent occurrence and the 
highest-valued occurrence.  
In-kind gifts are also recorded, as wealth transfers may just as easily occur 




for the other two types of assistance receipts, only assistance over the last 90 days 
exceeding 50 MK was included, and the additional details were collected only for the 
most recent and the highest-valued assistance-receipts. 
 Data was also gathered on instances of giving any of these three types of 
assistance. For each type of assistance (cash-gifts, in-kind gifts, and help paying fees or 
expenses to a third party), respondents were first asked whether any household members 
provided a value exceeding 50 MK in the type of assistance to anyone outside the 
household, and if so, how many times over the last 90 days. Follow-up details were again 
limited to just the most recent assistance of each type, as well as the highest-valued 
assistance of each type. The additional details included the month the assistance was 
given, the value of the assistance given, and the perceived relative wealth status of the 
recipient compared to the giving household (travel times were not asked). 
 Finally, data was also gathered on cash loans given out from each household. 
(While the baseline survey did collect data on informal loans received from other 
households, there was no attempt to gather information on loans out.) Again, the recall 
period was 90 days, and the threshold amount was 50 MK. In addition to the same 
questions as above (how many times a household member loaned money to someone 
outside the household, the date and amount of the most recent loan given, and 
comparative wealth level of recipient), the data includes amounts repaid. This enables 
analysis of the prevalence of any interest rates on these loans, and any impacts from the 
formal financial markets expansion on interest rates charged by households extending 





Food Security : Discussion of Measurement & the Variables I Use in this Study 
The survey included a module on food security, with three sections: (i) a section 
measuring security of food-access along a 21-point scale, (ii) a section on food-access 
coping tactics used, and (iii) a section on dietary diversity. All three sections are directed 
towards the main food-preparer of the household. 
 I rely heavily on the first, the food-insecurity access scale, so it merits some 
further explanation. The food insecurity scale comes from the USAID Household Food 
Insecurity Access Scale (HFIAS) for Measurement of Food Access, a tool developed and 
tested over several years by USAID‟s Food and Nutrition  Technical Assistance 
(FANTA) project as a low-cost and minimally invasive method for measuring important 
dimensions of household food-insecurity.
30
 The HFIAS survey tool was created in 2007 
in order to meet the need for “relatively simple, but methodologically rigorous, indicators 
of the access component of household food insecurity…that can be used to guide, 
monitor, and evaluate program interventions.”
31
 
 Initially based on the approach used to estimate the prevalence of food insecurity 
in the United States, the method was adapted to fit developing-country contexts. It is 
based on the idea that certain universally predictable responses arise from the experience 
of food-insecurity, and that these reactions can be captured through a survey and 
quantified in a scale. The group details a variety of field studies which verify the 
performance and validity of this method in different developing country contexts. They 
note that the measures constructed through the HFIAS scale are strongly correlated with 
other common indicators of food consumption and correlated with indicators used by 
                                               
30 For a complete description of the Household Food Insecurity Access Scale, see Coates, Swindale, and 
Bilinsky, 2007. 




voluntary organizations used to monitor their food-security interventions. Importantly, 
measures derived from the HFIAS method have been found to be sensitive to changes in 
a household‟s situation over time, which helps make them useful for assessing impacts of 
interventions. Coates et. al. also describe a study of 22 different applications of pre-
cursors to this or similar scales which identified important universal commonalities 
across cultures in the experience of food-insecurity, which were integrated into the 
HFIAS scale. 
 It is important to note the HFIAS tool provides information on food-access, but 
not food-utilization. That is, its objective is to estimate the status of a household‟s ability 
to obtain food of sufficient quality and quantity, as well as changes in that status. 
Questions of how food is used within the household once obtained fall under the purview 
of food-utilization, rather than access. Measurement of this aspect of food-insecurity is 
better done through other approaches, such as anthropometrics.  
 The version used in the IRIS survey was slightly adjusted (it excluded, for 
example, a question on subjective perceptions of anxiety about ability to procure 
adequate food). It is comprised of 7 main questions: the first three intended to measure 
dimensions of the quality of food households are able to acquire, the last four intended to 
measure the extent to which the household is able to obtain food of sufficient quantity. 
The recall period is 30 days. Each main question asks whether a particular event occurred 
over the last 30 days; if so, a follow-up to that question asks how often it occurred. 
Interviewers were trained to ask the frequency as an open-ended question, then indicate 
the response in the questionnaire as 1-2 times in the last 30 days, 3-10 days in the last 30 




three questions measure perceptions about quality of food that households have access to. 
The remaining four questions measure perceptions about quantity of food to which the 
household has access. 
 
Table 3. Questions Used to Construct the HFIAS Food-Security Measures 
Quality-Related Questions 
1 In the past month (30 days), were you or any household member not able to eat the kinds of 
foods you preferred because of a lack of resources? 
2 In the past month (30 days), did you or any household member have to eat a limited variety 
of foods due to a lack of resources? 
3 In the past month (30 days), did you or any household member have to eat some foods that 
you really did not want to eat because of a lack of resources to obtain other types of food? 
 Quantity-Related Questions 
4 In the past month (30 days), did you or any household member eat less in either the 
morning or the evening meal than you felt you needed because there was not enough food? 
5 In the past month (30 days), did you or any other household member have to eat fewer than 
your normal number of meals in a day because there was not enough food? 
6 In the past month (30 days), did you or any household member go to sleep at night hungry 
because there was not enough food? 
7 In the past month (30 days), did you or any household member go a whole day and night 
without eating anything because there was not enough food? 
 
 
The HFIAS method and the information it gathers allows for the construction of 
several different indicators to quantify the intensity of a household's experience of food-
insecurity, or the depth and breadth of food-insecurity among a given population. It can 
be used for example to determine the percentage of households that ever (yes/no) 
experience a particular condition (i.e. one the seven main questions in Table 3) over the 
last 30 days, or instead the percentage that experience each particular condition at each of 
the four possible levels of frequency (never, rarely, sometimes, often). The HFIAS also 




allowing identification, for example, of households that ever (yes/no) experienced either 
of the two types of insecurity of food-access. 
However, the two measures that I use most extensively are the Household Food 
Insecurity Access Scale Score (HFIAS score) and Household Food Insecurity Access 
Prevalence (HFIAP). The first, the HFIAS score, is a 0-21 point scale with 0 being least 
food insecure and 21 being most food insecure.
32
 Lower scores therefore indicate better 
food security. Scores are generated through a simple sum of the frequency-level with 
which each of the 7 possible food-insecurity conditions occurred in the last 30 days. If the 
response to one of the main questions indicated that the condition occurred “often” 
during the recall period (i.e. more than 10 times), the household received a 3 for that 
condition. If the condition occurred between 3-10 times, the household received a 2, if it 
occurred 1-2 times, the household received a 1; if never, the household received a 0.  
While useful in that it provides a more continuous measure of food-insecurity, 
one which is more sensitive to marginal adjustments in food-security status over time, the 
HFIAS score is admittedly a bit crude. For example, while intended to be ordinal, it is not 
necessarily intended to be cardinal: a score of 9 is unambiguously worse than a score of 7 
in this scale, but it is not clear whether the difference between 9 and 7 is equivalent to the 
difference between 7 and 5 in terms of measuring the differences in severity of food 
insecurity. The difference between 7 and 5 may be less (or greater) than that between 9 
                                               
32 The IRIS questionnaire omitted 2 of the original 9 questions in USAID‟s set of questions. Hence, while 
there scale is from 0-27, our scale is from 0-21.  One omitted question would have asked “In the past 30 
days, did you worry that your household would not have enough food?” This question does not pertain to 
the domains of food quality or quantity, but rather to “anxiety” with respect to sufficient food-acquisition, 
and it was determined this did not add enough to the food-security measures to warrant the added time-cost 
to the interview. The other question omitted was: “In the past 30 days, was there ever no food to eat of any 
kind in your household, due to a lack of resources?” The baseline questionnaire included a few questions 
on a household‟s food-stocks, which would have partially replaced function of this question, but that 




and 7; the HFIAS method is silent on this issue. It might make more sense to weight 
certain conditions more heavily than others, in order to create a more “informed” 
continuous index of food-insecurity experienced. However, without greater theoretical 
guidance for the construction of a more refined index, I choose to follow the method 
already outlined by the HFIAS tool. Its clear disadvantages notwithstanding, it appears to 
perform well, and its simplicity makes it attractive. 
Fortunately, the HFIAS tool also provides a categorical indicator which does 
attach greater weight to more severe experiences of food-insecurity in a logical fashion: 
the Household Food Insecurity Access Prevalence (HFIAP) indicator. While this variable 
is less sensitive to incremental changes, the meaning of the difference between one value 
and another is fully transparent, and comparisons across households or over time more 
straightforward. The HFIAP groups households into 4 categories of food-access 
insecurity: food secure (assigned a value of 1), mildly food insecure (2), moderately food 
insecure (3), and severely food insecure (4).  The more severe food-insecurity conditions 
that a household says occurred, and the more frequently conditions occurred, the higher 
the score.  
Generally speaking, mildly food insecure households have enough in terms of 
quantity of food, but may have occasional  poor food quality (or frequent occurrence of 
the most mild restrictions on food quality).  Moderately food insecure households tend to  
have more frequent serious problems with food quality, and occasional problems with 
adequate quantities of food. Severely food insecure households have serious difficulty 




More specifically, to be classified as “food secure”, a household must say that 
none of the food insecurity conditions asked about ever occurred – i.e. the reply no to all 
seven of the main questions. A household is considered “mildly food insecure” if it 
reports experiencing some of the conditions indicating a restriction in the quality or 
diversity of foods consumed, but generally experiencing them only rarely (i.e. 1-2 times 
in the last 30 days). To be considered “moderately food insecure”, a household would 
have to experience restrictions on food-quality “sometimes” (3-10 times per 30 days) or 
“often” (more than 10 times), and/or indicate that the two less severe questions on 
quantity-restrictions questions (questions 4 and 5)  occurred “rarely” or “sometimes”. 
Finally, any of the following would lead a household to be classified as “severely food 
insecure”: reducing meal size (question 4) or meal number (question 5) “often”, or ever 
experiencing the two most severe conditions (going to bed hungry, or going a full day 
and night without eating). This system for categorizing households, summarized in Table 
4 below, ensures that each possible set of responses to the HFIAS questions places a 
household in a unique category. 
 











(10 or more times) 
1 Qual Mild Mild Mild 
2 Qual Mild Moderate Moderate 
3 Qual Mild Moderate Moderate 
4 Qty Moderate Moderate Severe 
5 Qty Moderate Moderate Severe 
6 Qty Severe Severe Severe 
7 Qty Severe Severe Severe 







 The food security module also included a series of questions aimed to measure the 
diversity of household members‟ diets. The recall period for these questions was 
shortened to the  last 7 days prior to the survey interview. Just as for the other questions 
in the food-security module, these questions were asked of the main food preparer of the 
household. The measures of diet diversity developed are based on food-categories 
defined by Arimond and Ruel (2004), who create a 7-point scale which is a simple sum 
of consumption from 7 different food groups which they identify (starchy staples, 
legumes, dairy, meats (incl. eggs), vitamin-A-rich fruits and vegetables, other fruits and 
vegetables, and fats). In an analysis evaluating this score as a predictor of anthropometric 
outcomes for young children across 11 countries (including Malawi), they find it does 
quite well. The IRIS scale runs from 0-12, however.  
 Finally, the food-security module also included a section on coping tactics 
employed by the household over the 30 days prior to the interview in order to access 
food.
33
 Each household was asked how often it made recourse to the following actions in 
order to obtain food over the last month: sale of livestock to buy food, sale of other assets 
to buy food, borrowing food from friends or relatives, borrowing cash from friends to buy 
food, borrowing cash from relatives to buy food, purchasing food on credit, gathering 
wild food or hunting, harvesting immature crops, sending household members to east 
somewhere else outside the home, sending household members to beg, restricting 
consumption by adults so children can eat, restricting consumption by non-working 
                                               
33 The literature often refers to these as “coping strategies”. I intentionally choose to call them tactics 
instead, as many of these actions are perhaps better understood as short-term or immediate responses to 





household members in favor of working members, receipt of food-aid from outside 
organizations such as the government or NGOs or religious organizations, relying on 
cash gifts from friends or relatives in order to purchase food, migrating to earn money in 
order to purchase food, working extra. The potential responses for how often each of 
these activities was done included: never, 1-3 times in the past 30 days; 1-2 times per 
week; 3-6 times per week; every day. I also make use of the data gathered from this 
section in analysis of the welfare effects experienced by households as a result of 





Defining Vulnerability   
 I classify households by level of vulnerability to hunger and low welfare 
outcomes with the use of baseline (2008) variables on food-security status, assets, 
education, distance from major roadways, and gender of household head. The primary 
indicator is the household‟s 2008 HFIAP food-security score. Recall that, as the survey 
was conducted during the pre-harvest “hungry” season, these scores are likely to reflect 
conditions during the most intense period of vulnerability to low food-intake. The HFIAP 
score is based on data on food-intake over the 30 days preceding the survey interview. 
The food insecurity section is a slightly modified version of the USAID Household Food 
Insecurity Access Scale for Measurement of Food Access (Coates, Swindale, and 
Bilinsky, 2007).  Scores are generated by examining the frequency with which each of 7 
possible food-insecurity conditions occurred in the last 30 days.  
The Household Food Insecurity Access Prevalence (HFIAP) score is a food 
sufficiency indicator largely reflecting caloric intake. The HFIAP score groups 
households into 4 categories – food secure, mildly food insecure, moderately food 
insecure, and severely food insecure.  Mildly food insecure households usually have 
enough food, but may have poor food quality at times.  Moderately and severely food 
insecure households have problems with adequate food intake (or serious lack of access 
to quality food).   
This measure by itself, however, is too broad to identify those households of 
highest vulnerability –  nearly 40% of the sample falls into the highest food-insufficiency 
category (HFIAP=4). In addition, random variability in household consumption 




have had a bad year during the baseline and are not as vulnerable on average as this 
simple measure would predict. Measurement error in the food-security questions 
introduces further noise. To better zero-in on vulnerability, I therefore add distance from 
the van-bank stop as a proxy for distance from major roads, possession of a cell-phone, 
literacy, and whether the household is female-headed. Possession of a cell-phone is a 
proxy for wealth-level, and literacy is defined as whether the household has any members 
that can read. Table 5 shows the definition for each classification, and indicates the 
number of households in the final full panel in each category. Categories A-D are 
mutually exclusive; after category D, each successive category is a subset of the 
preceding category. (That is, G is a subset of F, F is a subset of E, E is a subset of D.) 
 
Table 5. Definition of Vulnerability Categories 
Vulnerability 
Category 




Category A 2008 HFIAP = 1 
Household classified as “food-secure” in 2008. 
77 80 
Category B 2008 HFIAP = 2 
Classified as “mildly food-insecure” in 2008. 
61 55 
Category AB Category A & B Combined 138 135 
Category C 2008 HFIAP = 3 
Classified as “moderately food-insecure” in 2008. 
417 413 
Category D 2008 HFIAP = 4 
Classified as “severely food-insecure” in 2008. 
443 463 
Category E 2008 HFIAP = 4, 3+km 
Classified as “severely food-insecure” in 2008, located 3 
or more kilometers from the bus-bank stop. 
429 434 
Category F 2008 HFIAP = 4, 3+km, no cell phone 
Classified as “severely food-insecure” in 2008, located 3 
or more kilometers from the bus-bank stop, does not 
have cell-phone 
415 427 
Category G 2008 HFIAP = 4, 3+km, no cell phone, illiterate 
Classified as “severely food-insecure” in 2008, located 3 
or more kilometers from the bus-bank stop, does not 
have cell-phone,  and either: (i) no HH member is literate 
in Chichewa; or (ii) household head is female. 
141 131 






Characteristics of the Final Panel Dataset 
 
Table 6 shows descriptive statistics on a variety of key household characteristics 
in the sample. Most variables should be self-explanatory. The variable “Relative 
Supporter” is a dummy for whether the household reported in the baseline that they can 
rely on a relative for support in times of need, and the variable “Friend/Nbr Supporter” is 
a dummy for whether they reported in the baseline being able to rely on a friend or 
neighbor. The HFIAP-Score is a 4-point food-security indicator that forms the basis for 
vulnerability-categories. The HFIAS-score is a 21-point food-security indicator. (For 
both indicators, higher values imply less security.) Category A through Category G are 
household vulnerability indicators, defined in the next section, such that these take a 
value of 1 if the household belongs to the category. Unless otherwise indicated, the 
reported values are percentages of households in the sample for which the indicator 




Table 6. Descriptive Baseline (2008) Statistics on Households in Final Panel 
  Overall   Lilongwe   Dedza Mchinji 
  Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d. 
Head is Male 0.852 0.355 0.850 0.358 0.849 0.358 0.859 0.348 
HH Size (People) 5.2 2.0 4.9 1.8 5.2 1.9 5.5 2.2 
Head's Age (Years) 41.6 13.9 41.3 14.3 40.7 13.0 43.4 14.8 
Head Has Some 
Schooling 
0.794 0.405 0.804 0.398 0.798 0.402 0.779 0.415 
Head Has PSLC or 
Higher 
0.248 0.432 0.203 0.402 0.231 0.422 0.309 0.463 
Has Literate Members 0.856 0.352 0.837 0.370 0.834 0.373 0.903 0.296 
Durable Assets (USD) 180.82 1009.02 115.68 312.20 132.43 322.99 305.01 1761.01 
Total Assets (USD) 1095.52 2681.48 1014.41 1542.66 841.49 1670.72 1542.22 4162.72 
Has Cell phone 0.119 0.324 0.096 0.295 0.123 0.329 0.133 0.339 
Has Salaried Member 0.148 0.356 0.096 0.295 0.175 0.380 0.149 0.356 
Has Business 0.255 0.436 0.284 0.451 0.265 0.441 0.219 0.414 
Land (Acres) 2.66 1.88 2.73 2.04 2.57 1.62 2.74 2.10 
HFIAP Score (1-4) 3.24 0.87 3.36 0.75 3.24 0.89 3.13 0.93 
HFIAS Score (1-21) 7.91 4.63 8.17 4.26 8.20 4.75 7.27 4.66 
Bank-Stop Distance 
(km) 
8.04 3.22 7.75 3.20 8.21 3.17 8.01 3.31 
Has Formal Acct 0.108 0.311 0.136 0.343 0.081 0.273 0.128 0.334 
Has Formal Loan 0.062 0.241 0.048 0.214 0.065 0.247 0.067 0.251 
Relative-Supporter 0.710 0.454 0.749 0.434 0.707 0.455 0.684 0.465 
Friend/Nbr-Supporter 0.789 0.408 0.856 0.352 0.777 0.417 0.756 0.430 
Category A Households 0.078 0.268 0.040 0.195 0.083 0.276 0.101 0.302 
Category B Households 0.058 0.233 0.044 0.205 0.055 0.229 0.072 0.259 
Category C Households 0.413 0.493 0.430 0.496 0.396 0.489 0.426 0.495 
Category D Households 0.451 0.498 0.486 0.500 0.466 0.499 0.401 0.490 
Category E Households 0.430 0.495 0.470 0.500 0.442 0.497 0.380 0.486 
Category F Households 0.419 0.494 0.445 0.497 0.440 0.497 0.368 0.483 
Category GH 
Households 
0.135 0.342 0.138 0.345 0.149 0.356 0.113 0.317 
Number of HHs (qty) 2,009   479   919   311   
Except where indicated in parentheses, units are proportions. Conversion rate for dollars 
used is about 141.5 kwacha to the dollar. Literacy is defined as being able to read and 






About 85% of the households are male-headed, with little to no variation across 
the three districts. The mean number of household members is 5.2, with household sizes a 
bit smaller in Lilongwe (4.9) and a bit larger in Dedza (5.5). The average age of 
household heads is 41.6 years old, with ages slightly higher in Mchinji and slightly lower 
in Dedza. For the majority of households (79%), the head had at least some years of 
schooling, but a much smaller proportion actually finished primary school (25%).
34
 Just 
over 86% of the households have at least one literate household member (defined as 
being able to read and write in Chichewa). Mchinji appears better educated on average 
than the other districts, with a higher proportion of heads that finished primary school 
(31%), and a higher proportion of households with at least one literate member (90%). 
I use two different asset variables. The first is the total value of the household‟s 
durable assets, excluding the value of any buildings, but including things like furniture, 
tools, bicycles, any appliances, and any micro-business assets (e.g. local beer-brewing 
materials). The second measure includes self-reported estimates of land-value, livestock, 
any cash savings deposits, and the value of all structures owned by the household. The 
mean value of durable assets is about $ 181 US, while that for total assets is $1,095 US. 
There is a very high degree of variation in both of these values, however. (The respective 
median values are about $50 for durable assets and $542 for total assets.)  Mobile phone 
ownership is also likely be a strong indicator of wealth – particularly the upper spectrum, 
indicating having surpassed a certain relatively high wealth threshold. This is especially 
likely to be true in 2008, when mobile phone penetration rates were still quite low, and 
typically only the relatively wealthy would have them.  Overall, 11.9% of households 
                                               




possessed a mobile phone. By all three measures, the average wealth level tends to be 
higher in Mchinji. 
Table 7 below shows the most common sources of income. While about a quarter 
of the households reported operating small non-agricultural businesses in the baseline, the 
majority derive their income primarily from farming. The average amount of land is 
owned is about 2.5 acres (the median is 2.0).  The main staple crop is maize, while 
tobacco is the most significant cash crop.  Other crops include groundnuts (peanuts) and 
vegetables.  The most commonly reported businesses include trading in produce or 
groceries, brewing and selling beer, petty trading, food processing, street-food sales, 
collecting and selling firewood. 
 Among household heads, the reported main occupations were farming (82%), 
salaried profession (8%), household business (5%),  and wage labor (4%). Nearly all 
households (99%) reported at least some level of farming, about 72% of the sample 
reported some level of animal husbandry over the year leading up to the interview in 




Table 7. Income-Generating Activities of Sampled Households 
 (% of households reporting) 
Farm Work 99% 
Animal Husbandry 72% 
Non-Agricultural Business 26% 
Salaried 15% 
Ganyu (casual Day-Labor) 47% 
 
                                               
35 Information on whether anyone in the household engaged in any casual-wage labor (or ganyu), is drawn 
from a household labor module, which only gathers data on labor over the last 30 days prior to the 
interview. So this figure is a lower bound of the estimate of households that engaged in ganyu. Ganyu labor 
is typically informal work for cash, e.g. working for a friend or neighbor in their fields or mending or 




The mean value for the 4-point food security indicator Household Food Insecurity 
Access Prevalence (HFIAP)  was 3.24, indicating quite low overall levels of food-
security, particularly with respect to food quality. This is perhaps not surprising, as the 
survey was conducted during the pre-harvest “lean” or “hungry” season, a period of 
heightened vulnerability, when food-stocks may run low for many households.  Table 8 
shows the percentage of households in each of the four categories.  Forty-five percent of 
households were severely food insecure, meaning that they have significant problems 
with food access. An additional 41% of households were moderately food insecure, 
meaning that they have frequent problems accessing quality foods or some problems 
accessing food at all.  Six percent fell into the mildly food-insecure category, and only 
8% of households were categorized as food secure.   
 
Table 8. Household Food Insecurity Access Prevalence (HFIAP) in 2008 
HFIAP Overall Lilongwe Dedza Mchinji 
Food secure 8% 4% 8% 10% 
Mildly food insecure 6% 4% 6% 7% 
Moderately food insecure 41% 43% 40% 43% 
Severely food insecure 45% 49% 47% 40% 
 
 
The sample average for the more refined 21-point Household Food Insecurity 
Access Scale (HFIAS) was 7.9, with a high degree of variation within districts. For the 
household diet diversity score (HDDS), high values indicate greater diet diversity, so that 
higher scores for this indicator are actually better rather than worse, unlike the other two 
indicators. The mean value for this variable was 7.1. As was the case for the asset 




higher proportion of households in the better-off food-security categories than the other 
two households, a lower average HFIAS score, and better diet diversity scores. 
The distance variable measures the radial distance (i.e. “as the crow flies”) from a 
central point in the village cluster to the closest regular stop  for the van-bank. (Recall 
that the bank‟s stopping points were located in six different trading centers located along 
the main highway.)  Households in the sample were located on average about 8 km from 
the closest stop by this measure.  
While over a third of the households (38.1%) report use of some sort of financial 
service external to the household, this is heavily dominated by informal services – 
particularly informal loans. Only 14.2% of the sample reports current use of formal 
services – 10.8% have formal savings accounts, 6.2% have current formal loans, and 
2.7% have both a formal savings and a current formal loan. A small proportion, 2.2% of 
the sample (45 households) have informal “savings accounts” (e.g. cash kept at a friend‟s 
or relative‟s house, or cash contributions to a rosca). The bulk of financial service use is 
comprised by informal loans, as 25.6% of all households report at least one current 
informal loan. Most of these were current loans from friends or relatives, held by 24.1% 
of the sample. 
Almost a third of the sample (31%) reported a current loan of some type. Among 
households with current loans, 17.4% had formal loans only, 80% had informal loans 
only, and 2.6% had both informal and formal loans. Only 13% of the sample reported use 
of an external cash-storage method.  Of these households, 82.8% had only a formal 
savings account, 16.9% had only an informal account,  and only one household had both 




Among households reporting current informal loans, the mean number held was 
1.2; 85% had only one, 14% had two, and 1% had 3 or more. Among those with informal 
cash-savings mechanisms, 98% of the households reported only one such informal 
savings “account”. Among households with current formal loans, none of them had  more 
than one formal loan. Among the 217 households reporting formal savings accounts, the 
mean number of formal accounts held by the household was 1.2; 86% held only one 
formal account, 13% held only 2 accounts, and 1% held 3 or more accounts. The average 
account balance is MK 16,290, but with a wide dispersion. The median is MK 4,000, the 
first quartile MK 1,000, and the third quartile MK10,000. Average loan sizes from formal 
and informal sources were about US$122 and US$14, respectively.  The majority of 










Table 9 reports the baseline characteristics for those households which attrited 
from the sample, and includes a column indicating any significant differences between 
the attriters and non-attriters. Attrition appears to have been disproportionately heavier 
among slightly better-off households in the sample, though not unreasonably so. Rates of 
failure to re-interview in 2010 were significantly higher from semi-urban areas – 
particularly the two bomas (the administrative centers of Dedza and Mchinji Districts) – 
most likely due to higher mobility among people located in such areas. For example, 
while only 4.5% of all households in the baseline lived in a community located within 1 
km of the mobile bank stop, 14.1% of attrited households came from these areas, 
compared to 3.0% among the non-attrited group (significant at the .01-level, not shown in 
table).  
Most other differences across attrited and non-attrited households appear likely to 
be driven from the fact that attrition was higher among those in closer proximity to urban 
areas. Attrited households are on average smaller (4.8 vs. 5.2 mean size), their household 
heads are younger (37.2 vs. 41.7 yrs old), and there is some evidence that their heads are 
slightly more educated (31.7% of attrited HHs had heads with  PSLC degree or higher, 
compared to 24.8% among non-attrited). Attrited households were more likely to possess 








Table 9.  Descriptive Baseline (2008) Statistics on Attrited Households 
  Overall    Lilongwe   Dedza Mchinji 
  Mean s.d. Diff Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d. 
Head is Male 0.844 0.364  0.872 0.336 0.800 0.401 0.884 0.322 
HH Size (People) 4.8 2.0 *** 4.8 2.4 4.8 1.8 4.7 1.8 
Head's Age (Years) 37.2 12.6 *** 36.4 14.1 37.4 11.0 37.5 13.5 
Head Has Some 
Schooling 
0.831 0.376  0.802 0.401 0.819 0.386 0.874 0.334 
Head Has PSLC or 
Higher 
0.317 0.466 *** 0.151 0.360 0.319 0.468 0.463 0.501 
Has Literate Members 0.874 0.332  0.814 0.391 0.869 0.339 0.937 0.245 
Durable Assets (USD) 39492 169998  15375 41790 33897 122268 69866 271891 
Total Assets (USD)          
Has Cell phone 0.215 0.411 *** 0.116 0.322 0.221 0.416 0.295 0.458 
Has Salaried Member 0.202 0.402 ** 0.116 0.322 0.241 0.429 0.221 0.417 
Has Business 0.325 0.469 *** 0.279 0.451 0.269 0.445 0.453 0.500 
Land (Acres) 2.39 1.59 ** 2.83 2.03 2.15 1.42 2.35 1.32 
HFIAP Score (1-4) 3.11 0.98 * 
(ranksum) 
3.31 0.80 3.08 1.05 2.99 0.99 
HFIAS Score (1-21) 7.03 4.92 *** 7.66 4.33 7.29 5.26 6.05 4.80 
Bank-Stop Distance (km) 7.16 4.15 *** 8.10 3.92 7.33 4.25 6.05 3.97 
Has Formal Acct 0.176 0.381 *** 0.118 0.324 0.179 0.385 0.223 0.419 
Has Formal Loan 0.058 0.235  0.058 0.235 0.062 0.242 0.053 0.224 
Relative-Supporter 0.684 0.466  0.709 0.457 0.717 0.452 0.611 0.490 
Friend/Nbr-Supporter 0.782 0.413  0.849 0.360 0.772 0.421 0.737 0.443 
Category A Households 0.113 0.318 ** 0.058 0.235 0.138 0.346 0.126 0.334 
Category B Households 0.086 0.281 * 0.035 0.185 0.097 0.296 0.116 0.322 
Category C Households 0.374 0.485  0.442 0.500 0.317 0.467 0.400 0.492 
Category D Households 0.426 0.495  0.465 0.502 0.448 0.499 0.358 0.482 
Category E Households 0.371 0.484 ** 0.419 0.496 0.393 0.490 0.295 0.458 
Category F Households 0.340 0.475 *** 0.419 0.496 0.372 0.485 0.221 0.417 
Category GH Households 0.132 0.339  0.186 0.391 0.152 0.360 0.053 0.224 
Number of HHs (qty) 326   86  145  95  
Except where indicated in parentheses, units are proportions. Conversion rate for dollars used is about 
141.5 kwacha to the dollar. Literacy is defined as being able to read and write in Chichewa 
 
 
 Among attrited, 20.2% had a salaried household member, while only 14.8% 
among the non-attrited households did. Attrited are more likely to have a household 




to be users of formal savings services (again, probably due to a higher proportion of them 
living closer to more urban environments, and perhaps due to the higher prevalence of 
salaried household members): 17.6% of attrited households report formal savings 
accounts in 2008, compared to 10.8% among non-attrited. Attrited households have on 
average less land than non-attrited (2.4 acres, compared to 2.7 acres among non-attrited). 
 Not surprisingly then, the attrited appear to be slightly less vulnerable on average. 
Attrited households had mildly better food-security scores in 2008, with a mean HFIAP 
score of 3.1 (compared to 3.2 among non-attrited, significant at the .10-level using a 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test), and mean HFIAS score of 7.0 (compared with 7.9 among non-
attrited). The attrited are mildly more representative of the non-vulnerable household 
categories. Among attrited households, 11.3% of were in vulnerability category A, 8.6% 
in category B, 37.4% in category C, 45.1% in category D . The analogous percentages for 
non-attrited are 7.8%, 5.8%, 41.3%, 42.6%. 
The attriters still represent a fairly diverse group, however, drawing from all 
sections of the 2008 sample. For example, while significant, average distance from 
mobile bank-stop is only7.2 km among attrited, 8.0 among non-attrited. There appears to 
be no significant difference in the distributions of total value of durable assets between 
each group (whether through t-test or Wilcoxon rank-sum).  More than three-quarters 
(79.8%) of the attrited group lived in clusters located 3 or more kilometers from the 
mobile bank-stop. There is no evidence of differences in literacy rates, social capital, or 
formal credit use between the attrited and non-attrited; and the attrited still represent a 




proportion of the highly vulnerable household-type (category G) across attrited and non-
attrited; they account for just over 13% of either group. 
3.3. Conclusion   
This chapter explained the empirical setting this dissertation uses to examine the 
indirect effects of formal savings use on the highly vulnerable non-users. It has described 
the major features of the longitudinal data used for analysis. It also detailed the data-
collection process, and defined key variables to be used in the analysis.  
This chapter has also highlighted key features of the setting which make it 
particularly amenable to an analysis of the indirect effects of formal financial services 
expansion on safety nets based on inter-household transfers. The initial shallow presence 
of formal finance is confirmed by the low penetration and usage rates measured in the 
baseline data. In addition, there is a strong presence of inter-household financial 
assistance, with over a quarter of the sample reporting recent loans from other households 
in 2008, and nearly half of the sample reporting recent cash-gifts or loans from friends or 
relatives in 2010. Finally, the fact that the survey took place during what is generally the 
most vulnerable period of the year – the pre-harvest lean season, when household 
resources are stretched to their thinnest – means that the data is likely to capture impacts 
on those transfers which are most likely to have substantial welfare effects. 
To accurately ascertain the impacts of financial deepening in this context, we 
designed a large-scale natural field experiment to exogenously boost formal savings rates 
among half the sample. The next chapter describes the experiment, based on an 
information intervention, the random assignment of which enables causal identification 




constructed, how it fits into the ordinary experiences of village communities in the area, 
and the randomization process. It then examines the effects the instrument had on formal 







Chapter 4. Exogenously Boosting Access Through a Natural Field 




In some ways, the ideal financial services impact assessment relies on a strict 
randomization of access. For the research questions I explore, for example, analysis 
would have been much simpler if a subsample of the communities in the overall sample 
had been randomly given improved access to the bank‟s services. This would have 
provided a very clean and simple group of treated communities against which an 
appropriate random selection from other communities would have served as a clean and 
simple control.  
However, strict randomization in the social sciences is often not practical, nor 
always ethical. In addition, when analyzing human behavior, in settings where 
randomization is unnatural, it may actually even be harmful to accurate identification of 
causal effects. Given that formal financial service expansion often proceeds through 
increased proximity of financial institutions to potential users, it is typically difficult to 
randomly select those to whom you provide improved access to. This was certainly the 
case in the present research setting, where expanded access was through a mobile van-




Comparing the communities in this area to controls drawn from other parts of the 
country would run the risk of important location-based heterogeneity which can strongly 
bias results. 
Another alternative would have been to deny access to the randomly selected 
controls. This has ethical complications, however, particularly if it is believed that these 
services may improve welfare outcomes of the poor, if the whole point of the project is to 
expand access to the poor, and the access has essentially already been provided. To make 
extra efforts to prevent some from using as service that may benefit them, even if the 
ultimate goal is to improve outcomes, puts the researcher on ethically questionable 
ground. Denying access also would have imposed important costs on the microfinance 
institution. On the one hand, staff would have needed to be trained to identify excluded 
communities, make sure to disallow people from those areas from completing the 
application process, and find acceptable ways of explaining to them that they would have 
to wait up to two years while others could start using services immediately. On the other 
hand, the bank would have had to turn away many potential depositors and their capital. 
These considerations aside, the institution was unwilling to randomly deny access to 
potential clients, and so this was not an option. 
It is important to note, however, that it is not clear randomly disallowing access is 
superior even from a research perspective. At least a few members of almost all of the 
control communities would have learned of the bank‟s expansion of access and tried to 
start using its services.
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 Had they been denied access while those in neighboring villages 
were allowed, and without any reasonable rationale for doing so, this would certainly 
                                               





have been perceived by individuals in the control villages is strange and probably unfair. 
This would have clearly disrupted the naturalness of the experimental setting, and it is 
hard to predict what the resulting impacts on behavior might be. A simple example might 
be that perceptions of discrimination against the community would increase local 
solidarity, and somehow affect inter-household assistance. 
The method we settled on was an encouragement in the form of an intensive 
information campaign that we designed to serve as an instrument for service take-up.  
This approach has the virtue of leaving the naturalness of the setting intact, as the 
presence or absence of an encouragement is more subtle than village-based denial of 
services-access, and also as there are more natural explanations even if the presence or 
absence is noticed (the bank has limited resources, they might visit other communities 
later, etc.). It also aligned very well with the objectives of the microfinance institution. 
No denial of access to potential clients was required, and it also enabled them to test a 
new marketing strategy (one which they subsequently expanded to other parts of the 
country, as they liked it so much). 
This chapter describes the information intervention and assesses its performance 
as an instrument for local formal savings rates. The first section describes the research 
that informed the intervention, and how it was implemented. Section II discusses the 
exclusion restrictions which must hold in order to interpret changes caused by the 
intervention to be operating through the channel of increased local formal savings rates. It 
explores the ways they may be violated, and argues that it is reasonable to assume the 
assumptions hold, so that the instrument may be validly omitted from the second stage of 




followed to randomize communities into information-treated and information-control, 
and tests for balance across the samples. Section IV describes the expected effects of the 
intervention ex-ante, and Section V analyzes the actual effects of the information 
campaign on financial services adoption. 
 
 
4.1. Creating & Implementing the Information Intervention  
Qualitative Research to Inform Method & Content of Intervention 
 
 “Dedza [boma] is too far to get to! It costs too much to access your 
money there. It’s no longer worth it!” – Focus Group participant, 
Nanseta Village, Dedza District, February 2008. 
 Two different types of Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were held, each with the 
aim of acquiring a different type of information to help guide creation of the information 
intervention. The objective of the first type of FGDs was to gather data to help determine 
the form of the encouragement, and the objective of the second one to determine its 
content. Information obtained in one type of FGD was often useful for the objective 
originally intended for the other type of FGD. Information was also cross-checked with 
other FGDs. 
In order to determine the form that the information-intervention should take (i.e. 
the delivery method for the encouragement to adopt financial services), several focus 




February of 2008 (shortly after the launch of the baseline survey). Each focus group 
consisted of about 10-12 people, with an equal mix of men and women. Participants in 
these discussions were not informed that we were affiliated with any particular 
organization. In some cases, the participants were randomly sampled, while in others they 
were a representative convenient sample, selected from community members who 
happened to be present and available at the time of the discussions.
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 Requests to 
participate were rarely, if ever, refused. (The discussions were held during a period of 
low labor demand, and individuals were often curious to interact with a foreigner and 
appeared to appreciate being asked their opinions.) 
 Discussions in these groups were guided by questions intended to ascertain the 
following: (i) community members‟ current extent of knowledge about formal financial 
services and their availability; (ii) how people acquired any information they do have 
about formal financial services; (iii) the quality of the information they currently have; 
(iv) what sources of extra-village information community members typically rely on and 
consider trustworthy for other spheres of activity; (v) subjective perceptions about the 
best way to increase knowledge about formal financial services in the community and 
reasons for why. Typical questions asked include: What financial organizations can 
people living here use, and what do they use them for? How do people in this community 
learn about financial services and their availability? From what sources do people in this 
village obtain other types of information about services and activities outside the village? 
                                               
37 When the FGD was scheduled enough in advance, random sampling of participants was feasible. If 
scheduled on too short a notice, we were forced to work with whoever was present and available at the 
time. In such cases, every possible effort was made to ensure participation by people representing a variety 




Among these, what is the most common way that people in the village get information 
from outside the community?
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 Some important consistent themes emerged from these discussions. One was that 
people generally had very low levels of awareness of formal financial services and 
knowledge about them, and sometimes knowledge that people did have was incorrect. In 
one village, for example, participants knew mostly just about the availability of certain 
types of savings accounts and wiring services provided by the post office in a trading 
center about an hour away on foot (the most common method of transportation). 
Information they had on any financial services from further afield came predominantly 
from one or two people in the village – men who traveled far enough and often enough to 
have such types of information, and who they said owned formal accounts in Dedza 
boma (several hours away). Some discussion participants also expressed significant 
mistrust of financial organizations, and a concern that financial services could be a guise 
used by others to swindle people of their money. 
Another common theme was that these areas typically already receive regular 
informational visits by various types of representatives from outside the community 
whose job it is to disseminate new knowledge. The most common examples cited were 
agricultural extension officers, and nutrition or health workers, sent by the government to 
provide information about new products on the market, health issues, provide 
vaccinations, etc. Participants in at least one village also mentioned regular visits by 
forestry experts. In some instances, agricultural extension officers were cited as a source 
                                               
38 The full set of pre-established questions is in Appendix X1. These questions are better understood as a 
guide, however, rather than a structured group interview. Digressions from these questions in the natural 
flow of the discussion were often pursued in order to maximize the amount of useful information unearthed 




for minimal information on formal financial services, such as how to set up formal 
accounts or how to apply for formal loans at certain institutions.  
Finally, perhaps based on their experiences with visits by these other highly 
informed outsiders, when asked about effective methods for spreading knowledge about 
financial services, most individuals in the FGDs expressed a strong desire to have regular 
access to some sort of “expert”. They wanted someone who they could ask questions 
regularly, someone from whom they could learn more about the specific value or 
usefulness of financial services to them. Other suggestions for effective ways to spread 
knowledge about formal financial services included holding one or a few classes in the 
village for the entire community to attend, or intensively training a few members of the 
community to serve as local educators or fixed information-resources in the village. 
These options tended to be less valued, however, than repeated visits by an outside 
expert, as there seemed to be a strong preference for regular access to reliable 
information “from the source”. 
The second type of focus group discussions were held to gather information to 
help determine the content to be included in the encouragement. For these, individuals 
were sampled from known clients of OIBM, the institution whose services were being 
evaluated by the impact assessment. The goal was to learn from them what types of 
information were most pivotal in their decision to start using formal financial products, 
and what their most serious concerns and questions were before adopting them. Having 
been identified and contacted through OIBM staff, the participants in these FGDs clearly 
knew that discussion facilitators were somehow associated with the financial 




that the goal of the discussion was to determine the best ways to explain its financial 
products and services to potential new clients in other villages. For these discussions, 
men and women were met with separately.
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Typical questions included: How did you first learn of the financial organization? 
Is there anything you could have been told when you were first learning of the 
organization that would have helped you better understand the financial services 
available to you? Were there any difficulties or points of confusion in the application 
process? Is there anything you wish you had known earlier in the process, or that would 
have helped you had you known it sooner? What are the most important or valuable 
aspects of savings (or credit) services to you? 
In addition, after probing to generate a list of things that clients wished they had 
known about the savings (or credit) services prior to starting use of the service, each FGD 
was guided through a rapid appraisal exercise. Each of the pieces of information was 
listed, and the group ranked them from most important to least important. 
Some of the key factors that participants identified as instrumental in their 
decision to adopt use of formal financial services included things such as fully 
understanding the fees structure of different services, discovering that fees and minimum 
balances were actually low enough for them to be able to use the services, fully 
understanding the application process (such as what passes as acceptable identification).
40
 
                                               
39This did not appear to have an important effect on the types of information provided. For the first type of 
FGD (to inform the method of the information-intervention), it was observed that the presence of men in 
the discussions did appear to have a mild impact on some women‟s willingness to voice their opinions. 
However, the effect was varied, did not appear particularly strong, and the interpreter (a woman) was adept 
at putting them women at ease and pulling them into the conversation. Nevertheless, to be careful, the 
second type of FGD was segregated by gender, to ensure all relevant information could be gathered. 
40 Identification documents can be quite costly and difficult to obtain in these areas. Birth certificates are 
not common, and while individuals can apply for certain types of ID at local government offices in the 




There were also several issues that clients wished had been cleared to them earlier on. 
These included things such as what would happen to their money in case of death, and 
also what would happen to any debts they may owe. Several people wished they had 
better understood the fees for maintaining savings accounts. Others wished they had 
better understood how the collateral needed in order to receive loans was determined. The 
findings from these discussions were then combined with pre-existing marketing 
materials of OIBM to create the content of the information intervention. 
 
The Information Intervention 
After consolidating the findings from the qualitative background research, I 
worked with the marketing team of OIBM to integrate what we learned into a plan for an 
information intervention that would meet both the institution‟s goals as well as our 
research objectives. Together, we fashioned an “intensive marketing campaign”, based on 
face-to-face interactions with a field based representative from the bank. This format of 
regular informational visits by a bank representative mirrored other commonly used 
methods to disseminate information to village communities in the area, and was in accord 
with the suggestions of community members themselves for the best way to provide 
information on financial services. 
The 60 village-clusters assigned to the information treatment (56 clusters in the 
final panel, after dropping the 4 problematic pairs) were divided into eighteen different 
groups of about 3-4 clusters each. Field-Based Promotional Assistants (FBPAs) were 
then hired to be responsible for each group of information-treated clusters. In general, the 
                                                                                                                                            
costs to visit the offices. One early advantage of OIBM was the possibility of using one‟s fingerprint as 




FBPAs came from communities in central locations with respect to the clusters in their 
group, typically from a larger trading center, often located along the main highway. All 
FBPAs were required to have at least a high school diploma; to be able to read and write 
fluently in English, as well as speak Chichewa and English fluently; and to have strong 
communication skills.  
After being hired, the FBPAs participated in a two-day intensive training, held 
only once for all of them together. The training focused on details of the financial 
services offered through OIBM‟s mobile bank, common questions of potential new users, 
and how best to explain the services to people unfamiliar with financial products. The 
FBPAs were instructed to remain within the boundaries of the enumeration areas 
assigned to the information-treatment. Each was given the same set of materials to be 
brought to the village with them on each visit, and the same reference guide for 
information on the financial services and answers to frequently asked questions.
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(Appendix 7 includes a copy of the training manual and reference guide used by the 
FBPAs.) In addition to their salary, each FBPA was paid a weekly transportation 
allowance, which most of them used to purchase and maintain bicycles to be used to 
travel along the dirt paths to get to the villages where they were working. 
 
  
                                               
41 In addition to a manual for the training, they were also given complete lists of frequently asked  
questions, informed by the focus group discussions with clients and non-clients. Each FBPA also brought 
to the village a few copies of three different types of posters, to be posted outside  in central locations of the 





4.2. The Exclusion Restriction: Could the Instrument Have Had a Direct Effect? 
The focus group discussions on how people in rural communities obtain 
trustworthy information from sources outside the village informed a marketing campaign 
that mirrored these methods of information dissemination. The backbone of the campaign 
consisted of the periodic visits from the FBPA, who brought informational materials, 
talked with members of the community, and left posters and other promotional materials 
in each village assigned to the marketing treatment. (See Appendix 7 for a copy of the 
training manual and information disseminated.) The goal was to exogenously induce 
higher take-up rates in the marketing village clusters than in non- marketing clusters.  
The exclusion restriction required for the encouragement to be able to function as 
a valid instrument relies on the assumption that the only way periodic informational visits 
by bank representatives changed villagers‟ behavior, such that it differed from the non-
encouraged clusters, was in their decision about whether to adopt formal services. That is, 
the validity of the instrument requires that these visits by themselves did not directly 
influence the outcomes of interest (e.g. inter-household transfers) through a channel other 
than the uptake of financial services. This would be violated, for example, if the 
information intervention affected other behaviors in the community besides service-
adoption, or altered other community-level variables, in ways that affected the outcomes 
of interest. The assumption that the exclusion restriction holds is valid if the only change 








The exclusive goal of the campaign was to provide information on the 
institution‟s products, with the hope that this would cause households to realize that it 
was to their benefit to open up savings accounts. As the bank is a savings-driven 
institution, its goal was to expand its client base, and the sole responsibility of FBPAs 
was to bring in more clients to the bank – i.e. recruit more formal savers. Their job 
consisted entirely of teaching locals about financial products and why they might find 
those offered by the bank useful. 
For the exclusion restriction to be violated, either (i) the information-content itself 
would have had to affect choices besides the financial services adoption decision; or (ii) 
the form the intervention took – periodic visits by the FBPAs – would have had to 
introduce elements to the marketing clusters not also present in the non-marketing 
clusters. With regard to the second possibility, it is not clear what visits by the FBPAs 
would introduce to communities other than information. Their sole job was to provide 
information on the bank‟s services and recruit new clients, and they were incentivized to 
do so as broadly and rapidly as possible. They were also present in each village only once 
every few weeks, sometimes only for a few hours,
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 preoccupied with the goal of 
teaching, convincing, and recruiting new clients. 
                                               
42 As discussed elsewhere, one explanation for why more information should lead to adoption of services is 
that the information intervention can be seen as a random reduction of information-acquisition costs for 
those in the marketing clusters.  
43 The FBPAs typically walked or bicycled to the communities where they worked. Travel times could be 





It is possible that tangential elements are somehow incidentally introduced by 
these types of visits to villages by outsiders from urban areas. Nevertheless, it is unlikely 
this would have caused any systematic differences between the encouraged and non-
encouraged clusters.  Most of the village clusters (marketing and non-marketing) are all 
located within 10 km of a major highway. The periodic presence of non-locals whose job 
it is to bring outside information to the communities is not unusual.
44
  It is quite common, 
for example, for agricultural extension officers and nutrition and health extension 
officers, to make informational visits to these villages in order to educate people about 
new techniques, practices, and available services
45
. This is just as true in the non-
encouraged clusters as in the encouraged clusters. Insofar as the form it took, the 
marketing campaign therefore does not introduce anything new or unusual.
46
  
Each FBPA was responsible for as many as 20-30 villages, and as much as a 
month might pass between visits. Given these circumstances, it is perhaps more likely 
that the survey interview itself (as it involves extended contact with a village outsider, i.e. 
the interviewer, in a 1.5-3 hour discussion of intimate details about the households) might 
have some sort of tangential effects of the sort that could be caused by the form of 
information intervention. Yet this was of course administered both in the treated and 
control areas. Taking all these factors into consideration, it is therefore unlikely that the 
                                               
44 This is actually a nice virtue of fashioning the encouragement in the way that we did – it fits right in with 
other commonly experienced “interventions” in these communities, which minimizes the risk that it did 
anything new to the marketing-areas (not also being experienced in the non-marketing areas), besides the 
provision of information on formal financial services. 
45 This was, in fact, the primary inspiration for how I designed the encouragement. After learning that this 
is the standard way that villages commonly receive information from outside, I intentionally fashioned the 
information intervention to mimic these pre-existing methods. 
46 While it might be argued that the campaign does add another set of visits, and this might matter if such 
visits do indeed have tangential effects, any marginal impact the mere periodic presence of FBPAs might 
have on local outcomes is minimal compared to decades of visits by government extension workers, aid 
organizations, and others. In addition, for this to have any bearing on the exclusion restriction‟s validity, it 





work of the FBPAs could have introduced anything to marketing areas not also already 
present in the non-marketing areas – besides the provision of information on financial 
services.  
The second way that the encouragement could have had a direct effect is that the 
information-content itself could have somehow affected behaviors other than the 
financial services adoption decision. There is no clear reason to expect that more 
information about formal financial products would, by itself, lead to changes in inter-
household assistance behavior. While detailed knowledge among those who actually use 
the services may be relevant to choices about assisting others (e.g. individuals realize 
they have higher rates of return by using formal savings), in most cases knowledge about 
services should be irrelevant to non-users. In particular, there is no reason to expect that 
simply knowing the details about formal savings and credit products should cause 
someone who does not use such products to start giving more assistance to others.  
To the extent that marketing might contain non-informational components 
intended to persuade (framing, etc.), any effects from such components are still likely to 
only affect the adoption decision and not have lasting impacts on other behaviors. This is 
especially true given the short-term and infrequent nature of the visits by FBPAs. While 
any aspects of the marketing that might have been more subjective or emotive could 
conceivably influence a decision of whether to adopt, they are unlikely to have lasting 
influences on long-standing personal habits or responses to the pressure of engrained 
social norms.  
Even if non-informational components of the marketing did somehow have 




effects I find.  It is perhaps possible, for example, that the bank‟s implicit – and often 
explicit – emphasis on the importance of building one‟s own personal wealth as an 
avenue to financial independence and future personal prosperity might be passed on by 
the FBPAs and operate as an ideological influence on behavior.
47
 This could potentially 
influence the behavior of all households in the community – regardless of whether they 
start using formal services – encouraging them to share less and focus more on the 
accumulation of personal or household cash resources and other assets. Again, however, 
it is unlikely that a handful of visits to the community over several months would be 
enough for ideology to have a large or immediate impact on long-standing social 
practices and individual habits. Nevertheless, to the extent that this is a possibility, such 
an effect would bias estimated impacts of formal savings uptake towards less assistance 
to other households. This would make it even harder to detect the patterns I find in the 
data, and would therefore suggest my findings are a lower bound of the true effects. 
 
 
4.3. Randomization Procedure & Balance Across Treatment and Control  
 
Recall from Chapter 3 that community sampling was performed following a 
matched-pair design. Each pair consists of two village-clusters. Clusters were first 
stratified by distance from each of the six mobile-bank stops, and by population. Two 
clusters were then randomly sampled from each population-distance group around each 




47 Such an affect would be at the level of altering preferences themselves. While not entirely outside the 
realm of possibility, this type of effect would most likely require much more frequent and extended 




of the six bank stops to form a pair for that stratum. In some cases, more than one such 
pair was sampled from a given population-distance group.  
One member of each pair was then randomly assigned to the community-level 
information-treatment, the other member to a control group which received no 
information treatment. The sampling frame included a rule stipulating a minimum 
distance of at least 3 km between the two clusters in any pair, to help minimize spillovers 
from information-treated communities to non-treated communities. The randomization 
procedure included a similar condition stipulating at least 3 km between any information-
treatment and control clusters not from the same pair. 
 
Balance Across Information-Treated & Information-Control 
Table 10 reports descriptive statistics on several important household dimensions 
of the baseline sample, restricted to the 56 treatment-control pairs in the final sample. As 
the statistics are from the baseline sample, it includes the 341 households that attrited 
and which are not part of the final full panel. The table presents overall figures, as well 
as split by marketing and non-marketing communities. The variable “Relative 
Supporter” is a dummy for whether the household reported in the baseline that they can 
rely on a relative for support in times of need, and the variable “Friend/Nbr Supporter” is 
a dummy for whether they reported in the baseline being able to rely on a friend or 
neighbor. The HFIAP-Score is a 4-point food-security indicator that forms the basis for 
vulnerability-categories. The HFIAS-score is a 21-point food-security indicator. (For 
both indicators, higher values imply less security.) Category A through Category G are 
household vulnerability indicators, defined in the first chapter, such that these take a 




reported values are percentages of households in the sample for which the indicator 
variable is true. The column of differences indicates statistically significant differences 
based on two-sided t-tests for most variables,  but Mann-Whitney U-tests for household 
size, HFIAP, and HDDS, with standard levels of significance indicated. 
 
Table 10. Descriptive Baseline Statistics on HHs in Final Sample, by Treated-Control Clusters 





  Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d.  
Head is Male 0.851 0.356 0.838 0.369 0.864 0.343 * 
HH Size (People) 5.1 2.0 5.0 1.9 5.2 2.0 ** 
Head's Age (Years) 41.0 13.8 41.1 13.9 41.0 13.8  
Head Has Some Schooling 0.799 0.401 0.787 0.409 0.810 0.392  
Head Has PSLC or Higher 0.258 0.438 0.243 0.429 0.273 0.446  
Has Literate Members 0.858 0.349 0.860 0.348 0.857 0.350  
Durable Assets (USD) 195.02 1037.58 180.41 1198.18 209.46 849.70  
Total Assets (USD) 
      
 
Has Cell phone 0.133 0.339 0.121 0.326 0.145 0.352 * 
Has Salaried Member 0.156 0.363 0.145 0.352 0.167 0.373  
Has Business 0.265 0.442 0.259 0.439 0.271 0.445  
Land (Acres) 2.62 1.85 2.61 1.65 2.63 2.01  
HFIAP Score (1-4) 3.22 0.89 3.21 0.88 3.23 0.90  
HFIAS Score (1-21) 7.79 4.68 7.83 4.68 7.75 4.68  
Bank-Stop Distance (km) 7.92 3.38 7.85 3.52 7.98 3.24  
Has Formal Acct 0.118 0.322 0.101 0.301 0.134 0.341 ** 
Has Formal Loan 0.061 0.240 0.061 0.240 0.061 0.240  
Relative-Supporter 0.707 0.455 0.710 0.454 0.704 0.457  
Friend/Nbr-Supporter 0.788 0.409 0.800 0.400 0.777 0.417  
Category A Households 0.083 0.276 0.080 0.272 0.086 0.281  
Category B Households 0.062 0.241 0.067 0.250 0.056 0.230  
Category C Households 0.408 0.492 0.415 0.493 0.400 0.490  
Category D Households 0.448 0.497 0.438 0.496 0.457 0.498  
Category E Households 0.421 0.494 0.418 0.493 0.425 0.495  
Category F Households 0.408 0.492 0.403 0.491 0.413 0.493  
Category GH Households 0.135 0.342 0.138 0.345 0.132 0.339  





Number of HHs (qty) 2335  1161 
 
1174   
Except where indicated in parentheses, units are proportions. Household size, HFIAP-score, HDDS-





The randomization was fairly successful at achieving a balance across the clusters 
administered the information treatment and those that served as controls. Age of the 
household head, as well as indicators on education-level of the household appear the 
same across the randomization. There are no apparent differences in asset levels, the 
types of income-generating activities they engage in (e.g. salaried employment, own 
business), or the amounts of land owned. Food-security outcomes do not differ across 
treated and control communities, nor doe how remote the communities are, ability to rely 
on relatives and friends for support, and usage rates of formal credit. 
Importantly, there are no differences between clusters assigned to receive the 
information intervention and the information-controls in the percentage of households in 
any of the vulnerability categories. In particular, there is no difference in the percentage 
of the sample accounted for by the “highly vulnerable” category. 
 There is a mild, but statistically significant, difference in terms of household size. 
Treated-areas have a mean household size of 5.2, compared to that of 5.0 in control-areas, 
a difference of 4%; the median number on both is 5 members. Areas receiving the 
information intervention also have a slightly lower percentage of female-headed 
households: while 14% of the sample in treated areas is comprised of female-headed 
households, 16% of those in control areas are female-headed (p=0.08).
48
 
Of greater concern is that it appears formal savings was already more prevalent in 
the clusters assigned to receive the marketing, prior to the marketing campaign. That is, 
while the randomization appears successful at achieving a balance between encouraged 
                                               
48 Both of these differences disappear when dropping the quarter of the sample comprised by Lilongwe 
district, where the randomization appears to have been a little less effective at resulting in a balance across 




and non-encouraged clusters along most household dimensions, it failed to achieve a 
balance in local prevalence of formal savings use. As this is the pivotal community-level 
dimension for the analysis, this is a potential cause for concern. 
However, upon closer examination of the data, the higher pre-intervention 
incidence of formal savings in the encouraged areas does not appear to be systematic. It is 
driven by differences in Lilongwe district – particularly from the upper tail of the 
distribution. For almost all (90%) of the 27 village clusters in Lilongwe district, the 
reported baseline percentage of households with formal savings accounts was 25% or 
lower (the mean was 12.7%). However, three clusters had levels of incidence reported at 
43% or higher (43%, 50%, and 55%). All three of these outliers happened to be assigned 
to receive the information intervention. The matched village cluster which happened to 
be assigned to control for each had proportions of 0%, 14% and 25%, respectively. 
Assuming the randomly assigned status was independent across each matched pair, the 
probability that this would occur is .125, low but clearly plausible. Given the skewed 
distribution of formal savings prevalence in Lilongwe, it would appear we were simply 
unlucky with the randomization on the dimension of formal savings.
49
 (As discussed in 
section 4.5 below, the baseline difference in formal savings in Lilongwe poses a minor 
complication for the effects of the information intervention on local formal financial 
services use. However, as the analysis in section 4.5 will show, the complication is easily 
addressed, lends itself quite easily to simple robustness checks,  and may in fact not 
                                               
49 Had the randomization resulted in opposite assignment within just the first pair alone (the one for which 
the difference is 43% vs. 0%), the difference in formal savings between treatment and control in the 
baseline would disappear entirely, the significance dropping to a p-value of 0.354, the magnitude dropping 





matter at all, depending on which model is the appropriate specification for the change in 
formal services use.) 
 
4.4 Ex-Ante Expected Effects of the Information Intervention 
 
The information intervention‟s anticipated effect was to increase use of 
financial services of a particular organization (OIBM) among households in the 
community. However, it is also possible the information provided might have 
induced individuals to start using services of other financial organizations operating 
within the vicinity as well. Once the information has been provided and the financial 
literacy of village residents boosted, OIBM has little direct control over whether 
individuals will in the end choose their products, or those of another organization. 
While not very helpful to the impact assessment of OIBM in particular, this actually 
serves the purposes of my analysis quite well, as the hypotheses I investigate concern 
the impact of formal services in general (rather than those of a specific organization). 
When analyzing the effects of the information below, I therefore test for its impact 
on formal financial services usage in general, irrespective of the financial 
organization. 
 While the content of the intervention was designed to encourage uptake of all the 
bank‟s financial products, expansion of access to services other than formal savings was 
such that the campaign ultimately served as an encouragement specifically for formal 
savings. During March and April of 2008, discussions with OIBM field-based micro-
banking officers revealed that access to formal credit is expanded through a very 




centers where the mobile bank stops, whose responsibility it is to oversee extension of the 
local lending operations of the bank, and facilitate introduction of new borrowers. They 
explained that communities are brought into the network of areas with access to loans on 
a village-by-village basis that access tends to expand outward in concentric circles from 
the bank‟s stop, and that it proceeds somewhat slowly, due to limited resources and 
personnel. 
 In order to start lending to new customers in a village, the micro-banking officer 
must first visit the village and get to know its leaders in order to develop a reliable local 
basis on which to judge credit-worthiness of individuals in the community wishing to 
take out loans. The officer must then return to the village at a later date in order to hold a 
“sensitization” meeting for anyone in the community interested in applying for loans. 
After this, a period of 4-8 weeks follows during which the homes of prospective clients in 
the community are visited to confirm they already have a business (as loans are intended 
to help existing businesses grow), and to further assess their risk as borrowers. The 
officers also talk with village leaders and other community members to better evaluate 
the “character” of the prospective client. The micro-banking officer typically makes at 
least 5-6 trips to the village during this period.   
As this process is quite involved and requires a non-negligible investment of time 
and energy on the part of the micro-banking officer, they tend to prioritize areas with 
higher economic activity –  areas with wealthier farmers, active businesses, and higher 
cash-flows. Moreover, they generally start with those closest to the mobile bank‟s stop 




however, and the random assignment to information-treatment, takes none of these 
factors into consideration. 
 The bank therefore follows an expansion plan for access to credit in a manner 
completely orthogonal to the information campaign. It is of course possible that micro-
banking officers could potentially take advantage of groundwork laid by the FBPAs in 
certain communities, following them by a few months and starting to extend loan 
operations in those communities. However, micro-banking officers often indicated long 
lists of higher-priority communities that they had already identified as relatively high-
income or business-oriented, suggesting their plans were to capitalize on such areas first 
before anything else. My prior expectation before analyzing the endline data was 
therefore that the information intervention would affect formal savings adoption rates, but 
have little to no effect on local access and use of formal credit. 
Another strong prior expectation with regard to the information intervention‟s 
effects has to do with distance. The more remote a community is, the more likely it is 
the information is filling an important gap, and the higher its expected marginal 
effect. This is not only because more remote areas are likely to be less connected to 
information networks and further removed from information flows pertaining to 
formal markets in general, but also because they are simply located further from the 
mobile bank‟s stop. In areas close to the bank‟s stop, households are likely to already 
have some level of information about the bank and its services, simply due to living 
in close proximity to its regular weekly location. Additional knowledge and 
information provided by the FBPAs may still be useful, but is likely to have a 




never even heard of the bank absent the information intervention. As distance from 
the bank‟s stop and major highways increases, the value of information on financial 
services in general, and knowledge about this bank in particular, are likely to 
increase, and with it the marginal impact of the marketing campaign. 
Finally, it is important to consider that the effects of the information 
intervention on local financial services usage levels can operate through two 
different channels, which may have differing behavioral outcomes in the end. On the 
one hand, the marketing campaign can induce non-users to adopt formal financial 
technologies (e.g. to open a formal savings account). On the other hand, it may also 
prevent current users from dis-adopting (e.g. closing a formal savings account 
already previously owned).  
It may very well be the case that it does not matter whether usage rates are 
higher due to induced adoption, or instead due to prevented dis-adoption, and that all 
that matters is the ultimate level of use. However, it is not clear a priori that the 
behavioral effects of each of these marketing-induced actions should be identical. It 
may be the case that  use of formal services affects the behavior of households that 
already (pre-marketing) self-selected into service-use differently than it affects 
households exogenously encouraged into its use. This might occur, for example, if 
previous users and induced users are systematically different types of households, 
such that formal services use affects their behavior differently. If so, exogenously 
boosting the level of adoption may have qualitatively different outcomes, or similar 
outcomes but of differing magnitudes, than exogenously decreasing the level of dis-




consequences of the two types of induced behavior warrants at least a consideration 
of the effects separately, to complement the simpler analysis of total level of users. 
In the following section, I therefore examine the information instrument‟s 
effects from both perspectives. First, I assess its impact on adoption rates and dis-
adoption rates separately, under the hypothesis that adoption is the pivotal behavior 
of interest. I then assess its impact on the overall level of service-use, which accounts 
for any dissuasive effect the marketing has on dis-adoption. The may be a simpler 
approach, though as will be seen, it raises some complications, and there is no clear 




4.5. Assessing the Instrument: Effects on Local Formal Financial Services Use 
I now proceed to an analysis of the instrument‟s effects on financial services 
use. The information intervention‟s anticipated effect was to increase use of a particular 
organization‟s financial services among households in the community. However, since 
the information provided might also induce individuals to start using services of other 
financial organizations near the area, and my goal is to investigate the impact of formal 
services in general (rather than those of a specific organization), I look at changes in 
savings and credit use at any financial organization.  
Note that looking at the effects on just the overall prevalence of formal 
services use combines two different possible effects – the effect of the information 
intervention on new adoptions, as well as any effect it has on preventing disadoption. 




separately, under the hypothesis that higher local usage rates from new adoption has 
different impacts on inter-household transfers than higher usage rates that stem from 
preventing decreases in usage by already-users. This would be the case, for example, 
if formal service-use affects the transfer behavior of households that had already 
(pre-marketing)  self-selected into service-use differently than it affects the behavior 
of households exogenously encouraged into its use. (For example, those already 
using formal services prior to the advent of the mobile bank and the administering of 
encouragement may be systematically different types of households, and formal 
services may affect their behavior differently. Alternatively, if duration of service 
use affects its impact on household behavior in any way, the key variable of interest 
may be new service-users).  
In the second set of analyses, however, I ignore this possibility, and look only 
at the effects of the instrument on the local prevalence of formal services use. That 
is, these analyses ignore whether service use is from prevented disadoption among 
already-users or from adoption by previous non-users. As will be seen, this second 
approach raises some complications requiring a deeper look at the data. 
Table 11 below reports results from a simple OLS regression of the adoption (or 
quitting) of formal savings services on a dummy indicating assignment to intensive 
marketing, with fixed effects at the cluster-pair level, and standard errors clustered at the 
village-cluster level.
50
 The left-hand side variable is a simple 0-1 indicator for whether 
the household has at least one formal savings account in 2010. This is equivalent to 
regressing the mean of the response variable for each cluster (i.e. the percentage of 
                                               
50Pairs were sampled on the basis of common characteristics, and it is plausible that the different pairs 
experience the expansion of formal services access via the van-bank differently. For example, those 
located closer to major highways may be more responsive to the expanded access than those pairs that 




households in the cluster with formal savings) on the dummy for information 
intervention, accounting for pair-level fixed effects, and explicitly correcting for 
heteroskedasticity across clusters due to the variation in number of households (FGLS). 
Columns 1 and 2 show results when the sample is restricted to those households 
which did not have formal savings accounts in 2008. The estimated coefficient for the 
marketing dummy therefore represents the increase in the proportion of previous non-
savings users that adopt savings, due to the marketing campaign. The first specification 
(column 1) includes all village-clusters, regardless of distance from the van-bank‟s stop 
(including being located right at the stop). The second (column 2) restricts the sample to 
those clusters for which both members of the cluster-pair are located three or more 
kilometers from the closest van-bank‟s stop. The rationale for splitting the sample in 
this manner is that the intensive marketing campaign may have smaller effects in 
areas close to the bank‟s stop, since such households are likely to already have a high 
degree of information about the bank and its services, due to living in close 
proximity to its regular weekly location.  
For the other two specifications (columns 3 and 4), the sample is restricted to 
those households which did have at least one formal savings account in 2008. Here, if 
the dependent variable takes a value of zero, it means the previously formal-saving 
household stopped use of formal savings sometime over the two-year period. Thus, the 
coefficient on the dummy in these regressions represents any effect the marketing 
instrument had on the proportion of previously using households that stopped formal 
savings use. 
The results in columns 1 and 2 indicate the marketing instrument had a 




formal savings, significant at the .05-level. Note that both the magnitude and 
significance of the instrument‟s estimated effect on adoption increases with distance 
from the bank-stop, which is consistent with the expectation that information on services 
is increasingly effective in more remote locations. Among all clusters, the marketing 
increased the percentage of previous non-saving households that adopted by about 
3.1 percentage points (p=.03), while among clusters three or more kilometers away, 
the effect is an increase of 3.7 percentage points (p=.01). To put these figures in 
context, the overall proportion of previously non-saving households that adopted formal 
savings in the non-encouraged clusters is 9.4%. So these changes represent a 33% 
increase and 40% increase respectively. The results shown in columns 3 and 4 reveal 
that marketing encouragement had no significant effect on the proportion of 






Table 11. Effects of Marketing on Adoption and Disadoption of Formal Savings 









VARIABLES Has Formal Svgs Has Formal Svgs Has Formal Svgs Has Formal Svgs 
Mktg Dummy 0.0306** 0.0371** 0.0441 0.0298 
 (0.0288) (0.0129) (0.490) (0.655) 
Constant 0.0645*** 0.0588*** 0.319 0.323 
 (0.000373) (0.000980) (0.355) (0.361) 
Pair Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Clustered SEs Y Y Y Y 
FSAV in 2008 N N Y Y 
Observations 1,784 1,593 217 169 
R-squared 0.064 0.066 0.270 0.308 
Cluster-Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Columns 1 & 2 restrict sample to 
households without formal savings in 2008, columns 3 & 4 restrict sample to households with formal 
savings in 2008. 
 
Table 12. Effects of Marketing on Adoption and Disadoption of Formal Credit 









VARIABLES Has Formal Loan Has Formal Loan Has Formal Loan Has Formal Loan 
Mktg Dummy -0.00708 -0.00693 0.00782 -0.0752 
 (0.416) (0.430) (0.948) (0.619) 
Constant 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.328 0.383 
 (0.000693) (0.000751) (0.440) (0.353) 
Pair Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Clustered SEs Y Y Y Y 
FCRED in 2008 N N Y Y 
Observations 1,860 1,651 120 93 
R-squared 0.038 0.035 0.396 0.419 
Cluster-Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Columns 1 & 2 restrict sample to 
households without current formal loans in 2008, columns 3 & 4 restrict sample to households with formal 
loans in 2008. 
 
 
Table 12 shows results from similar regressions, but which examine instead 
whether the instrument had any effect on changes in households‟ starting and stopping 
the use of formal loans. Here the response variable is whether the household reported a 




first two columns represent estimations with the subsample restricted to those households 
not reporting a formal loan in 2008. The coefficient on the marketing dummy in these 
estimations represents any effect of the information intervention on the percentage of 
households that report a formal loan in 2010, among those that did not report one in 2008. 
The last two columns represent estimations restricting the sample to those households 
that did report a formal loan in 2008. Here, the coefficient on the marketing represents 
the effect of the information intervention on the percentage of households that report a 
formal loan in 2010, among those that did report one in 2008. The marketing instrument 
is clearly insignificant in both cases, regardless of the distance of the cluster. 
From the perspective of adoption and disadoption, then, the instrument has no 
significant effect on changes in household behavior with respect to use of formal credit 
or stopping the use of formal savings. However, it does have a significant impact on 
starting use of formal savings, raising local adoption rates  by 3.1 percentage points 
(from 9.3% to 12.4%) across the whole sample, 3.5 percentage points (from 9.3% to 
12.8%) across the clusters one or more kilometers from the bank‟s stop, and 3.7 
percentage points (from 8.7% to 12.4%) across clusters three or more kilometers from 
the bank‟s stop. The instrument‟s failure to affect formal credit use, while affecting 
formal savings, is consistent with prior expectations based on the fact that the bank 
expands access to credit in a manner independent from the intensive marketing 
campaign.  
I now look simply at the overall prevalence of formal financial services use across 
all households, regardless of whether the households self-selected into financial service 
use pre-marketing. This ignores whether the endline differences in formal financial 




regressions where the left-hand side variable is again a 0-1 indicator, regressed on a 
dummy for the information intervention, with pair-level fixed effects, and standard errors 
clustered at the village-cluster level. The coefficient on the dummy for marketing now 
represents the effect of marketing on the proportion of the entire community (not 
restricting to previous users or non-users) that has a formal savings account. For the first 
specification, the response variable is a household-level indicator for whether anyone in 
the household had one or more formal savings accounts in 2008. For the second 
specification, the response variable is a household-indicator for having one or more 
formal savings accounts in 2010. In both of these regressions, the pair-level fixed effect 
accounts for any pair-level characteristics which might affect the overall percentage of 
households in the community that have formal savings. 
For the third specification, the response variable is a household-indicator for any 
change in whether anyone in the household has a formal account, over the two-year 
period. In this regression, the pair fixed effect accounts for any pair-level characteristics 
that have an independent effect on how the local prevalence of formal savings changes 
over the two-year period. (For example, if pairs located closer to the bank-stop are more 
sensitive to the increased access the van-bank provides and have larger two-year 
increases in the percentage of users than pairs located further away.) The first three 
columns in the table use the entire sample, the last three restrict the sample to those pairs 






Table 13. Effects of Marketing on Local Proportion of HHs with Formal Savings – All Districts 
 All Distances 3+km 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES FSAV in 08 FSAV in 10 Chg in FSAV FSAV in 08 FSAV in 10 Chg in FSAV 
Mktg Dummy 0.0316** 0.0443*** 0.0143 0.0383*** 0.0551*** 0.0185 
 (0.0373) (0.00928) (0.291) (0.00613) (0.00153) (0.211) 
Constant 0.0947 0.0845*** -0.0115 0.0894 0.0759*** -0.0148 
 (0.294) (0.00321) (0.920) (0.331) (0.00434) (0.896) 
Pair Fixd Eff Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Clustered SEs Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 2,005 2,005 2,001 1,766 1,765 1,762 
R-squared 0.108 0.101 0.036 0.096 0.105 0.034 
Cluster-robust pval in parentheses  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 14. Effects of Marketing on Local Proportion of HHs with Formal Savings – Dedza & Mchinji  
 All Distances 3+Km 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES FSAV in 08 FSAV in 10 Chg in FSAV FSAV in 08 FSAV in 10 Chg in FSAV 
Mktg Dummy 0.0170 0.0444*** 0.0283* 0.0172 0.0487*** 0.0323* 
 (0.317) (0.00846) (0.0695) (0.233) (0.00268) (0.0522) 
Constant 0.106 0.0844*** -0.0227 0.106 0.0810*** -0.0258 
 (0.226) (0.00345) (0.839) (0.227) (0.00361) (0.816) 
       
Observations 1,527 1,526 1,523 1,338 1,336 1,334 
R-squared 0.093 0.091 0.038 0.056 0.078 0.038 





The first thing to note in Table 13 is that the marketing instrument appears to have no 
significant effect on the change in the overall percentage of households in the community with 
formal savings, even when restricting to the more remote distance threshold where the 
instrument is more effective.  At first glance, this would seem worrying. However this is closely 
linked to the fact that formal savings rates in Lilongwe District cause a significant difference in 
formal savings prevalence between the marketing clusters and the non-marketing clusters, even 
in 2008, prior to the marketing campaign.  
Section 4.3 already discussed the fact that the random draw of communities and treatment 
assignment in Lilongwe District resulted in higher baseline formal savings rates in its treated 
communities. It also turns out that the effect of marketing on the change in prevalence of formal 
savings over the 2-year period is not significant in Lilongwe, and is in fact mildly negative. This 
may be due to the fact that households in Lilongwe district are closer to the capital city (and the 
bank‟s headquarters). Their greater proximity to the modern economy of the capital and its more 
highly developed financial infrastructure may mean they already began with a comparatively 
high level of information about financial services. This would dampen the effect of the 
information campaign on financial services adoption.  
Another strong possibility is that the econometric models for the regressions in Table 13 
for the change in percentage of formal services users are too simple and misspecified due to an 
important missing determinant. It is plausible that the initial-period level of formal savings 
prevalence (the percentage of households in the community with formal savings accounts before 
the marketing intervention) should affect the rate of change. This might occur via two possible 
opposite effects. First, if adoption exhibits any “learning by observing” or “copying” patterns, or 




services, one would expect higher period-one prevalence rates to lead to higher two-year changes 
in the prevalence in that area.
51
 For example, a community with only 1% of the population using 
formal services may take many years to reach a penetration rate of 5% without any outside 
intervention, simply due to very low local levels of awareness and/or trust with regard to the 
services. On the other hand, a community that starts out with penetration rates of 15% might 
reach a prevalence rate of 20% or 25% within just one or two years, as more and more people 
notice, trust, learn about the services and the benefits they would provide. 
Secondly, however, it may also be that there is a latent “capacity” within a community 
for the penetration rate of formal services, determined by the wealth levels of its inhabitants. If a 
substantial portion of the population (say X) is below the wealth threshold at which use of formal 
services provides net benefits, then one would expect the maximum penetration rate to be 100-X. 
It may also be the case that the closer the penetration rate gets to the maximum capacity, the 
slower usage spreads, since those (among the population that would actually benefit) who are 
last to adopt are likely to be the most resistant and slowest to be convinced. Regardless, the 
existence of a latent capacity would cause one to expect that higher period-one prevalence rates 
would lead to lower absolute values for the 2-year change in prevalence rate.  
If either of the above is the case, I should be including the initial local incidence of 
service use in the regressions for change in percentage of financial service users.
52
 Appendix 4, 
                                               
51 Just as can be the case in other types of technology adoption, use of a new savings technology by relatives and 
neighbors may spur the use of adoption by new users, such that the rate of expansion will be higher among those 
communities that already have comparatively higher rates of penetration, and lower among those communities with 
very low penetration (or communities with none at all). For example, in villages where no one has ever had a formal 
savings account, people may be much more suspicious of its utility – and even the security of their savings – 
whereas in villages where a quarter of the population has already recently started using formal savings, non-users 
may be less reluctant to start. 
52 It is worth mentioning that a linear regression is not entirely appropriate for a response variable that is a 
percentage, as it allows for predicted values outside the range of (0,1). I also tried running a Logit on the prevalence 
of formal savings in the baseline, and found almost identical results on the differences (though a few pairs had to be 




Tables A.4.1 and A.4.2, do in fact show that initial usage levels have a significant effect on the 
change in local usage over the two-year period. Results for two different specifications show 
that, when controlling for baseline penetration rates,  the impact of the marketing encouragement 
on the change in proportion of households in the village cluster that are formal savers is positive 
and significant, even in Lilongwe. (See Appendix 4.)  
The regressions reported in Tables 13 and 14, however, are the simplest specification one 
might imagine, and represent the most conservative estimates of the instrument‟s effect. It very 
well may be the that communities in Lilongwe are simply less responsive to the marketing due to 
being closer to the capital and its financial organizations. Since the most conservative approach 
would suggest that the information treatment did not have a significant impact in Lilongwe, I 
restrict the sample to Mchinji and Dedza districts (76% of the sample) and proceed with the 
analysis. 
Table 14 shows the results from the same regressions reported in Table 13, but for the 
sample restricted to these two districts. As the coefficient estimates show, there is no difference 
between marketing and non-marketing clusters in local prevalence of formal savings in the 
baseline, but there is a highly significant difference in the endline. The regression on the change 
in local prevalence of formal savings shows that the marketing resulted in a 2.8 percentage-point 
increase overall (p=.07), and a 3.2 percentage-point increase when restricting to the more remote 
village clusters (p=.05). As the average prevalence among non-marketing clusters in the endline 
was 12.2% overall and 10.4% in the more remote clusters, this represents a boost in the increase 
of local formal saving use by 23% and 31%, respectively. 
I repeat the same estimation exercise as above, for use of formal credit. The response 




loan. The results are reported in Tables 15 and 16 below. (These are analogous to Tables 13 and 
14, but that here the response variable is whether the household has a current formal loan.) The 
estimated coefficient on the marketing dummy is nowhere close to significant in any of the 
regressions. (Results for the more elaborate specification, with initial formal credit usage levels 
included as controls, are reported in Appendix 4, Tables A.4.3 and a.4.4. These results also show 
coefficient estimates on the marketing dummy which are nowhere near significant.) 
 
Table 15. Effects of Marketing on Local Proportion of HHs with Current Formal Loans - All Districts 
 All Distances 3+km 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES FCRED in 08 FCRED in 10 Chg in 
FCRED 
FCRED in 08 FCRED in 10 Chg in 
FCRED 
Mktg Dummy -0.00317 -0.00322 -0.00250 -0.00636 -0.00916 -0.00414 
 (0.707) (0.738) (0.820) (0.458) (0.319) (0.689) 
Constant 0.123*** 0.128*** 0.00198 0.125*** 0.132*** 0.00328 
 (9.30e-07) (2.69e-07) (0.821) (3.45e-07) (2.37e-08) (0.692) 
       
Observations 2,003 1,983 1,978 1,901 1,882 1,877 
R-squared 0.072 0.052 0.041 0.077 0.044 0.050 
Cluster-robust pval in parentheses  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 16. Effects of Marketing on Local Proportion of HHs with Current Formal Loans – Dedza & Mchinji  
 All Distances 3+km 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES FCRED in 08 FCRED in 10 Chg in 
FCRED 
FCRED in 08 FCRED in 10 Chg in 
FCRED 
Mktg Dummy -0.00356 0.00339 0.00357 -0.00789 -0.00637 -0.000404 
 (0.726) (0.762) (0.793) (0.427) (0.524) (0.974) 
Constant 0.123*** 0.122*** -0.00283 0.126*** 0.130*** 0.000320 
 (1.98e-06) (5.96e-06) (0.794) (5.17e-07) (2.05e-07) (0.974) 
       
Observations 1,524 1,511 1,506 1,456 1,444 1,439 
R-squared 0.078 0.053 0.044 0.084 0.043 0.054 





These results show that the instrument has no significant effect on changes in 
local prevalence of formal credit. However, when restricting to the 75% of the sample 
comprised by Dedza and Mchinji districts, the instrument does have a significant impact 
on changes in local prevalence of formal savings. The information intervention raises the 
local proportion of households using formal savings rates  by 2.8 percentage (or 23%) 
points across the whole sample, and 3.2 percentage points (or 31%) across clusters three 
or more kilometers from the bank‟s stop. The instrument‟s failure to affect formal credit 
use, while affecting formal savings, is consistent with prior expectations based on the 
fact that the bank expands access to credit in a manner independent from the intensive 
marketing campaign.  
I also run the same regressions as above on a sample restricted to the non-
vulnerable category of households – those for whom the marketing is expected to be  
most effective. Tables 17-20 below are exactly the same as Tables 13-16 above, 
except that the sample is restricted to households NOT in category G. The results 
differ little, except that the absolute magnitudes and significance of the instrument‟s 
effect on the change in the percentage of households using formal savings is now 
higher. In particular, when restricting to Dedza and Mchinji, for clusters beyond the 
3 km threshold, the marketing campaign raises the percentage of non-vulnerable 
households in the community which are formal savers by 4.0% (p=.03). This 
represents a 34% increase over the matched control clusters (for whom the average 





Table 17. Effects of Marketing on Proportion of Non-Vuln HHs with Formal Savings - All Districts 
 All distances 3+km  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES FSAV in 08 FSAV in 10 Chg in FSAV FSAV in 08 FSAV in 10 Chg in FSAV 
Mktg Dummy 0.0311* 0.0447** 0.0151 0.0389** 0.0593*** 0.0219 
 (0.0598) (0.0160) (0.324) (0.0119) (0.00202) (0.187) 
Constant 0.111 0.0998*** -0.0124 0.105 0.0878*** -0.0179 
 (0.290) (0.00141) (0.924) (0.328) (0.00225) (0.890) 
       
Observations 1,734 1,734 1,731 1,516 1,515 1,513 
R-squared 0.112 0.103 0.039 0.101 0.108 0.038 
Cluster-robust pval in parentheses  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 18. Effects of Marketing on Proportion of Non-Vuln HHs with Formal Savings – Dedza & Mchinji 
 All Distances 3+km 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES FSAV in 08 FSAV in 10 Chg in FSAV FSAV in 08 FSAV in 10 Chg in FSAV 
Mktg Dummy 0.0155 0.0483*** 0.0334* 0.0168 0.0566*** 0.0401** 
 (0.401) (0.00877) (0.0584) (0.296) (0.00184) (0.0322) 
Constant 0.124 0.0968*** -0.0273 0.123 0.0901*** -0.0328 
 (0.228) (0.00168) (0.831) (0.234) (0.00202) (0.796) 
       
Observations 1,322 1,321 1,319 1,151 1,149 1,148 
R-squared 0.097 0.099 0.042 0.061 0.089 0.042 
Cluster-robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 19. Effects of Marketing on Proportion of Non-Vuln HHs with Formal Credit - All Districts 
 All Distances 3+km 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES FCRED in 08 FCRED in 10 Chg in 
FCRED 
FCRED in 08 FCRED in 10 Chg in 
FCRED 
Mktg Dummy -0.00871 -0.00637 -0.00179 -0.0129 -0.0137 -0.00385 
 (0.367) (0.541) (0.885) (0.185) (0.177) (0.741) 
Constant 0.143*** 0.148*** 0.00145 0.147*** 0.154*** 0.00312 
 (3.60e-06) (2.21e-06) (0.885) (1.36e-06) (2.93e-07) (0.742) 
       
Observations 1,733 1,712 1,709 1,631 1,611 1,608 
R-squared 0.061 0.055 0.036 0.067 0.047 0.046 






Table 20. Effects of Marketing on Proportion of Non-Vuln HHs with Formal Credit - Dedza & Mchinji 
 All Distances 3+km 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES FCRED in 08 FCRED in 10 Chg in FCRED FCRED in 08 FCRED in 10 Chg in FCRED 
Mktg Dummy -0.00764 0.000892 0.00300 -0.0122 -0.00985 -0.00176 
 (0.511) (0.939) (0.843) (0.281) (0.345) (0.897) 
Constant 0.143*** 0.142*** -0.00243 0.146*** 0.151*** 0.00142 
 (9.61e-06) (2.25e-05) (0.843) (3.58e-06) (1.69e-06) (0.897) 
       
Observations 1,320 1,306 1,303 1,252 1,239 1,236 
R-squared 0.064 0.056 0.036 0.071 0.046 0.048 







Finally, I also run the same regressions, restricting the sample to the 
vulnerable category. Tables 21-24 report the results. Columns 3 and 6 in these four 
tables show the estimated effect of the information intervention on the incidence of 
formal services use among this group. As expected, the instrument has no effect on 
the vulnerable. (About 3% of the vulnerable group does have formal savings in the 
endline, a third of whom did not have formal savings in the baseline.) 
 
Table 21. Effects of Marketing on Proportion of Vuln HHs with Formal Savings - All Districts 
 All Distances 3+km 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES FSAV in 08 FSAV in 10 Chg in FSAV FSAV in 08 FSAV in 10 Chg in FSAV 
Mktg Dummy 0.0460** 0.0370* -0.00834 0.0460** 0.0370* -0.00834 
 (0.0338) (0.0934) (0.684) (0.0325) (0.0908) (0.682) 
Constant -0.0307 -0.0247 0.00556 -0.0307 -0.0247 0.00556 
 (0.161) (0.212) (0.691) (0.158) (0.209) (0.689) 
       
Observations 271 271 270 250 250 249 
R-squared 0.218 0.300 0.178 0.217 0.300 0.162 
Cluster-robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 22. Effects of Marketing on Proportion of Vuln HHs with Formal Savings – Dedza & Mchinji 
 All Distances 3+km 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES FSAV in 08 FSAV in 10 Chg in FSAV FSAV in 08 FSAV in 10 Chg in FSAV 
Mktg Dummy 0.0536* 0.0332 -0.0195 0.0536* 0.0332 -0.0195 
 (0.0573) (0.121) (0.395) (0.0552) (0.118) (0.390) 
Constant -0.0357 -0.0221 0.0130 -0.0357 -0.0221 0.0130 
 (0.185) (0.235) (0.440) (0.181) (0.231) (0.435) 
       
Observations 205 205 204 187 187 186 
R-squared 0.183 0.137 0.084 0.182 0.135 0.084 






Table 23. Effects of Marketing on Proportion of Vuln HHs with Formal Credit - All Districts 
 All Distances 3+km 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












Mktg Dummy 0.0375** 0.0187 -0.00309 0.0375** 0.0187 -0.00309 
 (0.0434) (0.481) (0.893) (0.0434) (0.481) (0.893) 
Constant -0.0250 -0.0124 0.00206 -0.0250 -0.0124 0.00206 
 (0.171) (0.510) (0.893) (0.171) (0.510) (0.893) 
       
Observations 270 271 269 270 271 269 
R-squared 0.506 0.197 0.332 0.506 0.197 0.332 
Cluster-robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 24. Effects of Marketing on Proportion of Vuln HHs with Formal Credit – Dedza & Mchinji 
 All Distances 3+km 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES FCRED in 08 FCRED in 10 Chg in 
FCRED 
FCRED in 08 FCRED in 10 Chg in 
FCRED 
Mktg Dummy 0.0422* 0.0125 -0.00845 0.0422* 0.0125 -0.00845 
 (0.0775) (0.715) (0.767) (0.0775) (0.715) (0.767) 
Constant -0.0281 -0.00834 0.00564 -0.0281 -0.00834 0.00564 
 (0.202) (0.720) (0.770) (0.202) (0.720) (0.770) 
       
Observations 204 205 203 204 205 203 
R-squared 0.536 0.150 0.301 0.536 0.150 0.301 
Cluster-robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Assessing the Instrument’s Effects on Account Balance Sizes 
 The information intervention does not appear to have any impact on the amounts 
households save in formal accounts, conditional on having an account. The survey 
collected data on the current balance of any accounts at the time of the interview. The 




high, though, with the median reported value at MK 2,000.
53
 Compared to the typical 
costs of opening an account (which are on the order of MK 1,500, as discussed in Chapter 
5), the median balance seems low. This is likely attributable to the fact that the interview 
took place during the pre-harvest hungry season, when household resources are running 
low, and account-holders are most likely to need to draw down accounts. It also suggests 
that, for at least some formal-savers, the accounts may be serving more as a within-year 
wealth storage and management device than as a long-term wealth accumulation vehicle. 
Looking across the information-treated and control communities, the mean and 
median are slightly higher in the control communities. This is in fact what we would 
expect if the wealthiest households in a village are the most likely to have formal 
accounts regardless of whether they are encouraged, and the encouragement is most 
effective for those that are just a little less wealthy. In communities which did not receive 
the information intervention, the mean account balance is MK 12,486, and the median is 
MK 2,500; while in the treated communities the mean is MK 10,692 and the median is 
MK 2,000. However, the differences are not statistically significant, either through a two-
sided t-test, or a Mann-Whitney U-test. 
 
  
                                               
53 These figures are lower than the account balances for formal accounts reported in the baseline (see 
Chapter 3, page 75). This may be a sign that households of lower wealth strata are starting to use formal 





This chapter showed that the information intervention had a strong and 
significant impact on the proportion of each community that adopted formal savings. 
After controlling for cluster-pair fixed effects and accounting for intra-cluster 
correlation, exposure to the randomly assigned information treatment increased the 
proportion of previous non formal-savers that adopted formal savings by 3.1 percentage 
points across all distance levels (p=.029), and 3.7 percentage points when restricting to 
more remote communities (p=.013). Over the same two-year period, the proportion of 
previous non formal-savers in the non-treated communities that adopted formal savings 
by the rose by 6.5 percentage points across all distances, and 5.9 percentage points in 
more remote areas. The 3.1 percentage-point and 3.7 percentage-point additional 
increases caused by the instrument therefore represent a 47% and 63%  increase in the 
adoption rate, respectively.   
This chapter also examined the instrument‟s effect on overall prevalence of formal 
savings in the local community (i.e. accounting for the possibility of any baseline differences 
in formal savings penetration between the treated and non-treated). From this perspective, the 
strong effect on adoption is partially muted due to high baseline incidence of formal savings 
in a few treated communities of Lilongwe, the district closest to the capital and the bank‟s 
headquarters, and relatively low impact on adoption. While this mildly complicates the 
picture, when restricting to the three-quarters of the sample located in the districts further 
from the capital, the instrument is shown to have a significant effect on the proportion of 
local households with formal savings. The marketing resulted in a 2.8 percentage-point 
increase overall (p=.070), and a 3.2 percentage-point increase when restricting to the 




clusters in the endline was 12.2% overall and 10.4% in the more remote clusters, this 
represents a boost in the increase of local formal savings use by 23% and 31%, 
respectively. 
The instrument had no effect on local usage rates of formal credit. This is 
consistent with prior expectations, based on the fact that the microfinance 
institution‟s expansion of access to formal credit is considerably slower than that of 
access to formal savings, and follows a path orthogonal to the information treatment. 
The next chapter examines the effects of this exogenous boost in local formal 













Chapter 5. The Impact of Formal Savings on Inter-Household 




The last chapter showed that the randomly assigned intensive information 
campaign had a positive significant effect on the proportion of households in each 
village-cluster that use formal savings. This chapter examines the impact of formal 
savings uptake on inter-household transfer receipts during the pre-harvest hungry-season, 
with a focus on “gifts”, or pure transfers. The analysis includes an examination of 
impacts across all households, but the emphasis is on receipts by the most vulnerable.  
The literature on informal insurance generally emphasizes the role played by 
expected reciprocation of transfers by the receiving party, when needed in the future. The 
focus is therefore typically on inter-household wealth flows that are part of mutual 
insurance arrangements, or informal contracts. To my knowledge, the little theoretical 
work that exists on the interaction of formal capital markets with informal institutions for 
addressing risk is restricted to analyzing these types of bidirectional wealth flows. The 
predictions from these models suggest inter-household transfers will diminish as formal 
capital markets develop. This is also consistent with the handful of empirical 
observations made thus far on the interaction of formal financial systems and informal 
systems of insurance. 
Contrary to suggestions inferred from the limited evidence, however, the 
introduction of formal savings technologies in rural Malawi has a significant positive 




savings rates were experimentally boosted, the proportion of households receiving cash-
gifts from other households during the hungry season is nearly 50% higher (about 21% 
versus 31%). When restricting to the most vulnerable households, for whom the impact is 
most clearly identifiable as via an indirect channel, the difference grows to 180% (about 
10% versus 28%). Instrumental variables estimates indicate that, for every one 
percentage-point increase in the proportion of households using formal savings, the 
worst-off households experience a three percentage-point increase in the probability of 
receiving a cash gift.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The first section develops a simple 
theoretical framework for analyzing the effects of formal savings services penetration in 
different contexts. In an attempt to broaden the theoretical approach that has dominated 
the literature on informal insurance institutions, a simple innovation allows for transfers 
which are unidirectional (“charitable gifts”) rather than bidirectional (“mutual insurance), 
as is commonly assumed.
54
 The model illustrates how the entrance of superior savings 
technologies can lead to different effects when transfers are of one type or the other. 
Section 2 examines the relationship between the information-instrument described in the 
last chapter and receipts of cash and in-kind gifts among the most vulnerable households. 
Finally, section 3 uses an instrumental-variables analysis to estimate the Indirect 
Treatment Effect (ITE) of a one percentage-point increase in the proportion of local 
households on the probability that a highly vulnerable household receives a cash gift. 
                                               
54 This is not the first time motivations other than reciprocal exchange are considered in the context of 
private transfers. As discussed in chapter 2, Lucas and Stark (1987) and Cox (1987) test models of 
altruistic-motivated giving and exchange-motivated giving, and reach different conclusions.  While the 
former finds evidence supporting “tempered altruism”, the latter argues transfers are driven by exchange-
motivations. The literature on informal insurance and inter-household wealth flows in villages has been 





5.1. Formal Savings: Competing Insurance Option, or Boost to One-Way Transfers? 
 
“I have my own mobile bank, and it has four legs – my goat!” (Malawian 
farmer, 2008, quoted in Flory & Nagarajan 2009)  
 
“You can withdraw from a [formal] bank any time. If you want to sell a goat, 




 The few earlier efforts to model the effects of formal financial services on 
household transfers follow the predominant assumption in the literature that such 
transfers are based on expected future reciprocation. Yet the effects on inter-household 
wealth flows and consumption insurance for the very poor may in fact hinge on whether 
such transfers are indeed based on reciprocation. This section uses a simple model to 
explore how the impacts of formal services expansion can differ when transfers may 
instead be driven by motives other than reciprocation. 
 To simplify, consider two idealized cases. In case one, transfers-out are one of a 
set of options for storing wealth to be used in the event of an adverse shock. In case two, 
transfers are driven by factors associated with charitable donations. The introduction of 
formal savings can have very different implications under these two cases.  
Assume that households wish to store some positive amount of wealth to serve as 
self-insurance against an adverse future consumption or income shock. It is commonly 
understood that one of the most prevalent ways to do this is by saving in-kind, for 
example through livestock or durables. Let the amount saved in this manner be called sD, 




of wealth the following period. If ρ<1, the wealth depreciates; if ρ>1, wealth appreciates. 
This simple storage technology is represented in Figure 2a. The introduction of formal 
savings can be represents a new storage technology. Let  sB represent the amount saved 
through formal accounts, and assume that the return from this form of saving is also 
linear. The introduction of this new savings technology is represented in Figure 2c by the 
new line, the slope of which shows the rate of return from saving through a bank. 
If formal savings is a superior savings technology, its introduction will cause the 
overall return on savings ρ to increase. (This is the case depicted in Figure 2c.) This may 
happen, for example, through a reduction in the transaction-costs of saving and dissaving 
if formal accounts represent a more liquid technology. Purchasing and liquidating non-
financial assets such as bicycles, radios, or goats may entail substantial time-costs of 
searching for a buyer, which may take several hours, days, or even weeks. There may 
also be explicit travel or transport costs involved in finding a buyer or seller, or 
transporting the asset. There will also be search and possibly transport costs for finding a 
new (lower-valued) non-financial asset in order to store the remainder of the 
precautionary savings the assisting household wants to hold. There may also be losses in 
asset-value that  could come from having to sell the asset at an inopportune time, or with 
an urgency that prevents getting the best price.
55
 Storing and accessing wealth through 
formal accounts has a different set of transaction costs – e.g. traveling to the bank, any 
withdrawal fees – yet it is likely these will be lower. Formal savings may also have 
                                               
55For example, in the presence of segmented markets, selling an asset just before harvest when local 
incomes are low may result in low demand and low prices obtained for the asset, or selling at a time when 
others are also trying to sell the same asset in order to liquidate their precautionary savings (e.g. due to a 
covariate shock) may cause a local supply shock and decrease the price received. The asset may have been 
purchased at a higher price, and would typically be redeemable at that higher price, if the household could 
wait until the value rose again, before liquidating it. Thus, even without any other costs, it may require a 




positive amounts of interest not available from saving in-kind, and lower risk of theft, 
loss, or damage. 
If the rate of return on formal savings is lower than that of saving through 
durables, the household will continue to save through durables and not start using formal 
savings. However, if the return on formal savings is higher, the household will switch to 
formal savings, and the return on its savings will increase. This is the case depicted in 
Figure 2c. 
 
Case 1: Transfers as “Saving Through People” 
If transfers are best understood as an alternative form of saving to insure against 
future shocks, a request by another for help is interpreted as an opportunity to save. In 
this case, the pivotal question is not how much is saved in total, but rather what happens 
to the amount of savings invested via transfers to other people. As only the latter affects 
inter-household transfers, total savings is not explicitly considered in this case, since it 
yields no insights with respect to provision of financial assistance to others. 
 In contrast to non-financial assets and formal accounts, it is reasonable to assume 
that saving through transfers to people, sT , yields diminishing marginal returns. At any 
given time, only a fixed number of people in one‟s network or community are likely to 
desire a transfer from another household. These households are likely to vary in their 
probability of being able to reciprocate the transfer at a future date. A relatively wealthy 
household, for example, that had an unusually bad year may be more likely to reciprocate 
than a very poor household which requests transfers from others almost every year. 




with lower probabilities of reciprocating.  After making transfers first to those households 
most likely to reciprocate, the transferring household will move on to those less-likely to 
do so. This storage technology is depicted in Figure 2b. 
When deciding how much saving to allocate to transfers-out, the household will 
provide transfers up until the expected yield from transfers equals that from saving in-
kind. This is represented by point sT
0 
in Figure 2a. With the introduction of formal 
savings, in the non-trivial case where the household adopts formal savings and ρ 
increases, the amount stored in transfers will decrease accordingly until the return from 
transfers equals the new ρ. This change is represented in Figure 2c and 2d, through the 






When transfers are an alternative form of saving, banks will compete with 
households as a destination for wealth-storage. If formal savings enters and increases the 
rate of return, there is an unambiguous decline in wealth-transfers, as the adopting 
household will stop transfers to those households least likely to reciprocate in the future. 
This reallocation of savings from the lower-yielding transfers-out (i.e. from transfers to 
“poorer-quality” households) to the higher-yield formal savings vehicle improves the 
quality of the savings portfolio of the formal-saver. Note that this result is independent of 
any effects on the total amount saved.
56
 
Note, however, that those households least likely to reciprocate (i.e. the “poor 
quality” investments) are likely to be disproportionately represented by the worst-off – 
                                               
56 Whether total savings increases or decreases, when at least some positive amount is allocated to the bank, 
the amount allocated to transfers-out will decrease until the return on this asset increases enough such that 





those who are chronically requesting transfers and rarely in a position to provide them. 
While improving outcomes for savings-users, this would remove an important source of 
consumption insurance for the worst-off. 
 
 
Figure 2. Figures (a) and (b) represent the allocation of savings prior to the entrance of formal savings. 
Figure (a) represents the simple linear technology of storing wealth in durables, while figure (b) shows the 
returns from storing wealth through transfers to other people. Figures (c) and (d) shows how the allocation 
of savings will change if the entrance of formal savings causes the rate of return to increase. Figure (c) 
shows the new rate of return from the linear savings technology (now the bank), and figure (d) shows how 
this affects the allocation of savings through transfers-out. 
 
Case 2: Transfers as “Charity”  
Transfers may also be understood as charitable gifts to a friend or family member. 
While there is a burgeoning literature on the motivations for such types of gifts in 




settings assumes reciprocal obligations. Yet there is no reason in principle that this must 
be the case. The utility benefit from a charitable gift might be intrinsic – i.e. not 
dependent on rewards or punishments from other agents. For example, seeing one‟s child 
or sibling in pain or near death may cause disutility, and giving assistance may decreases 
the disutility experienced. Utility from giving may also be extrinsic – i.e. motivated by 
rewards or punishments from others. For example, other family members or the broader 
community may punish a household for refusing to assist someone in need, and giving 
allows the provider to avoid punishment. A nascent literature explores examples and the 
economic consequences of this type of “pressure to give” (Hoff and Sen 2006, Baland et. 
al. 2007, Jakiela and Ozier 2011). A more positive example of extrinsic utility would be 
that being requested for a gift provides the opportunity to earn utility-enhancing respect 
and admiration in the community by providing assistance. They key difference between 
this case and the preceding case, is that the utility benefit from making a transfer is 
derived exclusively from the transfer itself, rather than from its impact on future-period 
budget constraints (which the transfer is assumed to not directly affect). 
In this case, assume that utility includes both consumption c and transfers x as 
arguments, so that         , and that first derivatives are positive for both arguments 
and the second derivatives negative for both arguments. Furthermore, assume they are 
neither complements nor substitutes (i.e. the cross-partials are zero). Transfers-out may 
therefore be understood simply as a different type of consumption, the marginal value of 
which is unaffected by own-consumption levels.  Assume that income each period is 




period is additively separable. Then the household‟s decision about how to allocate its 
resources can be explained with the following simple two-period model: 
 
   
           
                                                                      
                                       
where ci represents consumption in each period, xi represents a charitable gift in each 
period, yi is income received each period, δ is a discount factor, and ρ is the rate of return 
on savings. 
 In this setting, an increase in the interest rate will have the standard result that 
future consumption will increase, while the effect in present-period consumption is 
ambiguous. That is, as the rate of return on savings goes up, there is both a substitution 
effect and an income effect. The substitution effect causes the household to substitute 
away from c1 and  x1 towards c2 and  x2, as the relative price of the latter two drop. The 
real price of future expenditures (whether on c2  or x2), in terms of present expenditures, 
becomes cheaper  – each unit of future c2  (or x2) requires a smaller sacrifice of current c1  
(or x1) as ρ increases. However, the income effect causes consumption  and gifts in both 
periods to increase. The overall effect for period 2 is positive, but is ambiguous in period 
1. While consuming and giving in the present period is now more costly in terms of 
future potential consumption and giving sacrificed, it is also possible to increase both 
present consumption and giving and future consumption and giving. The effect of the 
entrance of formal savings in this context is illustrated in Figure 3. 
 The theoretical prediction is therefore less clear in the case where transfers are 




competing with households for savings. Instead, an increase in the rate of return on 
savings leads to the standard result that present-period total consumption may go up or 
down. As charitable gifts are essentially another type of consumption, they may also 




Figure 3: Figures (a) and (b) represent the situation prior to formal savings. Given the rate of return 
on saving through durables shown in (a), households face relative prices between present and future 
expenditures represented by the slope of the budget constraint in (b). Panels (c) and (d) depict the 
two possible effects of formal savings on expenditures when the entrance of banks causes the rate of 
return on savings to increase. The first figure in panel (d) shows preferences which cause the 
increased rate of return to lead to higher consumption and charitable gifts in both periods, while the 
second figure depicts preferences which would cause the increased savings rate to induce higher 
consumption and charity in only the future period, and lower consumption and charity in the 





Wealth-Constrained Access to Formal Finance 
 The idealized graphical representation of the returns on formal savings omits two 
important features which are likely to have important implications in practice. The first is 
that formal savings often involve a “minimum balance”  , which is essentially the 
minimum-priced financial asset the bank or institution is willing to sell. A household 
must at least have savings equal to   in order to even be able to store wealth through the 
formal savings technology.
57
 Graphically, this is shown in Figure 4, where the storage 
technology‟s wealth transformation-curve from period one to period two does not 
actually begin until     . For example, the minimum balance for an account with 
OIBM, the microfinance institution expanding access through the mobile bank, is MK 
500 (about $3.25). 
In addition, opening a formal account requires a fixed cost c, attributable to a 
variety of sources. These include, for example, the time it takes to travel to the bank, go 
through the application process, and open the account, along with any explicit costs 
arising from travel. Formal accounts often require official ID documents, such as birth 
certificates, frequently not automatically available to villagers, but obtainable from 
government agencies for non-negligible fees. There are also often mandatory explicit 
costs charged by the institution for opening the account – such as application fees, 
mandatory purchase of ATM cards, and other fixed fees to cover administrative costs. 
Information gathered on transaction costs from the baseline data indicate that the average 
explicit cash costs of opening a formal savings account, among all formal accounts in the 
                                               
57 This is technically true even for saving through non-financial assets. A household must at least have 
enough savings to purchase the cheapest non-financial asset available in order to store wealth through this 
method. It should most likely be the case that minimum balances for savings accounts will be higher than 




baseline data, was MK 1,462. The average reported amount spent on travel was MK 907, 
on ATM cards was MK 244, on ID documents MK230, and on application fees MK 81. 
In addition, about 45% of the formal savings accounts found in the baseline were subject 
to a monthly fee, the average value of which was MK 66 per month.
58
 Together, these 
add up to a fixed cost which may represent a substantial portion of savings for small 
savers. Graphically, the addition of fixed cost c shifts the wealth-transformation curve for 
banks downward, and shifts the starting point of the curve from   to       . 
 
Figure 4: The faint line shows the returns to formal saving in the absence of fixed access-costs. Only the solid 
portion of this line is attainable, as one must save at least the minimum balance  . The dark line shows returns in 
the presence of fixed access costs, where only the solid part of the line is attainable, as one must have at least 
    available. Positive returns from formal savings begin at  . 
 
                                               
58 There are also sometimes substantial cash costs associated with using a formal account. The average 
amount of cash spent in order to deposit into an account, among households that deposited during the 30 
day recall period before the interview, was MK 205 – predominantly transportation fees. The average 
reported amount spent on withdrawing from an account was MK 346, with about MK 300 coming from 




 Thus, only those households that are able to save at least        even have the 
ability to gain access to formal savings.
59
 This makes the poorest segments of the 
population essentially ineligible to adopt use of formal savings. The poorest in village 
communities are therefore unlikely to open savings accounts at banks, and thus unlikely 
to experience direct benefits from the expansion of formal savings services. Their 
constraints make them a de facto ineligible group. 
The question then becomes whether they experience any indirect effects as a 
result of the fact that the comparatively “wealthy” in their community – from whom the 
poorest might request transfers in times of need – start using formal savings. The 
theoretical framework suggests this depends on three factors: whether the relatively 
wealthy generally provide assistance to the worst-off prior to the introduction of formal 
savings; if so, whether such transfers are assumed to be based on the promise of 
reciprocation or instead driven by factors associated with charitable giving; and if the 
latter, whether the income effect dominates the substitution effect. 
While the model focuses on giving behavior of account-adopters, the empirical 
analysis that follows focuses primarily on the effects of local formal savings adoption on 
receipts of assistance. Focusing on assistance receipts (rather than gifts-out) places the 
analysis squarely on one of the most sensitive issues for poverty policy: whether and how 
formal savings expansion affects non-users, and in particular, the most vulnerable 
members of the community. This indirect approach to testing the model is also partly a 
                                               
59 Also note that, given that the fixed cost causes the total return from savings to drop, it is possible that 
saving amount        no longer provides a higher return than saving through durables. It may be 
necessary to save at least        through formal savings in order for the total return to be higher than the 




response to the empirical challenge presented by the data. Many communities are likely 
to have comparatively few households wealthy enough to access and derive positive 
returns from formal savings, and hence relatively few initial service-adopters. It is 
reasonable to suppose that when the relatively wealthy in a village provide assistance, 
they give to multiple households. A random sample from this environment is therefore 
likely to have more households that are potential recipients from formal savings adopters 
than households that are account-adopters. This means that tests on the behavior of 
adopting households are likely to lack statistical power. Tests on receipts of wealth flows 
in communities with high rates of adoption, however, serve as indirect evidence of the 
effects on decisions over transfers out.   
 
5.2. “IIT”: The Link Between the Instrument & Receipts of Assistance 
 The model in the preceding section leads to different predicted impacts on the 
decision to make an inter-household transfer, depending on whether transfers are a form 
of saving or instead a charitable gift. The data used to test these predictions contain 
information on transfers made during the pre-harvest hungry season, the time of year 
when household resources are most restricted, and requests for emergency assistance are 
arguably the highest. This is the period during which transfers received are likely to have 
the highest positive marginal impacts. It is also the time during which the opportunities to 
make decisions over saving through other people, or providing a charitable gift, are 
generally most abundant. 
 The data also benefit from a group which experienced a strong exogenous boost 




assigned information treatment serves as an instrument for the adoption decision to 
enable unbiased inferences about the impact of formal savings on transfers. In addition, 
the data also provide a well-identified group of households among whom changes in 
transfer receipts are a clean signal of the response of others to improved savings options. 
Any change in receipts by the de facto ineligibles (i.e. the highly vulnerable) clearly 
cannot be driven by their own adoption of formal savings. They are instead a sign of 
changes in the provision of assistance induced by formal savings. 
As already discussed above, the empirical analysis focuses primarily on the 
effects of local formal savings rates on receipts of assistance, particularly by the 
most vulnerable households. This is due mainly to the study‟s focus on empirically 
testing for the presence of indirect effects, and the indirect effects on the worst-off 
households in particular. As the data do not identify recipients of transfers-out, or 
whether recipients have formal accounts, examining transfers-out provides less 
information about indirect effects. Moreover, as the worst-off households do not use 
formal savings, analyzing impacts on formal savers is less directly relevant to the 
outcomes of the focal group for this study. It is only of secondary importance, as a 
means to corroborate the causal mechanism of effects suggested by the model. 
The discussion of the impacts of formal savings expansion begins with a brief 
look at simple percentage changes across the encouraged and non-encouraged 
clusters.  It then proceeds to an analysis of a variety of sharp differences in 
vulnerable-household transfer receipts, between marketing and non-marketing 
village clusters. In the context of assessing direct impacts, this would be analogous to 




the “indirect intention to treat”, or “IIT”.
60
 The indirect intention to treat effects are 
interpreted as preliminary evidence suggesting a causal effect from savings accounts.  
While the baseline includes data on a broad range of financial services and 
transactions, the detailed questions on inter-household transfers were not added to 
the questionnaire until the endline survey. Discussion of the impacts of formal 
savings adoption on inter-household transfers therefore begins with a cross-sectional 
analysis of the endline data, which is covered in this chapter. 
As long as the marketing inducement is randomly assigned, it is valid to 
interpret relationships between marketing and household outcomes as causal. 
However, the full panel does contain limited information for both years on certain 
types of wealth transfers that are similar to the gifts-information captured only in the 
endline. Chapter 6 therefore provides a follow-up to the cross-sectional analysis with 
a difference-in-differences analysis of these related types of transfers which serves as 
a robustness check for the results presented in this chapter, confirming that the 
patterns in cash-gifts discussed below were not present in the baseline. 
 
                                               
60 This estimand is similar in spirit to the “ITE” estimand defined by Angelucci et. al. (2009), as the indirect 
treatment effect from policy interventions on non-participants in the program. Though used in the present 
study only as an intermediate step, it bares mentioning that this is one of the first studies I am aware of to 
use an empirical approach which includes examining the indirect impacts, on non-eligibles, of the intention 
to treat eligibles. Though they introduce the ITE as a novel estimand for impact evaluations, Angelucci et. 
al. did not include an analysis of indirect intention to treat, as there was almost 100% compliance among 
eligibles in their sample, since the program they were discussing was welfare payments from the 
government, and almost all those who were eligible chose to be treated. In the present context of wealth-
constrained access to formal savings, however, the non-eligibles easiest to identify are the poorest 
households (group G). Those defined as “eligible” (potentially anyone not in group G) had a compliance 
rate far less than 100%, creating the need to distinguish between an indirect treatment effect (ITE, as in 
Angelucci et. al.) and an indirect intention to treat effect (IIT). In the present context, however, the ultimate 




A First Glance  
 We gathered data on cash gifts of 50 kwacha (about $.30) or more, received 
over a 90-day recall period preceding the interview.
61
 The vast majority are from 
within the local community. While we did not gather data on the actual distances 
between giving and receiving households, nor on whether the households were 
located in the same village, the data do include total round-trip travel times required 
to obtain each gift. About 80% of the reported round-trip travel times are below 30 
minutes (implying one-way trips of a maximum 5-15 minutes)
62
. This proportion 
remains about 80% whether looking at the sample overall, or just the highly 
vulnerable category. Given that the standard mode of transport in these areas is 
usually walking, and sometimes bicycling, this suggests that most of these transfers 
are between households within the same village, or at furthest from neighboring 
villages. 
Table 25 shows simple comparisons of the percentage of households 
receiving cash gifts in the non-marketing and marketing clusters – overall and by 
household vulnerability type.  Appendix 5, Table 5.A.1 is analogous, but compares 
percentages of households receiving multiple cash gifts. Before analyzing separately 
by vulnerability level, we already see a large difference in receipts of cash gifts from 
other households across marketing and non-marketing areas. While 20.8% of all 
households in the non-marketing areas received a cash gift in the last 90 days, 30.6% 
                                               
61 Interviewers were intensively trained on the difference between a “gift” and a loan, the latter carrying 
with it an expectation of repayment of some type of wealth in the future. In addition, the module I added to 
the survey with questions on gifts came after a section in which detailed information was already gathered 
on loans. Interviewers were trained to distinguish between the two and collect information on each only in 
their respective parts of the questionnaire. 
62 The question was asked so as to include time spent at the location of where they were requesting or 





of those in the marketing areas received one. (Significant with a t-test at the .00 
level.) This change in the proportion of households represents a difference of almost 
50%. In addition, while 7.4% of all households in the non-marketing areas received 
more than one cash gift, 12.0% of all those in the marketing areas received multiple 
cash gifts – a difference of 62%. This difference is also highly significant (p<.001; 






Result 1: Receipt of cash gifts during the hungry season is significantly more prevalent 
in the marketing villages than the non-marketing villages. Both the likelihood of (i) 
ever receiving a cash gift; and (ii) receiving multiple gifts is higher in marketing than 
non-marketing villages. 
 
Table 25. Percentage of Households that Received at Least One Cash Gift 
HH Type  


































6.1%   
 (p=0.282) 
C 






 (p=.0008)  
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10.9%  *** 
(p=.0001) 
F 





11.5% ***  
 (p=.0001) 
G 







The number of households in each category above is slightly smaller than the actual total number of 
households overall and total number in each category, as there are a few randomly missing 
responses for the cash gift receipt question. 
 
Note that this difference is not necessarily evidence of an indirect effect of formal 
financial services uptake, since these figures include households that did adopt formal 




that formal services use might have on a household‟s probability of receiving a cash gift 
from others. However, digging deeper and looking at differences by vulnerability level 
shows very strong differences among households of high vulnerability, among whom 
adoption rates are virtually non-existent. 
 The figures in Table 25 in fact show that the relationship between the marketing 
instrument and incidence of cash-gift receipts depends quite heavily on household 
vulnerability level. When we restrict our focus to the least vulnerable groups, for 
example, the difference between marketing and non-marketing areas in cash gift receipts 
attenuates substantially. Among those households that were food-secure (category A) or 
mildly food insecure (category B) in 2008, the percentage of households receiving at least 
one cash gift is not significantly higher in the marketing villages than in the non-
marketing villages (p=.294). 
There is a remarkably consistent pattern of an increasingly high marketing/non-
marketing difference as we move towards indicators of increasing vulnerability. The 
amount by which the percentage of households receiving gifts is higher in marketing than 
non-marketing areas is only 4.3% among the category A households (not significant), and 
8.5% among category B (not significant). The difference grows to 10.4% among category 
C households, 10.6% among category D, 10.9% among category E, 11.5% among 
category F, and 17.8% among Category G – all of which are highly significant (at the .01 
level or higher). Looking at the percentage changes in the proportion of households 
receiving gifts in moving from non-marketing to marketing (rather than just the change in 
the proportions), the pattern of increases is even more striking. Gift receipts in marketing 




the B-category (neither significant). The percentage difference grows to 48% among the 
C-category, 62% among the D-category, 69% E-category, 71% among the F-category, 
and 180% among the G-category. 
 
Result 2: The difference in prevalence of cash-gift receipts between marketing and 
non-marketing villages increases as vulnerability increases. The marketing/non-
marketing difference is negligible among the best-off households, but highly 
significant among the worst-off households. This is true for both receiving any gift, 
and receiving multiple gifts. The positive impact on the likelihood of (i) ever receiving a 
cash gift; and of (ii) receiving multiple cash gifts increases as vulnerability goes up. 
 
As a brief but important aside, recall that the highly vulnerable group (category 
G) includes both male- and female-headed households. It is conceivable that gender of 
household head could affect a household‟s treatment by the community, suggesting it is 
important to verify whether the two household types really ought to be analyzed as a 
single group in terms of assistance receipts. About 56%  of category G  (153 households) 
is female-headed (literate & non-literate), while 44% (119 households) is male-headed. 
The experience of the highly vulnerable male-headed households appears to be almost 
identical to that of the female-headed households. Among female-headed households in 
category G, 9.9% of those in the control areas received a cash gift, while 28.2% of those 
in the treated areas received a cash gift, resulting in a difference of 18.3%, significant 
with a two-sided t-test (p=.004). Among male-headed households in category G, 10.0% 




resulting in a difference of 17.1% (p=.016).  As gender of household head does not 
appear to affect the proportion of highly vulnerable households receiving cash gifts, 
either in the control or treated areas, I analyze all category G households as a single 
group. 
 
A Deeper Look: Impact on the De Facto Ineligibles 
We now proceed to a deeper analysis of the Indirect Intention to Treat Effect, 
which I call “IIT”. This is the first stage of analysis, before moving in the following 
section to an initial look at the Indirect Treatment Effect, or “ITE” (as defined by 
Angelucci et. al., 2009).  
Since this study is primarily concerned with the indirect effects of formal savings 
on consumption-smoothing of non-users, and the impact on assistance receipts by the 
most vulnerable households in particular, I focus on the experience of the highest 
vulnerability category. This is group G, which includes households that were highly food 
insecure in 2008 according to the HFIAP scale, live in communities more than 3 
kilometers from the bank-stop, and do not possess a mobile phone. In addition, they 
either have no literate household members, or are female-headed (57 of the 272 
households in this group are both female-headed and have no literate members).  
Restricting attention to the highest vulnerability group simplifies the 
interpretation of any causal effects as deriving from indirect effects of local formal 
savings usage, rather than direct effects from own use of formal savings. As discussed 
above in the theoretical framework, it is assumed that the minimum balance and fixed 






 This group is therefore assumed to not have access to formal savings, 
making them a de facto “ineligible” group. The classification of this group as ineligible 
lies in the spirit of Angelucci et. al. (2009), who analyze the indirect impact of Mexico‟s 
welfare program, Progresa, on ineligible households. (In their case, there is no IIT-
analysis, since nearly everyone offered participation enrolls, making indirect intention to 
treat almost identical to the indirect treatment effect.) 
The data is consistent with the assumption that this highly vulnerable group is 
essentially ineligible. Very few households in this group use formal savings services. 
Only 8 households (3.2%) of group G had formal accounts in 2010, 6 of which (2.4% of 
the entire group) started using formal savings between 2008 and 2010. (Of the 6 
households across both groups that switched from no formal savings to formal savings, 4 
of them were located in intensive-marketing areas.) Any effects on group G households 
stemming from local formal savings adoption rates are therefore highly unlikely to be 
caused by direct effects of having an account, but are instead attributable to indirect 
effects of others in the community having accounts. Moreover, the response variables for 
these few households tend to run in the opposite direction as that for the other 97% of 
category-G households (for example none of the 6 savings-adopting households in group 
G received a cash gift from friends or relatives in the endline).  So they are clearly not 
driving the results. 
We have already seen above (Table 25) that there is a large and significant 
difference in the proportion of category-G households reporting cash gift receipts 
between the marketing and non-marketing village clusters. Due to the random 
                                               
63 Even in cases where a formal account may be technically within the range of affordability for a very poor 
household, the fixed costs associated with opening the account should be high enough to cause total returns 




assignment of the marketing instrument, these differences in simple averages are 
sufficient to infer causal effects. However, those were simple t-tests, and it would 
clarify the picture to account for pair-level effects, and probable intra-cluster 
correlation among households in the same village cluster. In addition, we have seen 
that it is unclear whether in Lilongwe the instrument actually boosted the increase in 
proportion of households using formal savings. I therefore run a set of OLS 
regressions on the 0-1 variable for whether a household received a cash gift over the 
last 90 days, with pair-level fixed effects, and clustered standard errors, both for the 
entire sample as well as the sample restricted to Dedza and Mchinji districts. I 
estimate the regressions including all household types, and then restricting to just the 
highly vulnerable category. 
Table 26 reports the results. The conclusions are roughly the same as those 
based on the simpler t-test. Among all vulnerability categories, the marketing 
increases the percentage of households in the cluster receiving a cash gift by about 
10 percentage points, while it increases the percentage of highly vulnerable 
households receiving a cash gift by about 15 or 16 percentage points, all of which are 
significant at the .01-level. Note that the results are nearly identical when the sample 
is restricted to Dedza and Mchinji districts. (The significance level of the coefficient 
on the marketing dummy does drop, due to the fewer number of observations, but is 
still highly significant).  
A linear regression may not be appropriate for a regression of percentages. 




the village-cluster level, but which omit the pair-level fixed effects.
64
 Marginal 
effects are reported. As can be seen, the estimated effects are quite similar across the 
two specifications.
                                               
64 The inclusion or omission of pair-level fixed effects do not alter the basic results of the linear regression. 
When fixed effects are omitted, estimated magnitudes of effects are almost identical, and they remain 
significant well beyond the .01-level within all subsamples, whether using all households together or just 
the highly vulnerable. For example, across all households regardless of type, the estimated magnitudes are 
slightly lower when fixed effects are omitted, but just barely. The largest difference in estimated magnitude 
is .006 (an estimated coefficient of .089 versus .095). Across just the highly vulnerable households, the 




Indirect Intention to Treat (IIT) Effect on Percentage of Households in Cluster Receiving A Cash Gift 
 
Table 26. Linear Regression: WLS Approach – Explicitly correcting for heteroskedasticity by running on the whole sample 
 All Household Types Vuln HHs (G) 

















VARIABLES Rcv Csh Gft Rcv Csh Gft Rcv Csh Gft Rcv Csh Gft Rcv Csh Gft Rcv Csh Gft Rcv Csh Gft Rcv Csh Gft 
Mktg Dummy 0.0989*** 0.111*** 0.0953*** 0.0983*** 0.159*** 0.159*** 0.153*** 0.153*** 
 (1.17e-08) (4.82e-09) (2.31e-06) (1.23e-05) (0.000371) (0.000346) (0.00314) (0.00295) 
Constant 0.0409 0.0315 0.0438 0.0413 -0.106* -0.106* -0.102 -0.102 
 (0.397) (0.539) (0.367) (0.407) (0.0989) (0.0963) (0.117) (0.114) 
Pair Fxd Effcts YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
EA-Clust SEs YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
No. Clusters 112 96 85 72 99 91 76 69 
Observations 1,992 1,754 1,519 1,330 271 250 205 187 
R-squared 0.046 0.043 0.047 0.038 0.225 0.230 0.220 0.221 
Cluster-robust pval in parentheses  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 27. Probit – Marginal Effects 
 All Household Types Vuln HHs (G) 

















VARIABLES Rcv Csh Gft Rcv Csh Gft Rcv Csh Gft Rcv Csh Gft Rcv Csh Gft Rcv Csh Gft Rcv Csh Gft Rcv Csh Gft 
Mktg Dummy 0.0979*** 0.110*** 0.0885*** 0.0961*** 0.178*** 0.180*** 0.166*** 0.169*** 
 (5.57e-06) (5.68e-07) (0.000450) (0.000201) (6.44e-05) (0.000171) (0.00112) (0.00247) 
Pair Fxd Effcts NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
EA-Clust SEs YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
No. Clusters 112 96 85 72 99 91 76 69 
Observations 1,992 1,754 1,519 1,330 271 250 205 187 




Appendix 5 discusses results from a set of regressions which repeats the same IIT 
analysis as that reported in Table 26, but which takes the village-cluster as the unit of 
observation (instead of the household), the cluster-mean as the response variable, and 
uses Huber-White heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. This estimation approach, 
the results of which are reported in appendix Table 5.A.2, is clearly less efficient. 
However,  the instrumental variables regressions used to estimate the full ITE in section 
5.3 below are run at the cluster-level. Table 5.A.2 therefore reports the IIT estimates for 
cluster-level regressions for easier comparison with the ITE. Magnitudes of the 
coefficient estimates from this adjusted regression run at the cluster-level are essentially 
the same as those reported in Table 26. However, with many fewer observations, the 
significance for some estimates drop from the .01-level to the .05-level.  
 
Cash Gift Amounts Received 
Given the impressive impacts on the proportion of highly vulnerable 
households that receive any cash gifts, one might suppose cash gift amounts received 
by vulnerable households would also be affected by formal savings adoption rates in 
the local community. The data include amounts for the most recent gift received over 
the last 90 days. Across all households receiving gifts, the overall average amount 
reported is 620 kwacha (about $4). However, amounts vary substantially by 
vulnerability category. The average gift amount is 1,250 kwacha among A-category 
households, 890 kwacha among B-category households, 540 kwacha among category 




In contrast to the very strong association between the marketing instrument 
and numbers of households receiving gifts, simple tests on amounts show no 
significant differences across clusters exposed to the instrument and those not 
exposed to it. This is true overall as well as by vulnerability category. For example, 
whether looking at all households together, or just the highly vulnerable category, 
simple t-tests and Mann-Whitney U-tests on the differences in amounts received 
(conditional on receiving a gift) are nowhere near significant. The average amounts 
received are in fact mildly higher in the control villages.  
Results for a linear regression on the amount of cash received, including pair-
level fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the village cluster level are reported in 
Table 28 below. These results also show that, conditional on receiving a cash gift, 
amounts are no higher in the treated villages than the non-treated. When restricting the 
sample to those households that report receiving a cash gift and regress the amount of the 
gift on the marketing dummy, the dummy is not significant. In the full sample, across all 
households, a total of 512 households received one or more cash gifts. Among these, the 
gift amounts were actually slightly lower in the treated areas, although not significantly 
so (estimated coefficient on marketing of 174 kwacha, with a p-value of 0.19). Among 
the highly vulnerable, a total of 50 households received at least one cash gift, and the 
savings encouragement similarly has no measurable effect on the amount (p=0.21).  
These results suggest that the key decision of a benefactor household is not 
how much to give in a cash gift to a supplicant, but instead whether to give a cash 
gift at all. This may indicate that the gifts serve a similar purpose – for example, 




suggests that there are standard or commonly accepted gift amounts, which may vary 
by wealth-level of the recipient. 
 
Result 3: The instrument for formal savings adoption is not associated with an increase 




Table 28. OLS on Amount of Cash-Gift Received (Conditional on Receiving a Cash Gift) 
 All Household Types Vuln HHs (G) 

















VARIABLES Amt Csh Rcvd Amt Csh Rcvd Amt Csh Rcvd Amt Csh Rcvd Amt Csh Rcvd Amt Csh Rcvd Amt Csh Rcvd Amt Csh Rcvd 
Mktg Dummy -173.8 -118.8 -177.4 -100.0 113.0 113.0 130 130 
 (0.188) (0.361) (0.297) (0.542) (0.214) (0.201) (0.208) (0.198) 
Constant 1,486*** 1,449*** 1,488*** 1,437*** 108.0 108.0 96.67 96.67 
 (3.31e-07) (2.89e-06) (1.06e-06) (1.25e-05) (0.195) (0.182) (0.245) (0.234) 
Pair Fxd Effcts YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
EA-Clust SEs YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 512 435 384 324 50 47 40 38 





In-Kind Gifts and Payment of Fees 
The data also include information on receipts of in-kind gifts, as well as 
occurrences of someone outside the household making payment to a third party on 
behalf of a household member. The latter might include, for example, paying for a 
household member‟s medical fees, school fees, etc. Just as for the cash-gift variable, 
the question is limited to a recall period of 90 days, and only includes values that are 
greater than or equal to 50 kwacha (approx. $0.30). Appendix 5, Tables 5.A.3 and 
5.A.4 show the results from an IIT analysis of these transfer receipts which parallels 
that for cash-gifts. 
Though the estimated effects are rarely significant, the signs are consistent 
with the results for cash gifts. In particular, the estimated impact of the information 
intervention on the percentage of highly vulnerable households that report an in-kind 
ranges from 6.0 to 8.9 percentage points, depending on the sample, with borderline 
significance in two of the four regressions. The estimated impact on the percentage of 
highly vulnerable households receiving help paying fees to a third party is 4.4 
percentage points higher when including all three districts, representing a 62% 
difference, though this is not significant (p=.206). 
This analysis yields two important insights. On the one hand, it appears that 
direct monetary transfers to households are much more sensitive to the change 
introduced by formal savings uptake than either non-monetary wealth transfers, or 
monetary payments to a third party. More importantly, the fact that neither of these 




that the cash-gifts result is not simply the result of a substitution. It is not the case, for 
example, that vulnerable households are now receiving cash gifts in lieu of in-kind 
gifts, such as food. This is important, as it strongly suggests the change in transfer 
behaviors induced by the boost in formal savings leads to an improvement in welfares 
of the vulnerable households, an  issue that will be taken up in greater detail in 
Chapter 6. 
 
Result 4: The results on cash gifts do not appear to be driven by a substitution of 
cash-assistance in place of other types of assistance. This suggests that the 
increased cash assistance may lead to a positive welfare effect among recipients. 
 
5.3. The Indirect Treatment Effect (ITE) 
 Up until this point, analysis of effects has been limited to the framework of 
intention to treat – or, in this case, the indirect effect of the intention to treat (IIT). 
The ultimate goal, however, is to determine the causal indirect effects of financial 
service use expansion itself on inter-household transfer receipts by non-users. To do 
this, I regress transfer receipts on the percentage of households in the local 
community using formal savings, instrumenting for the latter with the randomly 
assigned information intervention. 
 Since the information on cash gifts was collected only in the endline, I am 
constrained to a cross-sectional analysis. That is, in the first stage, I regress local 
percentage of households with formal savings in 2010 on the marketing dummy, and 




percentage of households with formal savings. However, as we have already seen in 
the panel analysis of the marketing instrument‟s effects, it appears as if the instrument 
may not have been successful in boosting the local formal savings use in Lilongwe 
district. In addition, the marketing-clusters in Lilongwe already had a higher average 
level of formal savings use than the non-marketing clusters (though it was shown to 
be driven by one or two outliers). I therefore also report results restricting the data to 
the other two districts, Dedza and Mchinji. 
 As the focus here is the indirect effects of local formal savings use, I restrict 
analysis to just the highly-vulnerable category. The unit of observation in these 
regressions is the village-cluster, and the variables are therefore cluster-level 
aggregates. The dependent variable is the cluster mean of the 0-1 variable for 
receiving a cash gift among just the category-G households. That is, it is the 
proportion of the given village cluster‟s category-G households that receive a cash 
gift.  
The chief regressor of interest is the cluster mean of the 0-1 variable 
indicating whether a household has a formal savings account. That is, the key 
regressor is the proportion of households (among all households in the cluster) that 
report having one or more formal savings accounts. This variable may be endogenous 
for several possible reasons. For example, integration into the modern economy may 
weaken norms for assisting other households (e.g. dilute traditional safety nets and 
informal aid networks), and may also simultaneously increase the probability of 




modern life may therefore have higher formal savings usage rates, and lower gifts 
among non-users, but not due to an effect of formal savings on assistance. 
 The first stage is a simple linear estimation that regresses the percentage of 
households (among everyone) in the village cluster with formal savings on the 
dummy for marketing. The unit of observation is the village-cluster, so the dependent 
variable here is the cluster mean of the 0-1 indicator variable for a household having 
formal savings in 2010. The regression includes pair-level fixed effects. 
 It should be noted that, since the analysis is restricted to category-G 
households, I am forced to drop from the regression any clusters that do not have 
households in this category. This results in dropping 13 village clusters (11%) from 
the sample. The analysis in Chapter 4 of the information intervention‟s effect on use 
of formal financial services included these 13 clusters. In order to give a more 
accurate picture of the first stage in the actual IV regressions below, I therefore repeat 
the analysis of the instrument‟s effect on local formal savings and loans prevalence, 
leaving out these 13 clusters. The results are reported in Appendix 5, Table 5.A.5 
(formal savings) and Table 5.A.6 (formal credit), and are directly comparable to the 
results reported in Tables 13 and 14 (formal savings) and Tables 15 and 16 (formal 
credit) of chapter 4. As seen in Tables 5.A.5 and 5.A.6, there is very little difference 
between the results from the full sample, and the results when omitting the 13 clusters 
without category-G households. The estimated effect of the information intervention 
on the local percentage of formal savers in the endline is still significant at the .01 to 
.05 level, depending on the subsample and specification. In addition, as before, the 




The regressions in Tables 13 and 14, as well as those in Table 5.A.5, are at the 
household-level, and therefore yield the most efficient estimates of the effect of the 
information intervention on the local percentage of formal savers. The first stage in 
the IV estimations below, however, is a regression of the (calculated) percentage of 
households in each cluster with formal savings in 2010 on the marketing dummy. 
That is, the first stage is a regression of the cluster mean for the 0-1 household 
indicator for formal savings on the dummy for information intervention. I then correct 
for heteroskedasticity using heteroskedastic-robust standard errors. To the extent that 
this less efficient estimation of the instrument‟s effect on formal savings prevalence 
in the first stage results in a weaker instrument for endline local savings prevalence, 
this would be evident in the second stage, where the estimate for the instrumented 
variable would be non-significant. In linear IV regressions with a just-identified first 




The second stage is a simple cross-sectional Linear-IV with the endline data, 
where I regress the percentage of category-G households that receive a cash gift on 
the predicted percentage of households in the cluster with formal savings. I include 
pair-level fixed effects. There is of course no reason to cluster at the EA-level, since 
here the EA is the unit of observation. I also use Huber-White sandwich errors to 
account for heteroskedasticity caused by use of variables that are percentages with 
variation in the number of observations used to construct each percentage. I report 
results from the non-instrumented OLS, as well as the IV, for all distance levels, as 
                                               





well as those pairs beyond the three kilometer threshold, for all three districts and for 
just Dedza and Mchinji. 
The results are reported in Table 29. Both variables have been scaled up so 
that they are in terms of percentage points (i.e. they are multiplied by 100). The OLS 
estimates suggest a positive relationship between local formal savings prevalence and 
cash gift receipts among the most vulnerable. A one point increase in the percentage 
of local formal savings users is accompanied by an increase in the percentage of 
vulnerable households that receive a cash gift ranging from between 0.5 to 0.9 
percentage points. This is only significant, however, when including all districts and 
restricting to the three kilometer threshold (though it is quite close to significance at 
the .10-level in the other samples – especially when restricting to Dedza and Mchinji 
and looking across all distances). 
Instrumenting for local formal savings prevalence to remove the endogeneity 
sharply increases both the sign and magnitude, suggesting a negative bias in the OLS 
estimates. As shown in Table 29, a one point increase in the percentage of households 
in the cluster using formal savings leads to a 2.4 point increase in the percentage of 
vulnerable households that receive a cash gift. When restricting to Dedza and Mchinji 
districts, the magnitude of the effect grows to 3.2 percentage points. The effect is 
highly significant in all four subsamples.  
 Tables 30 and 31 show results for the same regressions, but instead where the 
response variables are (i) percentage of vulnerable households that received help 
paying fees or expenses to a third party; and (ii) percentage of vulnerable households 




cash gifts, though the effects are not nearly as strong, and not significant in all 
subsamples. The results for receipt of in-kind gifts are more mixed, the effect having 
a positive sign in some cases and negative in others, but never significant in any of 
the subsamples. That is, there is essentially no effect on receipt of in-kind gifts by the 
vulnerable group. This may suggest the effect is stronger for monetary wealth 
transfers than non-monetary transfers. Regardless, these instrumental-variables 
estimates of the indirect treatment effect of local formal savings rates on transfer 
receipts by the highly vulnerable confirm the result articulated in “Result 4” above 
(and supported by the evidence in the IIT analyses reported in Tables 5.A.3 and 
5.A.4). That is, the indirect effect on transfer receipts appears strongest for direct 
monetary transfers to households, and that the effect on receipts of in-kind gifts and 
help paying fees to a third party are either positive or not significantly different from 
zero. This suggests the influx of transfer receipts by the highly vulnerable is not 





Table 29. ITE: Effect of Increase in Pctg of HHs Using Formal Savings on Pctg of Vulnerable HHs in Cluster Receiving a Cash Gift 
 All Districts Dedza & Mchinji 
 OLS IV OLS IV 




(5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Pctg Vuln Rcv 
Cash Gift 
Pctg Vuln Rcv 
Cash Gift 
Pctg Vuln Rcv 
Cash Gift 
Pctg Vuln Rcv 
Cash Gift 
Pctg Vuln Rcv 
Cash Gift 
Pctg Vuln Rcv 
Cash Gift 
Pctg Vuln Rcv 
Cash Gift 
Pctg Vuln Rcv 
Cash Gift 
Pctg HHs w FSAV 0.547 0.547* 2.382** 2.382** 0.927 0.927 3.191** 3.191** 
 (0.112) (0.0978) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.125) (0.108) (0.0109) (0.0109) 
Constant -4.101 -4.101 -17.87 -17.87 -6.954 -6.954 -23.93 -23.93 
 (0.428) (0.408) (0.217) (0.217) (0.434) (0.412) (0.216) (0.216) 
Pair Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Hetsk-Robust SEs Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 99 91 99 91 76 69 76 69 
R-squared 0.540 0.526 0.272 0.250 0.572 0.555 0.310 0.282 
Robust pval in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 30. ITE: Effect of Increase in Pctg of HHs With Formal Savings on Pctg of Vulnerable HHs Receiving HELP PAYING FEES 
 All Districts Dedza & Mchinji 
 OLS IV OLS IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Pctg Vuln Rcv 
Help w Fees 
Pctg Vuln Rcv 
Help w Fees 
Pctg Vuln Rcv 
Help w Fees 
Pctg Vuln Rcv 
Help w Fees 
Pctg Vuln Rcv 
Help w Fees 
Pctg Vuln Rcv 
Help w Fees 
Pctg Vuln Rcv 
Help w Fees 
Pctg Vuln Rcv 
Help w Fees 
Pctg HHs w FSAV 0.514 0.514 1.011* 1.011* 0.392 0.392 0.713 0.713 
 (0.164) (0.147) (0.0558) (0.0558) (0.276) (0.253) (0.264) (0.264) 
Constant -3.857 -3.857 -7.582 -7.582 -2.940 -2.940 -5.351 -5.351 
 (0.444) (0.425) (0.255) (0.255) (0.485) (0.463) (0.381) (0.381) 
Observations 99 91 99 91 76 69 76 69 
R-squared 0.623 0.615 0.589 0.579 0.647 0.636 0.636 0.625 




Table 31. ITE: Effect of Increase in Pctg of HHs With Formal Savings on Pctg of Vulnerable HHs Receiving An IN-KIND Gift 
 All Districts Dedza & Mchinji 
 OLS IV OLS IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Pctg Vuln Rcv 
In-Kind Gft 
Pctg Vuln Rcv 
In-Kind Gft 
Pctg Vuln Rcv 
In-Kind Gft 
Pctg Vuln Rcv 
In-Kind Gft 
Pctg Vuln Rcv 
In-Kind Gft 
Pctg Vuln Rcv 
In-Kind Gft 
Pctg Vuln Rcv 
In-Kind Gft 
Pctg Vuln Rcv 
In-Kind Gft 
Pctg HHs w 
FSAV 
0.451 0.451 0.314 0.314 1.006 1.006 -0.398 -0.398 
 (0.338) (0.318) (0.674) (0.674) (0.273) (0.250) (0.709) (0.709) 
Constant -3.383 -3.383 -2.358 -2.358 -7.547 -7.547 2.986 2.986 
 (0.508) (0.490) (0.687) (0.687) (0.484) (0.462) (0.718) (0.718) 
         
Observations 99 91 99 91 76 69 76 69 
R-squared 0.660 0.612 0.659 0.611 0.706 0.655 0.632 0.568 





 5.4. Conclusion  
This chapter examined the key results of the thesis. The chapter began by 
formalizing the conceptual framework for the likely impact of formal savings expansion 
with a simple theoretical model. The model predicts that, when inter-household wealth 
transfers are viewed by the provider as an alternative form of saving, for example to 
insure its consumption against future adverse shocks, the appearance of formal savings 
may lead to a reduction. If a household adopts the newly available formal savings 
technology, this is a signal that it provides a higher rate of return than its previous 
alternative savings options. Such a household will reduce any allocation of savings to 
transfers it would have otherwise made, beginning with transfers to the least reliable to 
repay, until the return from saving through transfers is equal to the return provided by 
formal savings. For transfers viewed as savings vehicles, those given to the worst-off are 
likely the first to be cut, as it is probably they are the least likely to be reciprocated in the 
future.  
When transfers are viewed by the provider as a type of charitable gift, however, 
the model predicts an ambiguous result. Whether due to intrinsic or extrinsic factors, the 
benefit from a charitable gift is a direct utility gain in the current period, and therefore 
functions much in the same way as own-consumption. This is true regardless of whether 
giving makes the charitable donor unconditionally better-off, or if the event of having 
been requested first lowers the donor‟s utility and providing assistance helps mitigate this 
reduction. If the entrance of formal savings raises the rate of return, there is a competing 




each unit of consumption sacrificed this period by saving, one can consume even more 
the following period), there will be a tendency for households to save more now and 
substitute expenditures toward the future. On the other hand, the income effect tends to 
push expenditures up in both periods. The result is therefore ambiguous, and depends on 
the shape of household preferences. 
Taking the model to the empirical setting of Central Malawi, an examination of 
the data showed that the entrance of formal savings led to a substantial boost in cash gift 
receipts – particularly among the most vulnerable. A simple comparison of percentage 
differences showed that households in communities that received the savings 
encouragement were more likely to receive a cash gift, by 9.8 percentage-points, a highly 
significant difference, representing an almost 50% increase over the non-encouraged 
clusters. This difference systematically grows as vulnerability level increases. While not 
significant among the category A and category B households, the difference is 10.4 
percentage-points among category C households, 10.6 percentage-points among category 
D, 10.9 percentage points among category E, 11.5 percentage points among category F, 
and 17.8 percentage points among Category G – all of which are highly significant. 
Looking at the percentage changes in the proportion of households receiving gifts in 
moving from non-encouraged to saving-encouraged showed that receipts in marketing 
areas are only 14% more common among the A-category, and 33% more common among 
the B-category (neither significant). The percentage difference grows to 48% among the 
C-category, 62% among the D-category, 69% E-category, 71% among the F-category, 




As the highly vulnerable group is essentially ineligible to take up formal savings, 
these very strong impacts on their receipt of inter-household transfers is clear evidence of 
a spillover effect of formal savings adoption on non formal-savers. To more accurately 
quantify the nature of this impact, fixed effects were added and errors were clustered at 
the community-level, in a linear regression of receipt of a cash-gift on the information-
treatment dummy. This indirect intention to treat (IIT) analysis showed IIT estimates of 
the impact on the highly vulnerable‟s probability of receiving a gift ranging from 15.3 to 
15.9 percentage-points, which were highly significant. Results were almost identical in a 
Probit specification. The instrumental-variables regression then enabled an estimate of 
the full indirect treatment effect (ITE). This analysis showed ITE estimates indicating 
that a one percentage-point increase in the local proportion of formal-savers led to a 2.4 
to 3.2 percentage-point increase in the proportion of highly vulnerable households that 
received one or more cash-gifts. 
A brief analysis showed that gift amounts do not appear to be affected. This 
suggests that the impact is primarily on the decision of whether to give a gift in response 
to a given request, or how many households to provide cash gifts, rather than how much 
to provide through each gift. It was also seen that there is a evidence of mild increases in 
other types of assistance received, such as help paying fees to a third party. Importantly, 
the evidence indicates that receipt of other forms of assistance by the most vulnerable do 
not decrease in the savings-encouraged communities. It therefore appears that the influx 
in cash-gift receipts induced by increases in local formal savings use does not substitute 
for other forms of assistance. This suggests the potential for these changes in household 




evidence on welfare changes among the highly vulnerable in the savings-encouraged 
communities, using the full panel. It also makes use of the fact that baseline data exists 






Chapter 6. The Impact of Formal Savings on Related Transfers & 
On Welfare Outcomes: A Panel Analysis 
 
The last chapter showed that an increase in the proportion of the local 
community using formal savings led to increased receipts of cash gifts among the de 
facto ineligibles, who are also the worst-off households. This chapter explores highly 
suggestive evidence that receipts of cash loans were also affected. It also examines 
the welfare effects of increased cash assistance from friends and relatives by 
considering food-security and health indicators. Since the data on both sets of 
variables were gathered in the baseline as well as the endline, the analysis here is of 
changes across the two-year period. 
Since the marketing encouragement was randomly assigned, the cross-
sectional estimates of the effect of marketing-induced increases in local savings 
account usage should be consistent. That is, the randomization should ensure the 
endline pattern of differences in gift receipts examined in Chapter 5 was not present 
in the baseline, nor derive from any systematic differences between marketing and 
non-marketing clusters along any dimensions other than the marketing campaign 
itself. Unfortunately, since there is no baseline data on gift-receipts, this is 
impossible to verify for receipts of pure transfers. 
However, the data do contain information on informal loans received in both 
years. In reality, the dividing line between a gift and a loan is not always clear – 
particularly among recipients at the very low end of the wealth spectrum. In the 
survey interview, transfers were classified as “loans” if there was an explicit 




provides a cash transfer to a highly vulnerable household, for example, even if there 
is an explicit expectation of repayment, the provider may know there is a high 
probability the recipient will not be in a position to repay in the future. In 
expectation, the amount repaid is dramatically reduced (perhaps even close to zero), 
and the “loan” essentially becomes a gift.  The meaning of a “loan” to the poorest 
households from a friend or relative may even be qualitatively different; it may be 
understood that it will be repaid conditional on being in a position to repay, which is 
commonly known to be unlikely. If so, a “loan” might differ from a “gift” only in 
that there is a non-zero possibility it may need to be repaid. 
66
 
It is also important to note that the classification of a transfer as a “gift” 
versus a “loan” is based on the recipient‟s response, and we do not have data on how 
the provider viewed the transfer. If we had dyadic data with information on both 
givers and receivers for each transfer, we could verify which type of transfer the 
provider considered it to be. Even then, however, as the line between “loan” and 




                                               
66 Also, recall that the model predicts that, when transfers are motivated by issues such as expected 
reciprocation, self-insurance, and saving, adopting formal savings should cause a household to 
decrease its loans to those least likely to repay (or likely to repay less than the amount given). That is, 
it will place less of its savings in the inferior investments, given its set of options. These inferior 
savings options are likely to be disproportionately represented by the worst-off households. So, if 
loans to the worst-off are purely “loans”, and driven by reciprocation-based motives, rather than 
factors associated with charitable giving, loan receipts by the worst off should decrease if they. Yet 
this is not the finding in the results reported below. 
67 In all likelihood, a transfer will generally be subjectively perceived by the provider as lying along a 
spectrum between gift and loan, in accordance with the expected probability of repayment. Or, more 
accurately, a zero-interest informal loan to a household with a probability of \default high enough that the 
rate of return from the loan is clearly worse than alternative investments, will have a portion that is an 
unambiguous “gift”, which is equal to the difference in the rate of return from the loan and the better option 




This suggests there may be substantial noise in the identification of a transfer 
as a gift or a loan, and that the distinction between the two is not always clear – 
particularly for receipts among the worst-off. This chapter therefore explores what 
happens to receipts of loans. The following panel analysis shows that changes in loan 
receipts by the most vulnerable category of households experienced an uptick in 
information-treated communities very similar in scale to the cross-sectional 
differences observed for cash gifts. Depending on the specification, exposing the 
community to the formal savings encouragement increased the proportion of highly 
vulnerable non-saving households receiving loans from friends and relatives by 14.4 
to 22.4 percentage points. As in the case for cash gifts, the effect grows stronger as 
remoteness of communities increases and the power of the instrument in 
exogenously boosting formal savings rates grows. 
 Given the extensive literature documenting the importance of informal loans 
in consumption-smoothing, this substantial increase in the probability of receiving a 
cash loan from a friend or relative suggests important improvements in the 
smoothing capacity among the worst-off. These changes in receipt of loans from 
other households also serve as a robustness check on the assumption of no baseline 
differences in inter-household transfer behaviors. If anything, the baseline data on 
loans from other households suggests receipts were lower in the treated communities 
(though the difference is not significant). In this capacity, the panel analysis of local 
formal savings rates on inter-household loan receipts by the highly vulnerable 





Upon observing the substantial magnitude of exogenously boosted local 
savings rates un inter-household transfer receipts by the worst-off, the natural 
follow-up question is whether this actually matters in terms of welfare. As Townsend 
(1994) aptly points out, studying informal insurance institutions one at a time may 
lead one to overlook important supplementary smoothing options. Focusing on final 
consumption and related outcomes, however, enables the researcher to evaluate all 
available institutions jointly. While the data suggests the increased receipts of 
assistance are at least not substituting for other types of observed inter-household 
assistance receipts, it is possible the increased assistance might have general 
equilibrium effects on other types of consumption-smoothing devices that do not 
depend other households or which are not captured in the data. The true test in 
whether the influx of cash assistance from other households actually improves 
consumption smoothing and enhances well-being among the worst-off non service-
users therefore lies in whether their consumption and welfare outcomes have actually 
improved.  
 The panel analyses below show that living in communities that received the 
saving encouragement caused two-year improvements in at least three key welfare 
indicators among the worst-off. Households are 11.8 to 16.3 percent more likely to exit 
the worst food-security category in the HFIAP scale (severely insecure) to enter one of 
the three other less severe categories. They also experience a 1.3 to 1.4 reduction in the 
continuous food-insecurity score, HFIAS, representing a 10-12% improvement over 




The worst-off households living in savings-encouraged communities were 12 to 17.4 
percent less likely to report any members of the household as recently unwell. 
 The remainder of this chapter is divided into two short sections. The first analyzes 
the relationship between the instrument for local formal savings adoption and two-year 
changes in inter-household transfer receipts by the most vulnerable. The second section 
examines two-year changes in welfare indicators. 
 
 
6.1. IIT on Changes in Transfers: Impact of Information Intervention on Informal 
Loans  
 
The data include information on loans received from friends or relatives 
anytime in the past two years. These are cash loans, for which the purpose is not 
specified by the respondent. If formal savings accounts makes it easier for 
households to share wealth via cash assistance in order to help other households 
smooth consumption, we might expect to see the effect in loan-receipts as well as 
gifts. More generally, we might expect changes in receipt of loans to at least loosely 
track changes in receipt of pure gifts of cash. 
The percentage of highly vulnerable households reporting informal loans 
over the previous 2 years in 2008 was 39.7% in the information-treated clusters and 
42.6% in the information control clusters (41.2% overall). In 2010, this percentage 
rose to 49.2% in the treated clusters, and remained constant at 42.6% in the control 
clusters. When restricting to clusters 3 km out, the trend grows even stronger. In 
2008, while 38.5% of the highly vulnerable in the marketing clusters report informal 




the percentage in the marketing clusters rises to 50.4% and that in the non-marketing 
clusters drops to 43.4%. While these cross-sectional differences are not significant 
by themselves at conventional levels using two-sided t-tests, they are highly 
suggestive. 
Analyzing the changes, adding controls, and controlling for intra-cluster 
correlation sharpens the picture. Table 32 reports results from a simple first-
differenced regression of informal loan receipt on a dummy for the information 
intervention (or marketing campaign), with the sample restricted to the highly 
vulnerable households. All regressions include clustered standard errors, and four 
different regressions are shown – one without fixed effects, one with fixed effects at 
district level, one with fixed effects at zone-level, and one with fixed effects at the 
cluster-pair level. While differencing the data removes any time-invariant local fixed 
effects (such as variation in norms, tastes, or degree of integration into the modern 
economy), it does not account for any possible interactions of period changes with 
local variables or changes which vary across communities. On the one hand, an 
adverse shock experienced by all communities in the sample could be better 
mitigated by households in a community with extensive extra-village linkages, 
freeing households to give loans more easily than in a community with fewer extra-
village links. On the other hand, any region-specific or spatially covariate shocks 
which occur over the two-year period (positive or negative) may affect the ability of 
neighboring households to provide assistance differently in one area than another. 
The response variable is the change in whether a given vulnerable household 




therefore take values of {-1,0,1}, which correspond to going from receiving at least 
one or more loans to receiving none, experiencing no change, and going from 
receiving no informal loan to receiving one or more. The interpretation of the 
coefficient for the information intervention is therefore the effect of the marketing on 
the percentage of vulnerable households that received an informal loan. Table 33 
reports results from the same regressions, but restricted to Dedza and Mchinji. 
In all of the specifications, the estimated magnitudes are substantial, and they are 
significant in most. They are always significant, and generally at high levels, when 
including area fixed effects. In particular, when restricting to cluster pairs located three or 
more kilometers from the nearest bank-stop, the effect is significant in all specifications, 
and raises the percentage of vulnerable households receiving informal loans by an 
estimated 14.4 to 22.4 percentage points after adjusting for intra-cluster correlation. 
Grouping the treated and controls, the overall two-year change in percentage of highly 
vulnerable receiving informal loans at the 3 km threshold is an increase of 4.8 
percentage-points (a drop of 1.6 percentage points in the information-control clusters, and 
an increase of 11.6 percentage points in the information-treated). The estimated effect is 





Table 32. Change in Percentage Receiving an Informal Loan, Among Highly Vulnerable - All Districts 



















Marketing  0.103  0.128  0.146*  0.158**  0.144*  0.146*  0.165**  0.158**  
    Dummy  (0.207)  (0.112)  (0.0622)  (0.0291)  (0.0876)  (0.0748)  (0.0414)  (0.0281)  
Change in  -0.00518  -0.00746**  -0.00800**  -0.00912**  -0.00475  -0.00693*  -0.00732**  -0.00913**  
    Date  (0.128)  (0.0236)  (0.0166)  (0.0268)  (0.196)  (0.0588)  (0.0394)  (0.0325)  
Fixd Effcts   District  Zone  Clust-Pair   District  Zone  Clust-Pair  
Obsv.  271  271  271  271  250  250  250  250  
 
Table 33. Change in Percentage Receiving an Informal Loan, Among Highly Vulnerable - Dedza & Mchinji 



















Marketing  0.129  0.169*  0.181**  0.222***  0.193*  0.197**  0.218**  0.224***  
    Dummy  (0.180)  (0.0669)  (0.0453)  (0.00965)  (0.0512)  (0.0325)  (0.0180)  (0.00845)  
Change in  -0.00732  -0.0126**  -0.0112*  -0.00628  -0.00775  -0.0122**  -0.0117**  -0.00689  
    Date  (0.253)  (0.0363)  (0.0609)  (0.253)  (0.203)  (0.0360)  (0.0493)  (0.209)  
Fixd Effcts   District  Zone  Clust-Pair   District  Zone  Clust-Pair  








Table 34. Change in Percentage Receiving an Informal Loan, Among All Households - All Districts 
 All Distances  3+km  
Variables  ∆ Loan  ∆ Loan  ∆ Loan  ∆ Loan  ∆ Loan  ∆ Loan  ∆ Loan  ∆ Loan  
Marketing  0.0258 0.0394 0.0367 0.0372 0.0408 0.0490 0.0534 0.0478 
    Dummy  (0.597) (0.343) (0.380) (0.220) (0.434) (0.273) (0.216) (0.143) 
Change in  0.000795 -0.00106 -0.000897 -0.00194 0.00226 0.000396 0.000251 -0.000550 
    Date  (0.629) (0.490) (0.558) (0.219) (0.238) (0.815) (0.888) (0.789) 
Fixd Effcts   District  Zone  Clust-Pair   District  Zone  Clust-Pair  
Obsv.  1,988 1,988 1,988 1,988 1,750 1,750 1,750 1,750 
 
Table 35. Change in Percentage Receiving an Informal Loan, Among All Households - Dedza & Mchinji 
 All Distances  3+km  
Variables  ∆ Loan  ∆ Loan  ∆ Loan  ∆ Loan  ∆ Loan  ∆ Loan  ∆ Loan  ∆ Loan  
Marketing  0.0146 0.0398 0.0394 0.0547 0.0429 0.0575 0.0628 0.0611 
    Dummy  (0.808) (0.438) (0.437) (0.161) (0.508) (0.301) (0.238) (0.149) 
Change in  0.00610* 0.00275 0.00292 0.00298 0.00754** 0.00455** 0.00436* 0.00363 
    Date  (0.0926) (0.291) (0.245) (0.212) (0.0382) (0.0406) (0.0597) (0.133) 
Fixd Effcts   District  Zone  Clust-Pair   District  Zone  Clust-Pair  




 Tables 34 and 35 report results from analogous regressions, but instead using 
the total sample of all households. Here, while the sign for the coefficient estimate for 
the information intervention is always positive, the magnitudes are much smaller, and 
they are never significant across any of the specifications. The positive impact of the 
information intervention on the two-year change in proportion of households 
receiving a loan from friends or relatives is therefore limited to the highly vulnerable 
group.
68
 This suggests that loans to the highly vulnerable do in fact differ from other 
types of loans in an important way, and is consistent with the notion that loans to the 
highly vulnerable are more likely to be thought of as a type of charitable gift, rather 
than an alternative method of saving. 
 
Result 5: The instrument for local rates of formal savings adoption is associated 
with a substantial increase in the two-year change in the proportion of highly 
vulnerable households receiving cash-loans from friends or relatives. However, it 
does not affect the proportion of non-vulnerable households receiving such loans. 
 
The positive impact of the information campaign on the proportion of highly 
vulnerable households in the community receiving informal loans (14.4-22.4 
percentage points) is remarkably similar in scale to its estimated effect on the 
proportion receiving cash gifts (15.3-18.1 percentage points). While this serves as 
confirmation that the cash gifts result is not driven by baseline differences, it is also 
an important finding in its own right. Similar to the evidence on in-kind gift receipts 
                                               
68 When the above regressions are run on the sample restricted to the non-vulnerable (i.e. all household 
except for category G) using pair-level fixed effects, the highest significance for the estimated 




and cash-help with fees, it indicates the influx of cash gift assistance is not driven by 
a substitution effect. That is, it does not appear to be the case that cash gifts to the 
highly vulnerable are being substituted in place of cash loans. Rather, both types of 
wealth-flows to the highly vulnerable are increasing. This strongly suggests a welfare 
improvement among the highly vulnerable. 
 Finally, the results on two other panel variables deserve brief mention. Both 
years of data include information on whether a household received cash help in 
response to a specific shock, and also whether a household received cash help 
specifically in order to buy food. Analyses paralleling that for informal loans shows 
that the effect of the marketing on these transfers is in the same direction. The 
estimated effects are consistently positive. However, they are significant at 
conventional levels in only a few specifications. Appendix 6 reports the results. 
 
6.2. The IIT on Welfare Outcomes – Food Security and Health Outcomes  
The strong link between the instrument for increased local formal savings 
adoption and assistance receipts by the worst-off households suggests a positive 
indirect benefit from formal savings for the worst-off. However, it is not necessarily 
clear a priori that increased receipts of this type of assistance will improve household 
welfares. While all measurable indicators suggest the influx of assistance receipts in 
marketing clusters is not through a substitution away from other forms of assistance, 
the data may be failing to capture effects on other smoothing options. It is possible 
the increased assistance might have general equilibrium effects on other types of 




whether the influx of cash assistance actually improves consumption smoothing and 
the well-being among the worst-off non service-users we can check simple welfare 
measures. 
This section briefly examines the evidence for improvements in three different 
welfare indicators: two food-security indicators and one simple health indicator. The 
first is the percentage of highly vulnerable households that move up the HFIAP scale, 
from the category “severely food insecure”, to one of the three other categories 
(“moderately insecure”, “mildly insecure”, “secure”). Across the entire sample, 
43.3% of the households in this category in 2008 moved up, to be classified in one of 
the three less severe food-security categories in 2010 (44.1% in the marketing 
clusters, 42.4% in the non-marketing clusters, not significantly different).
69
 When 
restricting to the sample of highly vulnerable households, 40.3% of those in 
marketing-clusters exited the “severely insecure” category, while only 29.3% of those 
in non-marketing clusters did. This difference is significant at the .05-level (two-sided 
t-test). 
A simple first-differenced regression examines the effect more closely, 
controlling for location fixed-effects and adjusting for intra-cluster correlation. Table 
36 reports the results. The response variable is simply a dummy, which takes a value 
of one if the household is no longer in the “severely insecure” category in 2010. 
(Recall that all of the highly vulnerable households, by definition, were in the 
“severely food insecure” category in 2008.) The coefficient on the marketing dummy 
thus represents the effect of the information intervention on the proportion of highly 
                                               
69 30.6% of the sample moved in the opposite direction, from one of the 3 less-severe categories into 




vulnerable households that exit the severely-insecure category. As in the first-
differenced regressions above, location fixed effects are included  to account for the 
possibility that economy-wide changes are experienced differently in the different 
locations (due, for example, to market fragmentation or district-level economic 
changes), of spatially covariate shocks, or of differences in risk-bearing capacities of 
different locales. Errors are clustered at the village-cluster level. Change of date is 
included as an added control under the hypothesis that being interviewed later in the 
pre-harvest “lean” season might lower the measured food-security of a household and 
thereby diminish its likelihood of being measured as having exited the “severely 
insecure” category. The results are fully robust to omitting the change-of-date 
variable. 
The effect is substantial in magnitude, and significant in all specifications with 
the cluster fixed effects, as well as some without. The estimated effect of the 
information intervention on the proportion of vulnerable households exiting the 
severely food-insecure category ranges from 7.1 percentage points to 16.3 percentage 
points. This represents a 23% - 55% difference over the average proportion of highly 
vulnerable exiting the severely insecure category in the non-marketing clusters.  
The more continuous food-security indicator, HFIAS, indicates similar 
improvements in household food-consumption among the highly vulnerable in 
information-treated communities over the two-year period. Recall that the HFIAS 
indicator runs from 0 to 21, with higher numbers indicating worse food-security. 
While the average HFIAS score improved by 1.1 points among the highly vulnerable 




the highly vulnerable in marketing clusters (from 11.9 down to 9.9). This simple 
difference is not significant at conventional levels.
70
 
However, after controlling for location fixed effects, any changes in the 
interview date, and accounting for intra-cluster correlation, the estimated effect is 
significant at the .05-level. The second half of Table 36 reports results from a first-
differenced regression of a vulnerable household‟s HFIAS score on the dummy for 
the information intervention, the interview date, and pair-level fixed effects interacted 
with the period dummy, with errors clustered at the village-cluster level. The response 
variable is thus the change in the household‟s HFIAS score, while the regressors are 
the marketing dummy, and any change in the interview date, with time-varying 
location fixed-effects. As before, the fixed effects are included in the model to 
account for any variation in relevant changes across locations (such as covariate 
shocks or any economic changes confined within certain segmented markets) or 
location-dependent variations in capacities to address any universally experienced 
fluctuations. 
 The coefficient for the marketing dummy represents the average effect of 
living in a community assigned to the information treatment, on the change in a 
highly vulnerable household‟s HFIAS score. It is statistically significant across all 
four samples, and its magnitude is substantial. Those living in a community exposed 
to the marketing experienced an estimated reduction of 1.25 to 1.40 points. The effect 
grows stronger when restricting to Mchinji and Dedza districts, and is also stronger at 
the more remote distance threshold. As the average baseline value for this variable 
                                               
70 It is significant under a one-sided t-test when the hypothesis that the average effect is larger in the 
treated areas. A two-sided t-test yields a p-value of 0.194, while a Mann-Whitney U-test yields a p-




among the highly vulnerable group in 2008 was 12.0 overall (11.9 in treated, 12.0 in 
control), this represents a 10-12% improvement in food-security as measured by this 
scale. 
 It is also possible that increased cash assistance might lead to improvements in 
health outcomes. This could occur through several different possible channels. On the 
one hand, health effects might be directly related to food-security outcomes. 
Receiving loans or cash and in-kind transfers may reduce the probability of needing 
to consume poorer quality food. 
Cash assistance may also be helping to cover non-food consumption such as 
medical-related expenditures. Malaria, for example, is extremely prevalent in Malawi, 
with one of the highest rates in the world. Medical-related expenses may be high 
enough to inhibit timely preventive treatment which might avert more serious illness 
and even death. Anecdotal evidence suggests it is not uncommon, for example, to 
wait and  see how an illness develops to determine whether it is simply a cold or 
Malaria, because the transportation costs of going to a clinic may be high.
71
 In this 
context cash assistance may help cover transportation costs to free clinics, or help 
cover admission to often less-overburdened and perhaps closer paying-clinics. This 
might hasten treatment, or even induce an individual to seek treatment at all (rather 
than try to wait the illness out). Dercon et. al. (2008) find that in Ethiopian villages a 
certain type of health insurance provided by informal household networks offers help 
                                               
71 One widow living with her two grandchildren explained that she waited until a very late stage of 
cerebral Malaria before asking to a borrow a bike so her second grandchild could cycle him to the 
closest clinic. The survey teams periodically encountered parents seeking urgent assistance to get their 
children to a clinic after realizing the child had Malaria. The teams would use their car to drive the 
child to the hospital. Some of the children lived, but others died. In discussions, parents seem to know 
a sickness may be Malaria, but they note the high cost of going to a clinic every time a household 





cover observable components of health-related shocks, for example medical 
expenses. This may also be occurring in Malawi. Indeed, in qualitative interviews in 
rural areas of central Malawi, formal-savers report the top reasons people ask them 
for cash help are for medical expenses and sickness-related issues, to buy food, or to 
pay for funeral expenses. 
One simple measure of health outcomes the data contain is whether any 
household member was injured or sick over the last 14 days preceding the interview. 
The overall change in the percentage of households that answered “yes” to this 
question was an increase of 6.1%, from 75.6% to 81.8% over the two-year period. 
The change was mildly lower in the marketing communities (+5.8%) than in the non-
marketing communities (+6.5%), though the difference is not significant. When 
restricting to the highly vulnerable, however, the difference is striking. In non-
marketing communities, the percentage of highly vulnerable households reporting at 
least one household member unwell enough to stop normal activities increased by 
19.9 percentage points (from 72.3% to 92.2%). In marketing clusters, the percentage 
increased only 6.1 percentage-points – the same as the overall change across the 
sample – from 77.1% to 83.2%. The difference, which amounts to a 13.8 percentage  
is significant with a two-sided t-test (p=.029). 
Once again, a simple first-differenced regression examines the effect more 
closely, controlling for location fixed-effects and any possible changes in interview 
date, as well as adjusting for intra-cluster correlation. The results are reported in 
Table 37. The effect is significant in all four subsamples. The information 




households reporting an unwell member, ranging from 11.6 to 17.4 percentage points. 
Note that the scale of the effect, once again,  is quite similar to the increase in the 





Table 36. Changes in Food-Security Outcomes: Exiting Most Severe Food-Deficiency Status, and Lowering Deficiency Scores 
 Exit Severely Food-Insecure Change in HFIAS Food-Insecurity Score 
 All Districts Mchinji & Dedza Districts All Districts Mchinji & Dedza Districts 
 All Distances 3+ km All Distances 3+ km All Distances 3+ km All Distances 3+ km 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Exit Severe Exit Severe Exit Severe Exit Severe ∆ HFIAS ∆ HFIAS ∆ HFIAS ∆ HFIAS 
Marketing 0.162*** 0.163*** 0.118* 0.120* -1.251** -1.252** -1.393** -1.402** 
 (0.00272) (0.00241) (0.0780) (0.0720) (0.0147) (0.0143) (0.0308) (0.0285) 
Change Date -0.00351 -0.00389 -0.00249 -0.00290 0.0468 0.0473 0.0801* 0.0827** 
 (0.332) (0.301) (0.704) (0.655) (0.138) (0.151) (0.0552) (0.0477) 
Constant -0.138* -0.142* -0.100 -0.105 7.240*** 7.245*** 7.623*** 7.651*** 
 (0.0642) (0.0582) (0.274) (0.250) (1.12e-05) (1.08e-05) (1.67e-05) (1.53e-05) 
Pair-Lvl FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 272 251 206 188 269 248 203 185 
R-squared 0.291 0.279 0.276 0.264 0.219 0.212 0.221 0.211 





Table 37. Change in the Proportion Vulnerable Households Reporting a Member Unwell 
 All Districts Mchinji & Dedza Districts 
 All Distances 3+ km All Distances 3+ km 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES     
Marketing -0.120* -0.116* -0.174** -0.174** 
 (0.0727) (0.0775) (0.0470) (0.0456) 
Change Date -0.00502 -0.00618* -0.00958 -0.00965 
 (0.175) (0.0938) (0.171) (0.167) 
Constant 0.370 0.357 0.366 0.365 
 (0.117) (0.126) (0.178) (0.176) 
Pair-Lvl FE Y Y Y Y 
Observations 272 251 206 188 
R-squared 0.278 0.280 0.291 0.294 







6.3. Conclusion  
This chapter showed that receipts of financial assistance by the highly 
vulnerable in the form of informal loans from friends and relatives also increased  in 
the treated communities, strongly suggesting that increases in local formal savings 
rates have an effect on informal loans to the most vulnerable which is similar to the 
effect on cash gifts. Not only were informal loan receipts by the most vulnerable 
higher in the endline. Since baseline information on this variable is included in the 
data, it was verified that the two-year change in the proportion of vulnerable 
households receiving g loans was significantly higher in the treated communities than 
in the non-treated. (The change was in fact mildly negative in the non-treated.)  
Moreover, the scale of the increase in the proportion of highly vulnerable 
receiving loan-assistance that was induced by the instrument for local formal 
savings prevalence is remarkably similar to that induced for cash gifts. 
Depending on the specification, exposing the community to the formal savings 
encouragement increased the proportion of highly vulnerable households 
receiving loans from friends and relatives by 14.4 to 22.4 percentage points. As 
in the case for cash gifts, the effect grows stronger as remoteness of communities 
increases and the power of the instrument in exogenously boosting formal 




 On the one hand, this verifies that the causal interpretation of the endline 
pattern for cash gifts, which relies on the assumption that the randomization produced 
a good set of counterfactuals, is valid. Inasmuch as informal loans serve as a good 
indicator for inter-household wealth flows, there appears to have been no difference 
in inter-household wealth transfers in the baseline. 
 The finding that informal loan receipts increased among the highly vulnerable 
and not among the other household-types, in also an important resultant in its own 
right. On the one hand, it suggests that loans to the highly vulnerable and qualitatively 
different in some ways than loans to other types of households, and it is consistent 
with the hypothesis that they are in some sense thought of as gifts, and thus respond a 
similar way as cash gifts. On the other hand, given the importance of informal loans 
in smoothing consumption that has been documented in the informal insurance 
literature, the influx of assistance through informal loans is also likely to have 
important welfare effects. 
 To that end, this chapter also confirmed a significant welfare impact among 
the highly vulnerable in at least three important indicators of well-being. Within this 
household category, those living in communities treated by the formal savings 
instrument were treated community were 11.8 to 16.3 percent more likely to exit the 
worst food-security category in the HFIAP scale (severely insecure) to enter one of 
the three other less severe categories. They also experience a 1.3 to 1.4 reduction in 
the continuous food-insecurity score, HFIAS, representing a 10-12% improvement 
over baseline values. In addition, the worst-off households living in savings-




the household as recently unwell. These findings suggest that the influx in transfer 
receipts by the worst-off households induced by the increase in local formal savings 





Chapter 7. Conclusion 
The major contributions of this study lie in addressing a large and important 
empirical gap. Despite widespread interest in both informal insurance practices in 
villages as well as the potential benefits of modern capital markets for the poor, there 
is little research on the interaction of the two systems, and scant reliable evidence 
regarding the effects of formal institutions on informal institutions. Yet this is a 
potentially critical issue, especially for the worst-off households. By using a 
randomly assigned information intervention as an instrument, in combination with an 
orthogonal formal credit access expansion path, this study cleanly identifies the effect 
of formal savings on inter-household transfer behavior, and separates it from the 
effects of formal credit. 
The information intervention took the form of a marketing campaign, 
designed to encourage financial services uptake through the provision of details about 
the services and what they offer. This encouragement exogenously boosted local 
formal savings rates by significant magnitudes even in the more conservative 
specifications, without changing use of formal credit. When looking at service 
adoption, the information campaign led to a 3.1 percentage-point increase in the 
proportion of the community that started using formal savings, across all 
communities, and a 3.7 percentage-point increase in the proportion of new-adopters 
in communities located in more remote locales. These changes represent a 33% and 
40% boost, respectively, to the local adoption rate.  
When looking at the two-year change in total local incidence of formal savings 




determinant. In this approach, the encouragement caused increases in formal savings 
rates among the three-quarters of the sample located in the districts furthest from the 
capital and the bank‟s headquarters by an estimated 2.8 percentage-points across all 
distances, and 3.2 percentage-points in communities located in more remote locales. 
This represents a boost in the total local incidence of formal savings by 23% and 
31%, respectively.  
However, a more appropriate specification for the two-year change in local 
formal savings incidence might include the initial prevalence in the baseline as a 
control. This is due to the fact that the initial incidence level in a community is likely 
to affect the potential for formal savings expansion over the intervening two years. 
When the baseline formal savings rate is included as a control, the estimated impact 
of the encouragement on the two-year increase in formal savings incidence is 
significant across all three districts. Thus, under this model, the strength of the 
instrument is maintained across the entire sample, including the quarter of the sample 
located in Lilongwe, which is closest to the capital and its financial institutions. 
This boost in local formal savings induced in the marketing-areas appears to 
have led to a substantial positive impact on inter-household transfers. In communities 
exposed to the savings encouragement, 30.6% of all households report receiving one 
or more cash gifts, compared to 20.8% in the non savings-encouraged communities. 
This difference is highly significant, and represents an increase of almost 50% in the 
proportion of the community reporting cash-gift receipts in moving from the non-




The positive impacts of the savings-encouragement on receipts of inter-
household assistance systematically increase as vulnerability heightens. Among the 
least vulnerable 14% of the sample (households in categories A and B), cash gift 
receipts are no higher in the information-treated communities. Yet the difference 
becomes significant within households in vulnerability category C, with a difference 
of 10.4 percentage-points, growing to 10.6 percentage-point among category D, 10.9 
among category E, 11.5 among category F, and 17.8 among Category G. (Recall that 
these categories are based on baseline variables: category C contains households 
classified as “moderately food insecure”, category D those classified as “severely 
food-insecure”, and that categories E, F, and G are subsets of D representing 
increased levels of vulnerability.) The striking impact on receipt of inter-household 
transfers by the most vulnerable group underscores the fact that the impacts of 
financial deepening may be especially large on the worst-off households, a group of 
particular policy-importance for many anti-poverty and development initiatives. 
To more accurately quantify the nature of this impact on the most vulnerable, 
fixed effects are added and errors clustered at the community-level, in a linear 
regression of receipt of a cash-gift on the information-treatment dummy. This indirect 
intention to treat (IIT) analysis shows IIT estimates of the impact on the highly 
vulnerable‟s probability of receiving a gift ranging from 15.3 to 15.9 percentage-
points, all highly significant. Results are almost identical in a Probit specification. An 
instrumental-variables regression enables an estimate of the full indirect treatment 
effect (ITE) of increases in the proportion of formal savers on the percentage of 




estimates indicating that a one percentage-point increase in the local proportion of 
formal-savers led to a 2.4 to 3.2 percentage-point increase in the proportion of highly 
vulnerable households that received one or more cash-gifts. 
As minimum balances and fixed costs associated with opening a formal 
account create a barrier preventing use by the poorest, the highly vulnerable group is 
de facto ineligible to take up formal savings. These strong impacts on receipts of 
inter-household transfers by the most vulnerable are therefore clear evidence of a 
spillover effect of formal savings adoption on non formal-savers. This adds to a small 
but growing number of studies that highlight the importance of accounting for and 
measuring indirect impacts of policy interventions and aid programs. These effects 
can be of critical importance, particularly in village-settings, where households are 
often intimately connected with each other. The impact evaluation literature tends to 
remain focused on assessments of program effects on direct beneficiaries of the 
program. While perhaps natural, it is clear that in some cases very large effects may 
lie outside this narrow focus, and significant portions of a project‟s impact may be 
missed entirely when failing to account for indirect effects on the putatively “non-
treated”. 
The findings of this study carry significant methodological import in 
particular for impact assessments and project evaluations in microfinance, an 
increasingly common research activity in development. The results show that the 
provision of financial services has important indirect effects on non service-using 
households in the area. This means that within-locality comparisons, even when 




and unreliable method for measuring the effects of service-use on users. It becomes a 
question of identifying the appropriate counterfactual for what is intended to be 
measured. Even a perfect instrument for service-use will not identify its absolute 
effect if the comparison group is also affected. Thus, approaches based on using the 
Wald estimator to find local-average treatment effects (LATE) must be implemented 
and interpreted with extreme caution, and should not be used to infer absolute direct 
impacts of service-use unless it can be verified that the stable unit treatment value 
assumption (SUTVA) actually holds. As this study clearly demonstrates, when 
treatment is defined as own-adoption of a financial service, it is likely that SUTVA 
will in fact fail for certain key outcomes (e.g. transfer receipts and welfare indicators) 
when comparing across individuals in a village.  
Similar concerns complicate assessments of direct effects based on 
comparisons between communities. Microfinance researchers and project evaluators 
should thus bear in mind the implications that the presence of indirect effects may 
have on their empirical approaches to estimating the impacts they intend to measure. 
Equally important, the finding of strong indirect effects suggests that accurately 
measuring the full impacts of microfinance projects and interventions to expand 
access to formal capital markets, requires a broader focus on the entire community of 
which service-users form a part.
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This study‟s empirical findings on the response of receipts of monetary 
assistance (gifts and loans) to formal savings expansion are important in their own 
                                               
72 As a methodological aside, it also bares mentioning mentioning that this is one of the first studies I 
am aware of to use an empirical approach which includes examining the indirect impacts, on non-
eligibles, of the intention to treat eligibles – that is, use of an “IIT” estimand. If future project 
evaluations begin to incorporate analyses of indirect effects, as this study suggests is important, the 




right, not least because of previous suggestions the effect may be in the opposite 
direction. However, as Townsend (1994) rightly points out, by narrowing the focus to 
only a few institutions (e.g. gifts and loans), it is of course always possible to miss 
parallel changes in other consumption-smoothing options. While all observable 
indicators suggest that the increased monetary assistance did not substitute for 
assistance that would have been received in other forms, it is nevertheless possible the 
data fail to capture consequent effects on other smoothing mechanisms available to 
the ultra-poor. 
The data, however, permit the analysis to proceed several steps further, 
overcoming the pitfalls of looking at the impacts on individual institutions one at a 
time. By examining welfare outcomes of the households affected, it is possible to 
implicitly infer whether any substitution or displacement effects neutralize the 
positive benefits to recipient households. It also focuses the analysis squarely on 
outcomes of crucial policy relevance: the well-being of the poor. 
This study‟s results show that living in communities that received the saving 
encouragement caused two-year improvements in at least three key welfare indicators 
among the worst-off. Highly vulnerable households are 11.8 to 16.3 percent more 
likely to exit the worst food-security category in the HFIAP scale (severely insecure) 
to enter one of the three other less severe categories. They also experience a 1.3 to 1.4 
reduction in the continuous food-insecurity score, HFIAS, representing a 10-12% 
improvement in food-security over baseline values. In addition, highly vulnerable 
households living in savings-encouraged communities were 12 to 17.4 percent less 




 One of the most noteworthy findings of this study is the impressive magnitude 
of the effects on transfer receipts – particularly among the worst-off households – and 
the substantial impacts this has on welfare outcomes. While certainly promising, the 
lesson here should be one of caution. Recall that the model predicts an ambiguous 
result, making it possible for the introduction of formal savings to have a stimulating 
effect on inter-household wealth flows. It is not clear, however, that introducing 
formal savings will always have a positive effect. The results of this study quite 
clearly demonstrate that expanding formal savings access can have very large impacts 
on inter-household transfer behaviors, and that changes in transfer receipts can have 
substantial effects on the welfare of the poorest of the poor. While the fact that the 
experience of rural Malawi was in the positive direction is perhaps a promising sign, 
the model suggests this result depends on the shape of preferences. It is possible that 
preferences or cultural norms in Central Malawi differ in some relevant way such that 
its experience differs from that of other areas.
73
 Examining the extent to which the 
effects brought to light through this study are applicable to other settings and whether 
they depend on important dimensions of culture or social norms which change across 
environments therefore represents an important area for further investigation.  
Another important caveat is with respect to time-frame. Two years is a 
relatively short period for the materialization of impacts, and there may be 
                                               
73 As an example, this region is predominantly Chewa, an ethnic group that is historically matrilineal 
and matrilocal. Research elsewhere has shown the importance of matrilineal institutions, such as land-
inheritance and post-marital location practices, on behavior (e.g. Gneezy, Leonard, and List 2009; 
Flory, Leonard, and List 2011). In particular, List et. al. (??) find evidence that individuals in 
matrilineal societies may contribute more to public goods. If matrilineal customs are somehow linked 
to the strength and prevalence of “social preferences”, it may affect the ways in which the findings of 
this study apply to other settings. Further research on the relationship between land-inheritance and 
post-marital location practices on the one hand and gift-giving behavior to provide consumption 





countervailing effects which operate over a longer time-frame. For example, 
behavioral habits and social norms may change through the introduction of formal 
capital markets, but on a slower scale. This could conceivably cause the pecuniary 
and non-pecuniary rewards of transfers-out to change such that several years after the 
expansion of formal savings, the effect on inter-household wealth flows is reversed. 
In this case, if financial markets do not develop quickly enough, so that all 
households have access, the outcome could be more mixed, with potentially negative 
outcomes for highly vulnerable households whose previous safety nets have been 
displaced. In this case, policy-makers and practitioners will want to be more careful 
to see that promoting the expansion of formal savings options is accompanied by 
substitutes for safety nets which may disappear for the most vulnerable. Determining 
whether the effects identified in this study change over time, and perhaps even 











Conditioning on Baseline Prevalence of Formal Savings (or Formal Credit) 
This is a regression of the cluster mean on for the dependent variable (i.e. the cluster percentage of formal savers/borrowers or 
brute change in that percentage) on the cluster means for the regressors (i.e. cluster percentage of formal savers (borrowers) in 08, 
distance) 
 
Table A.4.1. Proportion of HHs in EA with Formal Savings, Controlling for Initial Local Savings Penetration & Distance 
 All Districts Dedza & Mchinji 
 All Distances 3+km All Distances 3+km 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES FSAV in 
2010 












Δ Pctg Fml 
Savers 
Mktg Dummy 0.0346* 0.0360* 0.0352 0.0366* 0.0425** 0.0430** 0.0476** 0.0480** 
 (0.0721) (0.0586) (0.115) (0.0999) (0.0383) (0.0355) (0.0408) (0.0389) 
FSAV in 2008 0.599*** -0.403** 0.629*** -0.371* 0.488*** -0.509*** 0.466** -0.531** 
 (0.000287) (0.0127) (0.00251) (0.0690) (0.00646) (0.00449) (0.0486) (0.0248) 
Distance -0.0251** -0.0255** -0.0349* -0.0353* -0.0293* -0.0292* -0.0311 -0.0308 
 (0.0486) (0.0433) (0.0968) (0.0907) (0.0760) (0.0756) (0.171) (0.174) 
Constant 0.181 0.184 0.274 0.277 0.245 0.243 0.265 0.262 
 (0.433) (0.420) (0.334) (0.325) (0.325) (0.327) (0.344) (0.350) 
Pair Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
         
Observations 112 112 96 96 85 85 72 72 
R-squared 0.817 0.591 0.782 0.565 0.817 0.656 0.736 0.651 







Table A.4.2. Proportion of HHs in EA with Formal Savings, Controlling for Initial Local Savings Penetration Only 
 All Districts Dedza & Mchinji 
 All Distances 3+km All Distances 3+km 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES FSAV in 
2010 












Δ Pctg Fml 
Savers 
Mktg Dummy 0.0275 0.0288 0.0402* 0.0416* 0.0423* 0.0429** 0.0541** 0.0545** 
 (0.169) (0.148) (0.0748) (0.0634) (0.0528) (0.0493) (0.0183) (0.0174) 
FSAV in 2008 0.728*** -0.272** 0.625*** -0.376* 0.645*** -0.353*** 0.456* -0.541** 
 (3.07e-08) (0.0277) (0.00249) (0.0639) (6.01e-06) (0.00959) (0.0501) (0.0206) 
Constant -0.103 -0.103 -0.0858 -0.0863 -0.0913 -0.0920 -0.0547 -0.0556 
 (0.598) (0.594) (0.622) (0.618) (0.602) (0.599) (0.699) (0.695) 
Pair Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
         
Observations 112 112 96 96 85 85 72 72 
R-squared 0.799 0.551 0.765 0.531 0.791 0.609 0.714 0.623 








Table A.4. 3. Proportion of HHs in EA with Current Formal Loans, Controlling for Initial Local Savings Penetration & Distance 
 All Districts Dedza & Mchinji 
 All Distances 3+km All Distances 3+km 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES FCRED in 
2010 












Δ Pctg Fml 
Savers 
Mktg Dummy 0.00572 0.00336 -0.00661 -0.00713 0.00929 0.00566 -0.00164 -0.00231 
 (0.694) (0.816) (0.631) (0.611) (0.592) (0.740) (0.924) (0.896) 
FCRED in 2008 0.388** -0.555*** 0.550*** -0.414** 0.278 -0.652*** 0.454** -0.495** 
 (0.0244) (0.000928) (0.00249) (0.0229) (0.117) (0.000227) (0.0242) (0.0189) 
Distance -0.0298*** -0.0307*** -0.0335*** -0.0306*** -0.0358*** -0.0372*** -0.0326*** -0.0289** 
 (0.00787) (0.00512) (0.00180) (0.00739) (0.00469) (0.00197) (0.00198) (0.0111) 
Constant 0.397*** 0.396*** 0.418*** 0.379*** 0.474*** 0.476*** 0.420*** 0.372*** 
 (0.00111) (0.00100) (0.000301) (0.00192) (0.000565) (0.000322) (0.000266) (0.00274) 
Pair Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
         
Observations 112 112 96 96 85 85 72 72 
R-squared 0.682 0.648 0.670 0.654 0.692 0.662 0.647 0.633 





Table A.4. 4. Proportion of HHs in EA with Current Formal Loans, Controlling for Initial Local Savings Penetration Only 
 All Districts Dedza & Mchinji 
 All Distances 3+km All Distances 3+km 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES FCRED in 
2010 












Δ Pctg Fml 
Savers 
Mktg Dummy 0.00254 8.32e-05 -0.00195 -0.00288 0.0128 0.00926 0.00520 0.00375 
 (0.876) (0.996) (0.896) (0.847) (0.536) (0.654) (0.778) (0.839) 
FCRED in 2008 0.403* -0.540*** 0.557*** -0.408** 0.320 -0.609** 0.495** -0.458* 
 (0.0522) (0.00914) (0.00446) (0.0347) (0.185) (0.0133) (0.0351) (0.0524) 
Constant 0.0909** 0.0809* 0.0701* 0.0626 0.0983* 0.0867 0.0758 0.0669 
 (0.0443) (0.0668) (0.0692) (0.105) (0.0840) (0.116) (0.124) (0.173) 
Pair Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
         
Observations 112 112 96 96 85 85 72 72 
R-squared 0.587 0.533 0.615 0.608 0.576 0.521 0.595 0.593 






The above tables provides evidence that the higher the initial 
percentage, the smaller the increase in that percentage. For example,  column 
2 suggests that for every 1 percentage point increase in the initial savings 
prevalence, the 2-year increase in percentage of households with formal 
savings will be 0.4 percentage points lower. (The average change in formal 
savings prevalence across the entire sample is +5.3%) This is an interesting 
finding in its own right. It suggests that communities may have an inherent 
capacity (at least in the short-term) for the fraction of households that will 
take up formal savings, and that as usage rates near that capacity, the rate at 
which new people convert to formal savings technology decreases. 
It also appears that distance matters in terms of the rate of conversion 
to formal savings use. Those communities closer to the bank-stop appear more 
responsive to the increased accessibility provided by the van-bank. This is not 









Table 5.A. 1. Percentage of HHs that Received More than One Cash Gift 
HH Type  C-clusters T-clusters TC Diff  Pctg 
Difference   
Signif  
All HHs 7.4% 12.2% 4.8% (p=.0004) +64% *** 
VulnA 
(Food-Secure)  












4.1% 9.0% 4.9% (p=.003) +120% *** 
VulnE 
(Sev Insec, No Cell) 




4.1% 9.0% 4.9% (p=.005) +120% *** 
VulnG 
(VulnF +Nonlit_w) 





Indirect Intention to Treat (IIT) Effect on Percentage of Households in Cluster Receiving a Cash Gift: Cluster-Means Approach 
 
Table 5.A.2. OLS Regressions on Means Approach – Correcting with Heteroskedasticity-Robust Errors 
 All Household Types Vuln HHs (G) 
 All Districts Dedza & Mchinji All Districts Dedza & Mchinji 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Rcv Csh Gft Rcv Csh Gft Rcv Csh Gft Rcv Csh Gft Pctg G Households 
Rcv Csh Gft 
Pctg G Households 
Rcv Csh Gft 
Pctg G Households 
Rcv Csh Gft 
Pctg G Households 
Rcv Csh Gft 
Mktg Dummy 0.0994*** 0.114*** 0.0996*** 0.106*** 0.157** 0.157** 0.181** 0.181** 
 (3.15e-05) (1.69e-05) (0.000349) (0.000923) (0.0370) (0.0300) (0.0385) (0.0304) 
Constant 0.100 0.0930 0.100 0.0972 -0.0785 -0.0785 -0.0904 -0.0904 
 (0.326) (0.397) (0.333) (0.362) (0.402) (0.382) (0.405) (0.382) 
Pair Fxd Effcts YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Robust SEs YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 112 96 85 72 99 91 76 69 
R-squared 0.582 0.555 0.602 0.504 0.570 0.558 0.596 0.580 
Robust pval in parentheses 




In Table 5.A.2, the results are shown for a set of regressions analogous to the 
regressions reported in Table 26 of Chapter 5, but in a manner that, though inferior, is 
directly comparable to the ITE analysis in section 5.3 of chapter 5. Instead of using 
the household as the unit of observation, these regressions take the village-cluster as 
the unit of observation, and uses aggregated variables from the cluster-level as the 
independent and dependent variables. That is, the left-hand side variable is simply the 
percentage of households within each cluster that received a cash gift (for columns 1-
4), or the percentage of type-G households in each cluster that received a cash gift 
(for columns 5-8). The only difference in these regressions from those reported in 
Table 26 is that here the actual percentage is regressed on the treatment dummy, 
rather than the household-level 0/1 variable. (That is, I first calculate for each cluster 
the mean value for the 0-1 household indicator for receipt of cash gift, then regress 
that on the marketing dummy for that village cluster). 
The primary difference is that the regressions reported in Table 5.A.2 use 
heteroskedasticity-robust sandwich errors to estimate the standard errors, instead of 
weighting each cluster-observation by the number of observations they contribute. 
The latter approach is more efficient, which should make the results reported in Table 
26 more accurate than those in Table 5.A.2. The reason I show the results in Table 
5.A.2 here is that I am constrained to use this approach in the instrumental variables 
regressions to estimate the full ITE in section 5.3 of Chapter 5.  
The differences between the coefficient estimates reported in Table 5.A.2 and 
those in Table 26 are negligible. The main difference is that the significance has 




vulnerable households receiving cash gifts is now significant at the .05-level, rather 
than the .01-level. A Probit regression would not make sense in the context of using 
the means from each EA (since it‟s not a 0/1 variable, but rather a continuous variable 
-- it‟s the percentage). So I do not compare OLS to a model that would force 





Table 5.A.3. Linear Regression: Indirect Intention to Treat Effect on Percentage of Households in Cluster Receiving an In-Kind Gift 
 All Household Types Vuln HHs (G) 

















VARIABLES Rcvd Kind-Gift Rcvd Kind-Gift Rcvd Kind-Gift Rcvd Kind-Gift Rcvd Kind-Gift Rcvd Kind-Gift Rcvd Kind-Gift Rcvd Kind-Gift 
Mktg Dummy 0.0291 0.0239 0.0146 -0.00250 0.0891 0.0891 0.0599 0.0599 
 (0.105) (0.210) (0.473) (0.907) (0.103) (0.100) (0.325) (0.320) 
Constant 0.137*** 0.141*** 0.148*** 0.162*** -0.0594 -0.0594 -0.0399 -0.0399 
 (4.63e-08) (2.11e-08) (2.42e-09) (0) (0.220) (0.216) (0.385) (0.380) 
Pair Fxd Effcts YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
EA-Clust SEs YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,982 1,744 1,509 1,320 271 250 205 187 




Table 5.A.4. Linear Regression: Indirect Intention to Treat Effect on Percentage of Households in Cluster Receiving Help Paying Fees 
 All Household Types Vuln HHs (G) 

















VARIABLES Rcvd Help Fees Rcvd Help Fees Rcvd Help Fees Rcvd Help Fees Rcvd Help Fees Rcvd Help Fees Rcvd Help Fees Rcvd Help Fees 
Mktg Dummy 0.0229* 0.0247* 0.0150 0.0168 0.0449 0.0449 0.0105 0.0105 
 (0.0565) (0.0556) (0.173) (0.144) (0.206) (0.202) (0.742) (0.740) 
Constant 0.0216* 0.0202* 0.0280** 0.0266** -0.0299 -0.0299 -0.00699 -0.00699 
 (0.0608) (0.0894) (0.0219) (0.0297) (0.295) (0.291) (0.746) (0.744) 
Pair Fxd Effcts YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
EA-Clust SEs YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,992 1,754 1,519 1,330 271 250 205 187 






Table 5.A.5. Effect of Marketing on Proportion of HHs with Formal Savings Accounts – Restricted to EAs with Category-G HHs 
 All Districts Dedza & Mchinji 
 All Distances 3+km All Distances 3+km 



























Mktg  0.0315** 0.0535*** 0.0240 0.0315** 0.0535*** 0.0240 0.00732 0.0420** 0.0356** 0.00732 0.0420** 0.0356** 
Dummy (0.0314) (0.00502) (0.129) (0.0315) (0.00508) (0.129) (0.609) (0.0135) (0.0411) (0.609) (0.0136) (0.0414) 
Constant 0.0948 0.0772*** -0.0192 0.0948 0.0772*** -0.0192 0.114 0.0864*** -0.0285 0.114 0.0864*** -0.0285 
 (0.296) (0.00536) (0.865) (0.296) (0.00542) (0.865) (0.184) (0.00358) (0.797) (0.184) (0.00366) (0.797) 
             
Observati
ons 
1,815 1,814 1,811 1,678 1,677 1,674 1,412 1,410 1,408 1,291 1,289 1,287 
R-squared 0.104 0.109 0.041 0.103 0.110 0.038 0.070 0.086 0.044 0.063 0.083 0.040 




Table 5.A.5 reports results on the marketing‟s effect on formal savings 
prevalence in the slightly smaller sample that includes only those clusters which 
contain category-G households. As Table 5.A.5 shows, in all samples, the instrument 
has a highly significant effect on the percentage of households in the village with 
formal savings in 2010 (regardless of distance threshold or district). For the second 
stage of the cross-sectional IV regressions to estimate the indirect effect of formal 
savings, this is technically all that matters. However, since I do have both years of 
data for the financial services variable, a more strict test on the instrument‟s strength 
in inducing the boost in local formal savings prevalence is looking at the two year 
change induced by the information campaign. Here, we see  that the instrument is not 
quite significant at conventional levels when including all districts, but is significant 
at the .05 level when restricting to the two districts furthest from the capital and the 
bank headquarters. (As discussed in section 4.5 of chapter 4, note that this lack of 
significance in the change in prevalence of formal savings may be due to the fact that 
the correct specification for the change in formal savings use actually requires 
including the baseline level of formal savings use as a determinant.) 
The regressions reported in Table 5.A.5 are not of course the exact regressions 
I run in the first stage of my two-stage least squares estimations described above. For 
the regressions in Table 5.A.5, the unit of observation is the household (with 
dependent variable a 0-1 indicator for formal savings), rather than the village-cluster 
(with dependent variable the mean of the 0-1 values within the cluster). The reason I 




the most accurate picture of the true effects of the encouragement on local financial 






Table 5.A.6. Effect of Marketing on Proportion of HHs with Current Formal Credit – Restricted to Clusters with Category-G HHs  
 All Districts Dedza & Mchinji 
 All Distances 3+km All Distances 3+km 



























Mktg  -0.00706 -0.0130 -0.00699 -0.00706 -0.0130 -0.00699 -0.00848 -0.00586 0.00130 -0.00848 -0.00586 0.00130 
Dummy (0.431) (0.185) (0.521) (0.431) (0.185) (0.521) (0.389) (0.575) (0.919) (0.389) (0.575) (0.919) 


















             
Obsv. 1,813 1,796 1,791 1,813 1,796 1,791 1,409 1,397 1,392 1,409 1,397 1,392 
R-squared 0.080 0.045 0.049 0.080 0.045 0.049 0.088 0.045 0.054 0.088 0.045 0.054 







Table 6.A. 1. Change in Percentage Vulnerable HHs Receiving Cash Help for Shocks 









VARIABLES ∆Cash Help  ∆Cash Help  ∆Cash Help ∆Cash Help  
assign_10 0.0315 0.0275 0.0655* 0.0627* 
 (0.381) (0.438) (0.0665) (0.0740) 
chgdate 0.000689 0.00205 -0.00193 -0.00110 
 (0.809) (0.452) (0.523) (0.703) 
Constant -0.0150 -0.000535 -0.0604 -0.0513 
 (0.663) (0.987) (0.147) (0.200) 
Pair Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Observations 272 251 206 188 
R-squared 0.303 0.306 0.319 0.319 
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1. PERSONAL SELLING 
 
1.1 Personal Selling 
Personal selling generally consists of presentation of products and services and 
associated persuasive communication to potential customers. In financial services, 




Adequate preparation is the key to effective selling and efficient use of sales time. 
The sales force personifies the bank and its approach, and quality of preparation is 
critical to the success of a sales visit. Knowledge of the bank and its products 
influences customers’ image of the bank. The right approach needs to be 




The sales sequence is designed to build an Awareness and take prospects 
through an Interest to Desire and Action (AIDA). Sales objectives need to be 
developed in the context of this sales process.  
 
1.4 Sales Interview 
 
The sales interview may last only minutes, but it is a very intense interaction where 
gestures and expressions are as important as the actual words spoken. The seller 
must be tactful, empathise with the customer and be aware of the hidden clues in 




Although a Promotion Assistant will have a planned approach to the sales meeting, 
this should not be too structured. It must be flexible enough to allow the 
development of issues and concerns relevant to the prospective customer and to 
allow the approach to be modified to meet the needs and personalities of different 
types of prospective customers. 
 
1.6 Buying Decision 
 
The prospective customer may decide to buy at any point in the sequence. A 
Promotion Assistant must be ever alert for buying signals and be prepared to 
attempt a trail close of sale. Experience and training are both important in helping 
the seller develop and perfect the various techniques and approaches used in the 
sales sequence. These techniques should not be seen as mechanical and routine 





1.7 Building Long-Term Customer Relationship 
 
The sales activity does not end with the signing up of an order. Maintaining 
customer goodwill and loyalty is important to the future of any business. 
Developing long-term relationships with prospective customers is likely to 




Self-motivation is very important for any Bank Representative. He or she needs  to 
display enthusiasm, intelligence, reliability, commitment, initiative and creativity, 
self-confidence, courtesy and sensitivity. A wide variety of targets may also be 
used both for motivation and control purposes. Training is essential both to aid 
motivation and to maximise sales performance.  
 
1.9 Kasupe Deposit Account 
 
Kasupe Deposit Account is a unique product that has been designed for people 
who reside in rural and semi-urban areas.  The majority of people who live in these 
areas usually have one big income that normally comes at the same time each 
year.  This is the reason the Bank has come up with features that customers 
demanded during the Micro Savings Survey that was conducted August to 
September 2006.  Kasupe Deposit Accounts most important selling points are: 
 
Monthly Administrative oo Ledger Fee MK0.00 
Over the Counter Withdrawal Fee MK25.00 per Withdrawal 
ATM Withdraw Transaction Charge MK25.00 per Transaction 
Interest Capitalisation Frequency  Monthly 
Minimum opening Balance MK500.00 
Smartcard Charge MK400.00  
 
1.10 Smartcard Price Reduction 
Opportunity Bank is pleased to announce the reduction of the smartcard price from 
MK1,000.00 to MK400.00 with effect from 25th February 2008.  This special offer 
runs from 25th February to 30 June 2008 and is part of the bank’s Five Years 
Celebration of its provision of service in Malawi. 
 
Opportunity Bank also extends the same offer to all customers who opened new 
accounts from 2nd January to 23rd February 2008 by refunding MK600.00 on the 
price they paid for smartcards. 
 
Those opening Savings Accounts or Kasupe Deposit Accounts during the 
celebration period will pay MK400.00 for smartcard and MK500 as account 





2. SELLING APPROACH 
2.1 Banking Business 
In banking business, sales personnel serve as the link between the bank and its 
customers.  Designing a sales force involves decisions regarding objectives, 
strategy, and structure. Once these have been accomplished, a manager must 
manage its sales representatives by training them, supervising them, motivating 
them and evaluating them.  
  
It has been said that in business there are three parts to every sale, i.e. the part 
performed by the bank, another part performed by the salesperson and yet another 
part performed by the customer.  Both the salesperson and the bank must 
contribute proficiently in creating, managing, and maintaining a successful sales 
force. 
   
2.2 Sales Closure 
 
Finding new prospects and explaining features and benefits of bank’s products 
rests with salespeople, the Promotion Assistants. It can be a very difficult task for a 
Promotion Assistant who isn’t sales-oriented, particularly when it comes to the time 
of closing the sale. Although it may be difficult, closing the sale doesn't have to be 
painful or bewildering experience. Here are a few basic pointers to help demystify 
this potentially awkward process:  
 
 Close from the beginning 
 
Explain your agenda. Tell the prospect exactly what you're selling and how it 
can benefit their business. Being up front about your intentions promotes an 
honest, mutually respectful, and rewarding discussion that is paving the way for 
a smooth close.  
 
 Learn to recognise potential customers readiness to buy  
 
A customer might indicate they're ready by asking questions about the product 
or the buying process: "How long would delivery take?" or "What does that 
mean?" Other signs include complaints about previous offers and interested 





3. SELLING FLOWCHART 
 
1. Greet & Introduce yourself as 
Opportunity Bank Representative 
 
2.  Introduce purpose of visit 
4.   Announce free Processing of Tobacco 
Proceeds in 2008 
5.  Two days after sell of Tobacco 
6. Introduce Kasupe Deposit Account 
8. Announce Reduction of Smartcard 
Price from MK1,000.00 To K400.00 
9. Introduce Fixed Deposits  
11. Announce Fixed Deposit Promotion 
 
Requirements: MK30,000.00 Three Months Fixed Deposit Contract. 
 
Prizes:  1st prize –  1 winner and gets 10 bags of fertilizer 
2nd prizes – 10 winners of 5 bags of fertilizer each 
3rd prizes – 50 winners of 2 bags of fertilizer each 
11. Finally, ask if they are going to sell tobacco through our Kasupe 
Deposit Account.  If the answer is yes, thank them and give them 
the card and explain what they should do. Once more thank them 
for giving you an opportunity to explain everything about 
Opportunity Bank. 
3. Present Bank’s Vision, Mission, Core 
Values and Customers Bill of Rights 
7. Announce celebration of five years of 
providing banking service in Malawi 
and changing banking landscape 




4. FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON DEPOSITS  
 
For many people, it sure feels like there’s just not enough money going around, but 
one way to change things is to curb spending habits and learn how to save. There 
are a lot of people who still hide their cash in pillows or tins in their houses. If 
people do not take money to the bank, with cash lying around like that, then there’s 
quite a temptation to make use of it somehow. If one leaves the extra cash in an 
accessible place, one may be more likely to exchange it for Cassava or pumpkin 
leaves. 
 
4.1 WHY SHOULD YOU SAVE? 
 
 To reach financial independence. 
This is the ultimate reason to save because what money can buy, other than 
the requisite material goods and services, is freedom and independence to do 
as you wish with your time.  
 
 To be prepared and anticipate the twists and turns of outrageous fortune.  
This is what an emergency fund is all about: don’t get caught unprepared!  
 
 To realize a known goal somewhere in the horizon. 
If you know you’ll be facing a big expenditure down the road, then get ready for 
it, e.g., weddings, school fees, hospitalisations etc. 
  
 To achieve your dreams. 
This is a warm and fuzzy answer. Many times it’s something luxurious, like a 50 
inch flat screen or a heated pool or a sailboat you always wanted. But it could 
also be something as prudent as eventually just having enough to deem 
yourself ready for the investing or even the business world.  
 
 To grab on to the next big opportunity. 
When the time is ripe, you better be there with the cash. Just the right moment 
can make all the difference and determine just how many 0’s there should be at 
the end of your money totals.  
 
 To prove something to yourself. 
I believe in measuring successes no matter how small, since it really helps with 
building confidence. Conquering the challenge of living within one’s means is 
sure one of those measures. Start saving and bask in the light of a personal 
victory!  
 
4.2 Q: WHAT ARE THE BEST PRACTICES FOR SAVING?  
 
A: Here’s how to save for the near term: 
 
 Know how much money you’d like to put away. 
You can start by knowing how much you can afford to sock away. What is your 




income and stuff it in your savings fund. Better yet, aim for 15% if you can. 
Once it reaches a certain amount to address short term goals, you can then 
divert the 10-15% going forward into investments.  
 
 Choose the type of vehicle to place your money in. 
Find out where you’d like to park your money in. There are many choices which I 
discuss further below but the answer for you lies in how much certain characteristics 
matter to you, such as liquidity and convenience, rate of return and stability.  
 
 Compare financial offerings across the board. 
o available interest rates  
o fees for maintaining such an account  
o minimum investment required to open an account  
o any other terms governing the account such as: how liquid will the funds be 
and are there penalties for withdrawal  
 
 Apply will power. Lots of it. 
Just like weight control, one of the best ways to stop spending money and 
finding enough to save is to go cold turkey. I found that by distracting myself 
and replacing my shopping hobbies (or habits?) with some other activity, I’ve 
managed to ignore the lovely wares that come by my house every month! 
 
 Stop buying impulsively. 
Before buying an item, give it a few days. If you are a fairly busy person or are 
trying to be one, then after a few days, chances are you will no longer 
remember the nonessential item that caught your eye earlier.  
 
 Pay yourself first by automating your savings process. 
What you don’t see won’t tempt you. Set up an automated savings programme 
through Opportunity Bank that will automatically suck your money into a 
savings or money market account or other short term fund.  
 
 Check up on how much you’ve got and keep track of your savings. 
There are many ways to address your savings: you can earmark them for short, 
medium or long term goals. Keep an eye on how much you are saving so that 
once you’ve got enough in short term instruments, you can move on to the next 
step and invest the rest for growth or income, and be able to take a bit more 
risk. 
 
 Where Should I Put My Short Term Savings? 
Before thinking about investing, make sure you have funds parked in safe 
accounts to handle short term needs. 
 
 Fixed Deposit 
These are deposit (Investment) instruments with specific maturities that vary in length 
of time period; At Opportunity Bank, there are: 1 month, 2 months, 3 months,  6 
months, 9 months and12 months contracts. Money is very safe in Fixed Deposit 
Contracts, the more the contract rolls over at maturity, the higher the guaranteed rate 




5. FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON LOANS 
 
5.1 Interest Rates and Mphamvu Loans 
 
5.1.1 Q. WHAT ARE THE INTEREST RATES ON LOANS OPPORTUNITY BANK 
OFFERS? 
 
The ruling interest rates since 1st February 2008. 
 
Kasupe Deposit Accounts     2% 
Savings Deposits     5% 
  
Fixed Deposits  
1 Month Fixed Deposit    5% 
2 Months Fixed Deposit    6% 
3 Months Fixed Deposit    5.5% 
6 Months Fixed Deposit    4% 
                                   9 Months Fixed Deposit    Negotiable 
12 Months Fixed Deposit    Negotiable 
Premium Investment Accounts  
7 Days Premium Investment Account     5% 
21 Days Premium Investment Account    5.5% 
  
 
BASE LENDING RATE  
 
 
  20% 
Mphamvu Loans 3.5% above base 
Payroll loans 9% above base 
 
MICRO   LOANS ( MONTHLY RATES)  
 
 
   
Premium Trust Banks    4.02% 
Monthly Premium Trust Banks    2.92% 
Individual Micro Credit1     3.75% 
Individual Micro Credit 2    2.27% 
                           Individual Micro Credit 3    1.95% 
 
5.1.2 Q:  WHAT IS A MPHAMVU LOAN? 
 
A: Mphamvu loans are loans that are offered to customers who have either a 
savings account, Kasupe Deposit Account or Fixed Deposit in Opportunity 
Bank and want to maintain their investments. 
 
5.1.3 Q:  HOW LONG CAN A CUSTOMER REPAY HIS/HER MPHAMVU LOAN?  
 
A: A customer can choose the repayment terms that suit them. They can either: 
 spread their repayments over any period up to 12 months or  
 make one bullet or balloon repayment after an agreed period particularly if 




5.1.4 Q:  HOW MUCH WILL MY MONTHLY REPAYMENTS BE? OR WHAT ARE 
THEIR ANY REPAYMENT OPTIONS? 
 
A: It really depends on how long a customer chooses to repay back the loan. A 
customer can choose to repay monthly or make a balloon or bullet payment.  
 
5.1.5 Q:  CAN I CHOOSE A DATE FOR MAKING MY REPAYMENTS? 
 
A: Yes, you can choose whatever repayment date you like. 
 
5.1.6 Q:  HOW DO I APPLY? OR HOW CAN ONE GET A MPHAMVU LOAN? 
 
A: A customer can drop in any branch of Opportunity Bank during banking hours 
and operations staff will be delighted to help the customer choose the loan 
product that suits the customer best. Applicants are required to complete an 
application form found at the enquiry desk in the branch. Once the form is 
completed the applicant will be taken to Branch Loans Administrator who will 
ask the applicant to sign a loan agreement.  
 
5.1.7 Q:  HOW QUICKLY WILL I GET MY MONEY?  
 
A: The funds will be transferred into your chosen bank account within 2 hours of 
your signing of the loan agreement. An electronic payment is sent direct to your 
bank account and the money can be withdrawn as soon as the funds reach 
your account. 
 
5.1.8 Q:  HOW LONG WILL IT TAKE TO GET A DECISION ON MY LOAN?  
 
A: As an Opportunity Bank customer, the bank gives an answer a decision within 
minutes, and in all other cases, the likely turnaround period is matter of 
minutes. 
 
5.1.9 Q:  DO I NEED A SAVINGS OR A GUARANTOR TO TAKE OUT A LOAN?  
 
A: As a customer, you need to have either a Savings or Kasupe Deposit Account 
for the loan to be disbursed to. As long as you have a Fixed Deposit, the bank 
will organise a loan to suit your needs. 
 
5.1.10 Q:  ARE THERE ANY EXTRA CHARGES?  
 
A: Yes, there is an arrangement fee of 2.5% for the loan amount which is paid 
upfront and interest that will be charged to the loan at the end of each month. 
 
5.1.11 Q:  HOW MUCH CAN I BORROW?  
 
A: The amount a customer can borrow is limited by the Fixed Deposit amount held 
in the bank.  For example, if a customer has MK10,000.00, can borrow up to 
MK9,000.00. 





A: It has to be repaid, however, if there are some issues, the customer must notify 
the branch manager at least 72 hours. Failure to do so, the bank will assume 
that the customer wants to use the Fixed Deposit to repay the loan. 
 
5.1.13 Q:  HOW CAN A CUSTOMER CHANGE THE LOAN VALUE DATE? 
 
A: A customer must contact the branch manager at least 72 hours before the 
repayment date is due. 
 
5.1.14 Q: HOW MANY TIMES CAN A CUSTOMER BE ALLOWED TO EXTEND THE 
MPHAMVU LOAN? 
 
A: The bank allows the customer to extend the Mphamvu loan as many times as 
possible as long as the Fixed Deposit covers the loan amount and interest. 
 
5.1.15 Q:  WHEN WILL THE LOAN REPAYMENT HIT MY DEPOSIT ACCOUNT? 
 
A: The loan repayment amount will be debited to the Savings or Kasupe account 
on the agreed repayment due date.  
 
5.1.16 Q:  WHAT ARE MY REPAYMENT OPTIONS? 
 
A: A customer has two repayment options to choose from: 
 
 Elect to repay equal amounts every month on a particular date; or 
 Elect to repay once at an agreed date. 
 
5.1.17 Q:  WHAT HAPPENS IF THE CUSTOMER DOES NOT MAKE A REPAYMENT 
ON THE DUE DATE? 
 
A: If customer fails to make a repay on the agreed date, the bank will use the 
Fixed Deposit pledged to repay the loan.   
 
5.1.18 Q:  ONCE THE CUSTOMER PAYS OFF THE CURRENT LOAN, HOW LONG 
WOULD IT TAKE TO ACCESS A RE-loan? 
 
A: On the same day the other loan is fully repaid.  
 
5.1.19 Q:  WHAT IS REQUIRED TO RECEIVE A RE-LOAN? 
 






5.2 Other Types of Loans 
5.2.1 Small and Medium Enterprises Loans 
These are small to medium business loans that Opportunity Bank provides to 
established small to medium entrepreneurial persons operating established 
businesses.  Clients in this category provide various types of collateral and the 
loans range from MK600,000 to MK1,500,000. Repayments range from 4 months 
to 12 months. 
5.2.2 Corporate Loans 
These are large business loans that Opportunity Bank provides to established 
businesses.  Clients in this category provide various types of collateral and the 
loans range from MK1,500,000.00 to several millions.  Repayments range from 4 
months to 12 months. 
5.2.3 Micro Credit 
5.2.3.1 Q:  WHAT IS MICRO ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT? 
 
A: Micro enterprise development is a programme that provides micro loans to  
marginalised and under-served entrepreneurs along with basic business 
training, mentoring, financial planning and leadership development.  It also 
includes financial services such as savings and insurance.  Opportunity Bank 
uses Premium Trust Banks in extending its services to micro entrepreneurs 
who are asked to form groups and the membership should between 7 and 10 
in urban and Semi-urban and between 10 and 15 in rural areas. 
 
5.2.3.2 Q:  CAN OPPORTUNITY BANK ASSIST PEOPLE IN DEEP POVERTY WITH 
LOANS? 
 
A: Opportunity Bank helps people that are in deep poverty but are doing some 
businesses to improve their livelihood so as to meet their families' basic 
needs. 
 
5.2.3.3 Q. WHAT IS A PREMIUM TRUST BANK? 
 
A: A Premium Trust Bank is a group of 7 to 10 poor entrepreneurs in urban 
areas and 10 to 15 in rural areas, who guarantee each other's loans so that 
they can start small businesses and support their families through the loans. 
 
5.2.3.4 WHAT KIND OF BUSINESSES DO OUR CLIENTS OPERATE? 
 
A: They operate very small businesses in the informal sector-food preparation, 
sewing, knitting, weaving, and basket making, for example. Other popular 
activities are retail businesses, where clients buy and resell goods like fruit, 
vegetables, clothing, soap, and hairbrushes. Some are farmers raising 





5.2.3.5 Q:  WHAT TYPE OF LOANS DOES OPPORTNUNITY BANK GIVE TO ITS 
CLIENTS? 
 
A: Opportunity Bank provides several types of loans to different categories of 
customers as follows: 
 
 Micro Credit 
Micro credit is a small business loan that Opportunity Bank provides to 
minor entrepreneurial persons operating petty businesses that are not 
recognised and served by main stream banks because of her or his poverty 
and lack of collateral. Customers are put in groups of between 7 and 10 in 
urban and semi-urban and between 10 and 15 in rural areas and their 
solidarity acts as their collateral. The loans range from MK10,000 to 
MK150,000. Repayments range from 4 months to 12 months. 
 
 Individual Micro Credit 
Individual Micro credit is a small business loan that Opportunity Bank 
provides to established minor entrepreneurial persons operating petty 
businesses that are not recognised and served by main stream banks 
because of the small size of the businesses.  Clients in this category provide 
collateral and the loans range from MK30,00 to MK600,000. Repayments 
range from 4 months to 12 months. 
 
5.2.3.6 Q:  HOW MANY CLIENTS DO YOU SERVE? 
 
A: We currently serve more than 130,000 clients. 
 
5.2.3.7 DO YOUR CLIENTS HAVE A GOOD RECORD OF REPAYING THEIR 
LOANS? 
 
A: Yes. Our clients have maintained an average repayment rate of 98 percent or 
better.  
 
5.2.3.8 Q:  DO YOU CHARGE INTEREST? 
 
A: Our clients are charged commercial interest rates.  This allows us to cover 
our costs and sustain our operations, ensuring that the loan capital is 
maintained to benefit the community for generations.  Experience with lending 
to the economically underserved has shown that they can afford market 
interest rates when other lending terms are favourable.  Moreover in the past, 
their only other means of obtaining credit was through loan sharks, who may 
charge as much as 500-1000 percent annual interest rates. 
 
5.2.3.9 Q:  CAN I ACCESS MY CASH FROM ANY OTHER PLACE OTHER THAN 
OIBM BRANCH NETWORK?  
 
A: Yes through ATMs that accept our smartcards are installed at Malawi Savings 





5.2.3.10 Q:  WHAT HAPPENS TO MY MONEY IN THE SMARTCARD WHEN I LOSE 
IT? 
 
A: Electronic money in the smartcard is never lost.  Once the card is replaced 
the money will be automatically transferred to the new card. 
 
5.2.3.11 Q:  IS IT POSSIBLE FOR ME TO SAVE MONEY WITH OIBM WHEN I 
ALREADY HAVE A SMARTCARD?  
 
A: Yes you can. You can open an account at OIBM and use your existing 
smartcard to link to the new account. 
 
5.2.3.12 Q:  Q. CAN I GET A BUSINESS LOAN TO: 
 
buy the equipment and inventory?  
pay overhead costs such as rent, salaries, etc.?  
have a large enough reserve fund for extra working capital for taking advantage 
of "specials" and for surviving temporary setbacks? 
 
A. Yes  
 
5.2.3.13 Q:  HOW DO I KNOW HOW MUCH FUNDING I NEED?  
 
A. It is essential to know what the initial costs of land, building, fixture, machinery, 
supplies, vehicles, pre-opening expenses and opening inventory and daily 
operating costs, rising inventories, payroll, rent, taxes, advertising, accounts 
receivable, etc. will add up to. 
 
You must prepare a cash flow forecast, which will give you a reasonable 
estimate of your cash requirements for the first 12 months. Some instructions 
and sample forms on preparing cash flow forecasts are available and the 
loans officer will assist you to prepare at no cost.  
 
5.2.3.14 Q:  Q. WHAT ARE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LONG TERM AND SHORT 
TERM FINANCING? 
 
A. Long term financing is used to buy fixed assets such as buildings, machinery 
and fixtures and is paid back in equal monthly instalments and is repaid within 
36 months.  
 
Short term financing is used to pay for current assets such as inventory, 
accounts receivable and other working capital requirements and is repaid 
within 12 months.  
 
Note: It is easier to borrow money by pledging fixed assets, so don't pull all 








5.2.3.15 Q: WHAT DOES OPPORTUNITY BANK NEED TO KNOW ABOUT MY 
BUSINESS? 
 
A. Opportunity Bank needs to know:  
 that you can repay the loan out of normal business activities.  
 the loan is big enough to do the job. 
 cash flow projections for the first 12 months, including repayment plans. 
 projected profit and loss for the first and second year. 
 itemised list of stock and equipment. 
 list of assets you can offer as collateral.  
 short history of your business experience.  
 statement of your personal net worth. 
 
5.2.3.16 Q:  WHAT IS CASH FLOW FORECASTING? 
 
A. cash flow forecasting is your most useful tool to help ensure financial solvency. 
With this forecast you try to predict all the funds that you will receive and 
disburse, and the resulting surplus or deficit. You take into account not only 
the operating and capital budgets, but also the ratio of cash sales to credit 
sales and the paying habits of your customers. To estimate cash outflow you 
must also consider the promptness with which you intend to pay for your 
materials and merchandise. 
 
By making a cash flow analysis you can estimate:  
 
 How much cash will be needed to operate your business each month. 
 When you will need additional short term funds from the bank. 
 When you will have a surplus funds reduce your bank loans. 
    This information can assist you in timing your capital expenditures more 
appropriately, accelerate collection of accounts receivable, ward off a cash 
shortage, plan short term borrowing well in advance and perhaps invest a 
temporary surplus.  
 
5.2.3.17 Q:  WHERE CAN I FIND A SOURCE OF FUNDS AND WHAT TYPE SHOULD I 
APPLY FOR? 
 
The most common source of financing for small business is Opportunity Bank. 
To provide working capital, Opportunity Bank can provide short and long term 
loans against inventory or accounts receivable, etc.  The loans are used for: 
 To assist in establishing your new business  
 To purchase an existing business  
 To purchase new equipment  
 To provide additional working capital. 
 Opportunity Bank also offers a full range of banking services, including 
personal and business deposit and loan accounts, buying and selling of 







5.2.3.18 Q: HOW DO I BENEFIT FROM OPPORTUNITY BANK? 
 
A. Opportunity Bank provides capacity building to its clients so that business 
management skills are properly developed. Experience counts heavily in 
planning, organising, supervision, directing, control, development and 
demonstrated success. 
  
 Arrange your borrowing needs well in advance and keep time on your 
side. With time on your side, Opportunity Bank provides competitive 
terms, such as security margins, interest rates and collateral 
requirements.  
 Risk-taking must be a calculated endeavour not a speculative gamble.  
 Loan Officers will always put your loan request in writing and ask you 
to finalise all loan documents before making any other financial 
commitments.  
 Keep yourself current on the prevailing lending attitudes so that you 
can adjust your own administration of receivables and collections 
accordingly.  
 The only constant human element in your banking relationship is 
yourself.  
 
5.2.3.19 Q:  HOW DO I DEVELOP A GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH MY BRANCH? 
 
To develop a good bank relationship:  
 Find out the services Opportunity Bank offers (location, hours, etc.).  
 Give the bank representative all the information he requires for head office 
approval of the loan. 
 Annually arrange a line of credit to meet peak requirements (but borrow only 
what is necessary, when necessary).  
 Adjust the loan level as actual requirements change.  
 Make realistic repayment commitments. 
 Avoid overdrafts. 
 Be prepared to provide security for the loan. 
 
5.2.3.20 Q:  WHAT ELSE DOES OPPORTUNITY BANK NEED TO KNOW FROM THE 
CUSTOMER? 
 
A. Opportunity Bank will require the following information:  
 
 Amount of loan and period for which is needed. 
 Reason for the loan and a brief history of the company  
 Financial statements of the business for the past two years  
 Details of current financial position including specific data on:  
o Accounts receivable.  





o Fixed assets. 
o Short and long term debt. 
o Special accounts facts about company operations.  
o Facts about management and officers. 
o Details of the project to be financed.  
o Cash flow statements for next 12 months (indicating operating line of 
credit).  
o Projected financial statements (indicating present requirements). 
o The security you're offering. 
 
5.2.3.21 Q:  HOW IS MY APPLICATION EVALUATED BY OPPORTUNITY BANK? 
 
A. Your application will be evaluated on:  
 Your debt paying record.  
 Ratio of debt to net worth.  
 Past earnings and potential future earnings of company.  
 Value and condition of the collateral for security.  
 Your character and credit rating.  
 Your management ability. 
 The fact that you have prepared a business plan. 
 Opportunity Bank will accept the following as collateral:  
o Granting of a floating charge debenture.  
o Personal guarantees of officers of limited companies. 
o Co-signers or guarantors. 
o Pledging of cash surrender value of life insurance. 
o Agreement to restrict salaries, drawing and loan payment of proprietors, 
partners and principal shareholders.  
o Assets such as a vehicle(s), equipment, residence(s), commercial 
buildings. 
 Restrictions imposed by Opportunity Bank on the borrower  are: 
o Maintain working capital at a specified amount.  
o Furnish financial statements, monthly, quarterly or semi-annually.  
o Share structure.  
o Limit dividends. 
o Sell the company or the assets.  
o Create no new debt except as agreed.  
o Provide no guarantees on behalf of others. 
o Restrict drawings or benefits to shareholders. 
 The following will serve as security for term loans:  
o Mortgage on property or chattel. 
o Floating charge debenture on other assets. 
o Personal guarantees. 
 







  Fixed Rate 
With interest rates going down now, this is not a great time to get a fixed 
rate loan, but when interest rates are rising. With a fixed rate loan the 
repayments are worked out at the beginning and never change. That way, 
you can budget and know exactly how much you will pay over the term of 
your loan. 
 
 Variable Rate 
A variable interest rate moves up and down to reflect changes in the 
financial market especially now when interest rates are going down. 
 
Changes in the rate do not affect what you pay each month, but rather how 
long it will take you to repay your loan. If the interest rate drops over the 
term of the loan, you will repay the loan sooner. If the rate increases, it may 
add an additional repayment or two. 
 
Warning: If you do not meet the repayments on your loan, your 
account will go into arrears. This may affect your credit rating. 
 
5.2.3.23 Q:  HOW MANY YEARS CAN I REPAY MY LOAN OVER?  
 
A: You can choose the repayment terms that suit you. You can spread your 
repayments over any period up to 5 years.  
 
5.2.3.24 Q:  HOW MUCH WILL MY MONTHLY REPAYMENTS BE?  
 
A: It really depends on how long you choose to pay back the loan. The shorter 
the term you choose for your loan, the higher the monthly repayments will 
be. The longer you take to repay, the smaller your monthly payments.  
 
5.2.3.25 Q:  WHAT ARE THE FLEXIBLE OPTIONS THAT YOU OFFER?  
 
A: Balloon or Bulk Payment – Repay once after the sale of Agricultural produce 
or as agreed. Choose to pay fortnightly and monthly. 
 
5.2.3.26 Q: CAN I CHOOSE THE DATE I MAKE MY REPAYMENTS? 
 
A: Choose the method you find most convenient. Whichever method you select, 
either fortnightly or monthly and you can choose whatever repayment date 
you like. 
 
5.2.3.27 Q:  HOW DO I APPLY?  
 
A: Just drop in any Opportunity Bank branch and we will be delighted to help you 
choose the loan product that suits you best. 
 





A: The funds will be transferred into your chosen bank account within 24 hours of 
you receiving written confirmation from us that your loan has been accepted. 
An electronic payment is sent direct to your bank account and the money can 
be withdrawn as soon as the funds reach your account. 
 
 
5.2.3.29 Q:  HOW LONG WILL IT TAKE TO GET A DECISION ON MY LOAN?  
 
A: As Opportunity Bank customer, we'll give you a decision in minutes, and in all 
other cases, the likely turnaround period is approximately 24 hours. 
 
5.2.3.30 Q: DO I NEED SAVINGS OR A GUARANTOR TO TAKE OUT A LOAN? 
  
A: You don't need have savings built up. As long as you can show that you're 
able to make the repayments, we'll organise a loan to suit your needs.  
However, we would expect you to build savings thereafter. 
 
5.2.3.31 Q:  ARE THERE ANY EXTRA CHARGES?  
 
A: With Opportunity Bank all fees are explained to the customer by the loans 
officer before the loan is disbursed.  
 
5.2.3.32 Q:  WHAT DOES CREDIT INSURANCE COVER?  
 
A: Opportunity Bank takes credit life insurance for all loans the bank offers its 
clients. 
 
5.2.3.33 Q:  WHAT DOES CREDIT INSURANCE NOT COVER?  
 
A: As with all life insurance policies, there are certain circumstances it does not 
cover.  If a client dies within 14 days of collect the loan funds, the bank 





6. SELF-ESTEEM - SELLING MPHAMVU LOANS ROLE PLAY 
 
Method: Individual and Group Activity 
Time:  10 minutes 
Materials:  1 Envelope per group member. 
 
Objectives: 
 To demonstrate that all participants have creative talent.  
 To stimulate individual powers of persuasion and communication.   
 
Steps to Follow: 
 
a) Participants are going to give a sales presentation to other participants.  
b) Each participant will be given a Fixed Deposit and will have an opportunity to 
sell the minimum of 3 Mphamvu loans to other participants. After listening to 
each presentation and watching the role play, other participants will 
complete the evaluation form for the presenter and submit to the Facilitator. 
The salesperson who sells more Mphamvu Loans wins the game. 
c) The forms will be analysed and the results will be given to HR for future 
reference. 
 
Reflection should be based on the following questions: 
 
 Who was the most persuasive?   
 Who was the most creative? Why? 
 What techniques did the successful salespersons use to make you want to 
obtain Mphamvu loan?  






Poor Good Very 
Good 
Excellent 
1.  How did he explain the products to 
customers? 
     
2.  How persuasive was he?      
3.  How creative was he?      
4.  How did he go through the selling 
steps?  
     
5.  How did he close the deal?       





7. BRANCH MANAGERS’ RESPONSIBILITIES 
7.1 Product Knowledge 
 
It is the Branch Manager’s responsibility to ensure that: 
 All the staff including Promotion Assistants have good knowledge in all 
products and services the bank offers its customers.  
 Product Review Training Programmes are in place at the branch and that all 
members of staff are taken through each and every product and service. 
 Product Champions are identified to lead in training other members of staff 
particularly new staff. 
 Promotion Assistants have strong knowledge in Bank’s: 
 Vision 
 Mission 
 Core Values 
 Customers’ Bill of Rights 
 Free Processing of Tobacco 
 Tobacco proceeds are credited to customers’ within two days 
 Kasupe Deposit Accounts 
 Five Years Celebration and Reduction of Smartcard Price 
 Fixed Deposit Contracts 
 Fixed Deposit Promotion and all prizes 
 Mphamvu Loans 
 
7.2 Monitoring and Supervision of Field Based Promotion Assistants  
7.2.1 Reporting 
Field Based Promotion Assistants (FBPAs) will report directly to the Branch 
Managers of their designated branches.   
7.2.2 Engagement of Community Based Volunteers 
Local communities will be actively involved in the Bank’s promotion programme. 
This promotion programme can succeed only if Branch Managers engage local 
communities and opinion leaders in this noble programme. 
7.2.3 Proposed Approaches 
 
a) Introduction of the Field Based Promotion Assistants to communities 
 
Branch Managers will introduce FBPA to local communities and opinion 
leaders such as chiefs, Agriculture Extension Officers, Head teachers of some 
key schools, Health Surveillance Officers, and all TAMA councillors. This would 
help the FBPA to gain trust and relate more easily with members of the 
community. It is advisable that one meeting should be organised in each area 





b) Use of Volunteers 
 
 Through local leaders, Branch Managers will identity one male and one 
female volunteer in each target village. 
 The volunteers will be provided basic training by Branch Managers in the 
products and services villagers are targeted to buy at this time of the year. 
The bank’s basic information should be in the following: 
 Vision 
 Mission 
 Core Values 
 Customers’ Bill of Rights 
 Free Processing of Tobacco 
 Tobacco proceeds are credited to customers’ within two days 
 Kasupe Deposit Accounts 
 Five Years Celebration and Reduction of Smartcard Price 
 Fixed Deposit Contracts 
 Fixed Deposit Promotion and all prizes 
 Mphamvu Loans 
 
 Volunteers will be assisting in mobilising people in their localities and 
acting as the link between the community and our FBPA.  
 These volunteers will in addition be very instrumental in monitoring 
performance of the FBPA as well as spreading word of mouth to their 
neighbours.  
 Branch Managers will be holding monthly meetings with all volunteers to 
get feedback, energise and motivate them. To motivate volunteers, the 
bank will pay MK1,000.00 as seating allowance whenever meetings are 
held.  





We are preparing serialised cards that Branch Managers will give to their 
FBPA.  The procedure is: 
 
 FBPA will be giving such cards to prospective clients who will have shown 
real willingness to open Kasupe Deposit Accounts with the Bank. 
 Each card will have a reference number, the branch will enter the customer 
name and customer identification number in the register alongside the card 
reference number.   
 The Branch Manager will pay an extra MK500 for any extra 10 customers 
who have opened the accounts because of the FBPA’s effort.  This will be 
calculated only if the targeted has been exceeded and will be in the 






8. TOBACCO DEPOSITS ANNUAL TRENDS AND BRANCH TARGETS  
 
 In 2005 we raised just over USD300,000.  
 
 In 2006 we raised just over USD1.3 million. 
 
 In 2007 we raised in excess of USD13 million.   
 
 In 2008, we are targeting to raise from Tobacco Farmers alone in excess of Fifty 
(50) million United States Dollars as follows: 
 
BRANCHES NEW FARMERS AMOUNT USD 
Area 25 1,000   5,000,000 
Kasungu 2,000 10,000,00 
Lilongwe 1,500   7,500,000 
Limbe 1,500   7,500,000 
Malangalanga 1,000   5,000,000 
Mponela 1,000   5,000,000 
Mobile 1,000   5,000,000 
Mzuzu 1,000   5,000,000 





9. FIELD BASED PROMOTION ASSISTANTS BUDGET 
 
BUDGET FOR FIELD BASED PROMOTION 
ASSISTANTS 
 
      
Area Quantity/ 









Mponela 16 50             1,500                  500                   24,000  
Ntchisi 16 25             1,500                  500                   24,000  
Dowa 16 25             1,500                  500                   24,000  
Madisi 16 30             1,500                  500                   24,000  
Msundwe 16 25             1,500                  500                   24,000  
Kamwendo 16 25             1,500                  500                   24,000  
Mchinji 16 50             1,500                  500                   24,000  
Nkhoma 16 30             1,500                  500                   24,000  
Chimbiya 16 25             1,500                  500                   24,000  
Dedza 16 50             1,500                  500                   24,000  
Malomo 16 25             1,500                  500                   24,000  
Jenda 16 25             1,500                  500                   24,000  
Mperembe 16 25             1,500                  500                   24,000  
Mbalachanda 16 25             1,500                  500                   24,000  
Enukweni 16 25             1,500                  500                   24,000  
Santhe 16 25             1,500                  500                   24,000  
Thondwe 16 25             1,500                  500                   24,000  
      
SUB TOTAL  510                                         408,000  
      
Volunteers Monthly Allowance 1,000   
      
For any extra 10 customers the Field Promotion Assistant will get a bonus of MK500.00 
      
Funding will be taken from Mphamvu Loan promotion budget line because Mphamvu  
Loans will be promoted along side Fixed Deposits.   
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